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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this dissertation, I argue that Stephen Skowronek’s theory of political time can 
be used as analytic to better understand the rhetorical opportunities and constraints for 
presidents and presidential candidates. In particular, I look to Ronald Reagan as a case 
study: as a president who came on the heels of the end of FDR’s liberal era, Reagan set 
the tone for a new presidential regime, consisting of particular rhetorical and policy 
commitments that were all shaped through his neoliberal economic policy. After 
identifying the rhetorical hallmarks of the neoliberal era as constructed by Reagan, I 
analyze the rhetorical efforts of his successor, regime articulation president George H.W. 
Bush, to negotiate the changing domestic and international atmosphere within the 
rhetorical and policy constraints of Reagan’s neoliberalism. Finally, I identify and 
analyze the preemptive efforts of Bill Clinton and Ross Perot during the 1992 election as 
they attempted to renegotiate key aspects of Reagan’s rhetorical and policy 
commitments to win the presidency.  
 The analysis of each individual’s rhetoric is aided by attention to both discursive 
and visual rhetoric: the rhetorical interiors and exteriors of regime discourse. The 
analysis of Reagan’s neoliberal regime emergence begins with the 1964 primary run 
against Barry Goldwater and continues through his presidency. Analysis of Bush begins 
with his 1980 primary election contest against Ronald Reagan and culminates in the 
1992 election. Both Clinton and Perot were analyzed using stump speeches and 
advertisements from the primaries through the 1992 presidential election. For each 
 iii 
 
individual, analysis of Time magazine covers provided visual confirmation or rejection 
of each rhetor’s rendition of neoliberal regime commitments. In the end, while Reagan 
was successful in establishing the rhetorical and policy commitments of the Neoliberal 
regime, Bush was unable to perform those commitments to the satisfaction of the base; 
as a result, Clinton’s rendition of the neoliberal regime, which he presented as a “third 
way” during the 1992 presidential election, succeeded in winning the presidency.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During the height of the 1992 Republican primaries, president George H.W. 
Bush traveled to Dover, New Hampshire to deliver a series of speeches to secure the 
Republican nomination from challenger Pat Buchanan. While, as Bush recounted, the 
entire trip seemed “off,” it was his address to Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
employees that caught the attention of both his campaign staff and the media. During the 
course of the speech, Bush wavered between criticizing Congress for not letting him 
govern, the media for being “smart alecks,” and the people for failing to understand the 
complexity of the economy. Toward the end of the speech, Bush compared himself to 
“Lincoln, going on his knees in times of trial,” and entreated the audience, “. . . don’t cry 
for me, Argentina.”1 Following the trip, Bush was shown on the cover of Time magazine 
as weak and receding in relevance despite being engaged in “the fight of his life.”2 
White House Communications Director David Demarest demanded that the campaign 
managers keep Bush on message because the media were picking up on his odd turns of 
phrase, calling his speeches “word salad.” A bigger problem than staying on message 
existed for Bush, though, for as a number of campaign and White House employees have 
argued, the president did not have a consistent message. Caught between the interests of 
the party, his own convictions regarding governance, and the looming shadow of 
Reagan’s presidency, Bush was mired in a rhetorical situation that few presidents face. 
1 Bush, George. H.W. “Address to Mutual Liberty Employees at Dover.” 
2 Time, “The Fight of His Life,” August 24, 1992. 
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As his own rhetorical performance and subsequent visual representations of Bush’s 
presidency (such as that on the cover of Time) indicate, Bush faced a rhetorical situation 
that required he carefully manage the expectations of the Reagan legacy while 
continuing to be responsive to the swiftly changing international and domestic situations.  
 A number of rhetorical scholars have explored why George Bush has largely 
been considered a rhetorical failure and an unsuccessful president. These studies have 
examined his economic, foreign policy, religious, and domestic policy rhetoric at 
length.3 What many of these studies conclude, is what Marty Medhurst succinctly 
argues: “The specter of Reagan, and particularly Reagan’s skills at public 
communication, seemed to haunt Bush from beginning to end.”4 Certainly, the Reagan 
presidency placed constraints on Bush, many of them rhetorical. But presidents are 
always judged according to their predecessors. Why, then, the focus on Reagan as 
Bush’s main obstacle? Steven Skowronek’s theory of political time sheds some light on 
this question. 
 Skowronek’s body of work, which focuses on the issue of presidential leadership, 
can help rhetorical scholars to better understand how presidential rhetorical authority is 
enabled and constrained by the “specter” of presidents such as Reagan. Skowronek 
contends that the warrants for presidential authority are affected by what he calls 
“political time,” a recurrent pattern of presidential authority that results in political 
                                                
3 See The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush, ed. Martin Medhurst (Texas 
A&M University Press, 2006). 
4 Martin Medhurst, “Why Rhetoric Matters: George H.W. Bush in the White House,” in 
The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush, ed. Martin Medhurst (Texas 
A&M University Press, 2006), 5. 
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“regimes,” created by presidents who find themselves in the right place, at the right time, 
with the right resources: presidents such as Reagan. These individuals have the ability to 
reset the narrative cycle of political time, forging a new political regime in opposition to 
the old. For example, Reagan established his claims to presidential authority by arguing 
that the existing regime (the “Liberal Regime” initiated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt) 
was no longer a viable system. By critiquing the existing regime and providing a new 
ideological perspective on government, Reagan was able to forge a new regime, 
supported by a new set of coalitions. Reagan had effectively reconstructed the political 
scene from the ashes of his predecessor.  
 We might ask: what does this mean for George Bush? According to Skowronek’s 
theory, there are four distinctive roles that presidents occupy within political time: 
reconstruction, articulation, preemption, and disjunction. Reconstruction presidents, as 
previously discussed, create a new political regime and forge new coalitions in 
opposition to the old; articulation presidents are representatives of the dominant regime 
and continue to forward its commitments; preemption presidents are opposed to the 
dominant regime and attempt to chip away at its power; and disjunction presidents 
represent the dominant regime as it becomes enervated, or sapped of power.5 Each of 
these roles creates particular opportunities and constraints for the presidents who inhabit 
them.  
Within political time, Bush occupied a specific type of articulation role: that of 
the “orthodox innovator.” Gaining the presidency on the heels of the reconstructive 
                                                
5 Skowronek, Steven. Presidential Rhetoric in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal. 
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president (Reagan), he was placed in the difficult position of turning the “predecessor’s 
legacy into a workable system of government.” This process, he admits, lacks the 
rhetorical appeal of reconstruction. Certainly, then, Bush’s role as an orthodox innovator 
following Ronald Reagan’s regime reconstruction affected Bush’s performance of 
presidential authority and the public’s reception of those performances. As Skowronek 
argues, political time has a “narrative structure” that presidents must manage in order to 
make the case for the exercise of presidential leadership. Presidents must reckon with the 
work of their predecessors and rhetorically situate themselves within the existing 
narrative of the affiliated regime, as it is ascending, maintaining, or waning. Skowronek 
explains: 
. . . presidents will have a rudimentary understanding of their political identity as 
affiliated or opposed to the basic commitments of ideology and interest 
institutionalized by the last reconstruction . . . they will make a contingent 
evaluation of the current prospects for action on that relationship.6 
 
Thus, the relative strength of the regime will lend itself to particular “stories” that 
establish the warrants for presidential authority: a strong regime will lend itself to 
narratives of presidential authority that accept and extend the regime’s commitments. 
Likewise, a presidential candidate during a moment of regime weakening will be more 
successful situating him or herself as an agent of change rather than a continuation of the 
established order. This becomes especially clear during moments of transition within the 
regime: as John Murphy has argued, “Presidential authority becomes increasingly 
complex in moments of succession.”7 
                                                
6 Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, xv. 
7 Murphy, “Crafting the Kennedy Legacy,” 578. 
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The complexity of presidential authority in moments of succession calls for the 
question: how is presidential authority passed on to regime successors? In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to pay close attention to the regime’s rhetoric 
beginning with its first moments of emergence during presidential elections, a task 
Skowronek does not undertake. This dissertation argues that by first tracing the regime’s 
rhetoric as it was constructed and attending to its circulation across a series of regime 
transitions, we might better understand how the warrants for presidential authority are 
constructed, circulated, and transferred from president to president. For example, we 
might consider how Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric of regime construction enabled and 
constrained particular rhetorical practices for George Bush throughout his presidency, as 
well as during subsequent moments of transition, such as the 1992 presidential election.  
In this dissertation, I make two main claims: first, I argue that there is a rhetoric 
of political time. The rhetoric of political time for a particular regime relies on the 
circulation and rearticulation of key texts that first emerged during the previous regime’s 
decline. As presidential rhetors affiliated with the dominant regime attempt to exercise 
their presidential authority, they are bound to the commitments of the dominant regime 
and must manage the discourse of the regime in ways that respond to domestic and 
international exigencies as they arise. Relatedly, I demonstrate that each role in political 
time (repudiation, reconstruction, articulation, and preemption) has its own set of 
rhetorical resources that individuals ideally engage in order to manage the regime’s 
constitutive legacies during their moment in political time. 
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Second, I contend that using the rhetoric of political time as an analytic 
framework to understand presidential rhetorical leadership provides scholars with a more 
nuanced means of engaging in thick contextual analysis of presidential rhetoric, 
including the rhetoric of presidential campaigns. That is, by closely attending to the 
constitutive legacies of a regime over time, it becomes possible to more accurately 
reconstruct the context of presidential rhetorical texts and provide reasoned judgments of 
their efficacy. As part of the effort to reconstruct a text’s rhetorical and historical 
context, I argue that doing thick contextual analysis requires attention not only to the 
textual discourses of a regime, but also the visual rhetorical responses to a president’s 
regime management, such as the images of Bush on the cover of Time following his 
stump speech debacle in New Hampshire. Such texts, I argue, are,part of understanding 
presidential rhetoric’s  “rhetorical exteriors” and serve as visual rhetorical confirmation 
or rejection of a president’s regime management and provide insights into public 
perceptions of a president’s rhetorical authority.8 
In an effort to better understand Bush’s predicament and what it can teach us 
about the exercise of presidential rhetorical authority, the remainder of this chapter will 
proceed as follows: first I will provide a review of the literature on presidential rhetorical 
authority in order to make the argument that understanding presidential rhetorical 
authority requires attention to its constitutive functions. I continue by offering thick 
contextualism and constitutive rhetorical history as a rhetorical method by which it is 
                                                
8 See James Jasinski and Jennifer Mercieca. “Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics,” in 
Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Michael Hogan (eds.) The Handbook of Rhetoric and 
Public Address. West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. (2010). 
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possible to trace the layers of discourse that enable the rhetorical exercise of presidential 
authority. More specifically, I point toward constitutive legacies as a theoretical 
perspective that can guide the process of thick contextualism. Embedded within a 
regime’s constitutive legacies, I argue, are potential narratives that enable and constrain 
rhetorical practice for regime representatives and challengers alike. In order to sharpen 
the methodological focus on presidential authority, I explain how political time can serve 
as an analytical framework that draws our attention to the workings of a regime’s 
constitutive legacies during different moments in the regime. To that end, I define what I 
call the rhetorics of repudiation, reconstruction, articulation, and preemption. Finally, I 
provide summaries for each analysis chapter, including Ronald Reagan’s Liberal regime 
repudiation and Neoliberal regime construction, George Bush’s Neoliberal orthodox 
innovation, and finally, Bill Clinton and Ross Perot’s Neoliberal regime preemption.   
Understanding Presidential Authority 
Presidential authority is influenced by a president’s use or misuse of the “bully 
pulpit.” As Richard Neustadt argues, the president “does not get action without 
argument” and “presidential power is the power to persuade.”9 Similarly, a robust line of 
inquiry examines rhetorical leadership as it relates to the president’s appeals to the 
people rather than Congress. In Jeffrey Tulis’s 1987 book, The Rhetorical Presidency, 
Tulis posited that the presidency underwent a major change as a result of Woodrow 
                                                
9 Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York, NY: 
Wiley & Sons, 1960. Print. 
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Wilson’s “doctrine of popular leadership.”10 Following Wilson, Tulis argued, presidents 
ceased appealing to Congress and instead began the practice of “going public”: directly 
appealing to the people. These appeals to the public were often attempts to circumvent 
Congress and gain popular support for the President’s agenda.11 As a result of Wilson’s 
doctrine of popular leadership, a “second constitution” went into effect that legitimized 
and perhaps even created a requirement for presidential popular leadership. However, as 
Terri Bimes argues, this put the president in an awkward situation as he was 
“simultaneously expected to be the head of state representing a stable constitutional 
order and a popular politician swaying the public to support new initiatives.”12 This shift, 
then, changed not only the rhetorical practices of individual presidents, but also the 
public’s expectations for the institution of the presidency itself as the president was 
expected to persuade the people of his constitutional authority and gain support for 
particular pieces of legislation. 
Presidential authority, as a number of scholars have argued, is linked to a 
president’s understanding of kairos, or the opportune moment. That is, in order to 
successfully perform the presidency and influence the public, presidents must understand 
the contexts within which their discourse intervenes. These scholars argue that a number 
of situational factors contribute to a president’s ability to successfully enact the 
rhetorical presidency. These situational factors involve public expectations for particular 
                                                
10 Tulis, Jeffrey. The Rhetorical Presidency, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987: 132. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Bimes, Terri. “Understanding the Rhetorical Presidency,” in George C. Edwards III 
and William G. Howell (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the American 
Presidency, Oxford: Oxford University Press (208-231), 2009, p. 211. 
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forms of speech, public perceptions regarding the exercise of presidential authority, and 
the myriad influences of media on public understanding of the presidency. 
Studies related to public expectations for presidential speech focus primarily on 
generic expectations for presidential address. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell argue that genres of presidential speech, such as inaugural addresses and state 
of the union addresses, provide the president with the opportunity to constitute the 
people, rehearse national values, make policy recommendations, and enact the 
presidential role.13 The expectations for such speeches, Campbell and Jamieson argue, 
have evolved over time as previous presidents set the standard and established public 
expectations for particular moments. By employing the requisite rhetorical form in 
response public expectations regarding a particular context, presidents have the 
opportunity to perform the role of the presidency through public discourse.14 
Public perceptions regarding the exercise of presidential authority also impose 
constraints on the rhetorical presidency. While the rhetorical presidency model posits 
that presidents increasingly appeal to the public, the existence of the “unitary executive” 
                                                
13 Jamieson, Kathleen Hall and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell. Presidents Creating the 
Presidency: Deeds Done in Words. 
14 See also Stephen Browne, “’The Circle of Our Felicities’: Thomas Jefferson’s First 
Inaugural Address and the Rhetoric of Nationhood,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 
5:3 (2002), 409-438; Mark P. Moore, “Reagan’s Quest for Freedom in the 1987 
State of the Union Address,” Western Journal of Speech Communication, 53 
(Winter 1989), 52-65; and Davis W. Houck and Mihaela Nocasian, “FDR’s First 
Inaugural Address: Text, Context, and Reception,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 5:4 
(2002), 649-678; and John M. Murphy, “A Time of Shame and Sorrow: Robert 
F. Kennedy and the American Jeremiad,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 76 
(1990), 401-414.  
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presents challenges to this model.15 Using institutional means such as executive orders 
and signing statements, presidents have the opportunity to influence policy without the 
assistance of the public. These practices, Vanessa Beasley argues, may make the 
“strategic need to ‘go public’ on public policy” less urgent and highlight the need to 
attend to “institutional arrangements” both within and from the White House.16 Public 
opinion regarding presidential use of signing statements and executive orders is mixed at 
best, and can be seen as a circumvention of checks and balances.17 However, the need 
for presidents to lead the public, rhetorically or administratively, is linked to a larger 
issue of public expectations regarding presidential leadership, which Justin Vaughn and 
Jennier Mercieca have called “heroic expectations.” As they argue, the kinds of promises 
presidents must make to legitimize their candidacy for office has resulted in the public 
expecting more and more action from the president, despite existing institutional 
constraints.18 
Adding to the public’s unrealistic expectations of the president are media, whose 
horse-race election coverage and focus on polls often reduce presidential address to their 
                                                
15 See Kenneth Mayer, “Going Alone: The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,” 
Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency, 427-564; Richard W. Waterman, 
“Assessing the Unilateral Presidency,” Oxford Handbook of the American 
Presidency, 477-500. 
16 Beasley, Vanessa. “The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the Unitary Executive: 
Implications for Presidential Rhetoric on Public Policy.” Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs, 13:1 (2010), 29. 
17 For example, the public firestorm that erupted regarding Obama’s immigration policy. 
18 Mercieca, Jennifer and Justin Vaughn. “Barack Obama and the Rhetoric of Heroic 
Expectations,” in Heroic Expectations: Establishing the Obama Presidency, ed 
Justin Vaughn and Jennifer Mercieca. College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2012.  
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most truncated audio and visual forms: sound bites and image bites.19 In addition to 
reporting sound and image bites of presidential address, news media also offer visual 
rhetorical snapshots of the presidency via images and video clips. These visual rhetorical 
discourses, Keith Erickson argues, can be thought of as performance fragments: images 
and texts “assembled to illuminate” a president’s political influence. These images and 
help to constitute the president’s relationship with the people and “recount, retell, or 
reshape society’s cultural and political realities.”20 Although presidents may attempt to 
control the kinds of presidential images that circulate throughout American culture, such 
as Barack Obama’s White House flickr stream, mass media continue to provide a source 
of presidential images that have journalistic legitimacy.21  
                                                
19 See Jody C. Baumgartner, Jonathan S. Morris, and Natasha L. Walth. "The Fey Effect 
Young Adults, Political Humor, and Perceptions of Sarah Palin in the 2008 
Presidential Election Campaign." Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 1 (2012): 95-
104; Martin Gilens, Lynn Vavreck, and Martin Cohen. "The mass media and the 
public's assessments of presidential candidates, 1952–2000." Journal of Politics 
69, no. 4 (2007): 1160-1175; Kiku Adatto. Sound bite democracy: Network 
evening news presidential campaign coverage, 1968 and 1988. Joan Shorenstein 
Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University, 1990; Erik P. Bucy and Maria Elizabeth 
Grabe. "Taking television seriously: A sound and image bite analysis of 
presidential campaign coverage, 1992–2004." Journal of Communication 57, no. 
4 (2007): 652-675. For more on image bites, see E.P. Bucy and M.E. Grabe, 
“Taking Television Seriously: A Sound and Image Bite Analysis of Presidential 
Campaign Coverage 1992-2004.” Journal of communication, 57 (2007), 652-
675.  
20 Erickson, Keith V. “Presidential Rhetoric’s Visual Turn: Performance Fragments and 
the Politics of Illusionism.” Communication Monographs, 67: 2 (2000), 138-157. 
21 See Cara Finnegan, "Picturing the Presidents: Obama and the Visual Politics of White 
House Art" in The Rhetoric of Heroic Expectations: Establishing the Obama 
Presidency, ed. Justin Vaughn and Jennifer R. Mercieca (Texas A&M University 
Press, 2014). 
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In addition to journalistic media outlets, entertainment media also influence 
public perceptions of the presidency. For example, Shawn and Trevor Parry-Giles argue 
that “The West Wing” influences the way people think about the presidency in terms of 
issues such as character personality, and credibility: what these authors call 
“presidentiality.”22 These mediated and fictional representations of the presidency 
influence the public’s expectations for presidential performance and provide presidents 
with rhetorical resources for executive action.  
Because of the myriad situational issues that enable and constrain the exercise of 
presidential authority, successful presidential leadership is linked to persuasion, or 
rhetorical leadership. Leroy Dorsey defines this as “the process of discovering, 
articulating, and sharing the available means of influence in order to motivate human 
agents in a particular situation.”23 In addition to successfully engaging the available 
means of persuasion, presidential rhetorical leadership has also been linked to the 
concept of prudence, a specific type of rhetorical performance that represents a 
president’s ethos and requires that presidents be able to enact the “sometimes conflicting 
virtues of thought and character—to understand how, when, and in what manner or 
balance being strategic and saintly, reasonable and righteous.”24 In order to be perceived 
as a successful rhetorical leader, the president must be capable of enacting “the artful 
                                                
22 Parry-Giles, Shawn and Trevor Parry-Giles, The Prime Time Presidency: The West 
Wing and U.S. Nationalism (University of Illinois Press, 2006). 
23 Dorsey, Leroy. “Introduction” in The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership, ed. 
Leroy G. Dorsey. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press (2002) p. 9. 
24 Ibid, 13.  
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balance of superior decision-making skills and the exhibition of the requisite 
character.”25  
Ethos is also related to a speaker’s ability to manage myriad and competing 
rhetorical traditions. S.M. Halloran contends that  
…ethos, underlines the importance of the orator’s mastery of the cultural 
heritage; through the power of his logical and emotional appeals, he became a 
kind of living embodiment of the cultural heritage, a voice of such apparent 
authority that the word spoken by this person was the word of communal 
wisdom, a word to be trusted for the weight of the person who spoke for it and 
the tradition he spoke for.26 
 
When presidents perform in a manner that demonstrates ethos, they weave together the 
different threads of ideology, policy, and “communal wisdom” in order to demonstrate 
their mastery of the nation’s cultural heritage as it exists in relation to pressing events. 
Presidents demonstrate ethos by contextualizing the cultural heritage of the nation and 
finding ways to situate the American people within those parameters. As a number of 
scholars argue, presidential rhetoric has a potent constitutive function that aids in the 
exercise of presidential authority.  
 The study of presidential rhetoric’s constitutive function is derived from Maurice 
Charland’s germinal essay on constitutive rhetoric. In it, Charland demonstrates how 
proponents of Quebec’s political sovereignty called into being the peuple québécois, an 
identity that “would legitimate the constitution of a sovereign Quebec state.”27 He 
                                                
25 Ibid, 10. 
26 Halloran, S.M. “Tradition and Theory in Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62 
(1976), 234-241. 
27 Charland, Maurice. “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois.” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 73:2 (1987), 133-150. 
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continues, arguing that “claims for a Quebec sovereignty base themselves upon the 
asserted existence of a particular type of subject, the “Québécois’” who are called forth  
. . . as political subjects through a process of identification in rhetorical narratives 
that “always already” presume the constitution of subjects . . . a subject is not 
“persuaded” to support sovereignty. Support for sovereignty is inherent to the 
subject position addressed by souverainiste (pro-sovereignty) rhetoric because of 
. . . a series of narrative ideological effects.28 
 
This group of people, Charland argued, did not “exist in nature, but only within a 
discursively constituted history.”29 Or to put it another way, the peuple québécois were 
called forth through rhetoric and the process of rhetorical identification. Similarly, 
Benedict Anderson has discussed “imagined communities” when discussing the idea of 
the nation. As Anderson argues, “the nation. . . is an imagined political community” 
because “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.”30 Constitutive rhetoric as used by presidents can thus be thought of as 
a kind of rhetorical imagining: presidential discourse can enable individuals to imagine 
themselves, to constitute themselves as part of a group that did not exist before the 
rhetorical imagining began. Constitutive rhetoric is the process by which the imagined 
community is constructed. The presidency is a place where particularly potent forms of 
constitutive rhetoric work to help disparate American citizens understand themselves not 
just as people geographically located in the United States, but as connected parts of the 
whole that is the rhetorical construct of the United States.   
                                                
28 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 134. 
29 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 136. 
30 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities, 6. 
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Constitutive rhetoric is an important component of presidential authority, as a 
number of scholars have argued. For example, Mary Stuckey and Frederick Antczak 
point out that presidential rhetoric has a constitutive function that “plays a major role in 
the construction and continuous reconstruction of political perceptions” that help the 
public to understand the president’s role and authority.31 Extending this notion, Vanessa 
Beasley argues that chief executives have historically “used the bully pulpit to ‘form a 
mass’ out of an increasingly diversifying American people,” indicating that presidential 
rhetoric can be used to constitute the people as well.32 In other words, there exist within 
presidential rhetoric moments where presidents use their rhetorical authority to subtly 
reinforce “the audience’s presumed collective identity as national subjects.”33  
Continuing the discussion of presidential rhetoric’s constitutive power, Stuckey 
argues that “differing elements of discourse and constitutive claims come together to 
forge our national identities” within presidential rhetoric.34 More specifically, Stuckey 
demonstrates how the processes of inclusion and exclusion are enacted through 
presidential rhetoric because the institution of the presidency has the power to define. By 
closely analyzing specific instances of presidential discourse that exclude specific 
                                                
31 Stuckey, Mary and Frederick J. Antczak. “The Rhetorical Presidency: Deepening 
Vision, Widening Exchange.” Communication Yearbook, 21 (1998), 405-441. 
32 Beasley, Vanessa. You, the People: American National Identity in Presidential 
Rhetoric. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press (2004). 
33 Ibid, 9. 
34 Stuckey, Mary. Defining Americans. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 
(2004), p. 3. 
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groups, Stuckey draws attention to an affordance of the institution itself, articulating 
how presidential rhetoric functions to define who can be “American.”35  
Constitutive rhetoric used by presidents is not always successful, though. 
Kenneth Zagacki explores failed constitutive rhetoric in his discussion of George W. 
Bush’s discourse concerning the military occupation and democratization of Iraq. 
Zagacki concludes that Bush’s rhetoric, in which he attempted to “call forth” an 
audience of democratized Iraqi subjects resulted in a number of “constitutive paradoxes” 
because the “collective democratic ‘we’” does not always recognize foreign subjects for 
who they are, especially a mixed variety of fragmented ‘peoples’ such as the people of 
Iraq.”36 In attempting to “create identification between Americans and the Iraqis,” Bush 
unwittingly “contributed to conditions that were diametrically opposed to democratic 
transformation.”37 Constitutive rhetoric is thus part and parcel of a president’s enactment 
of rhetorical authority. By using constitutive rhetoric wisely, presidents can call forth the 
people to support any number of issues. How, though, do presidents judge a wise use of 
constitutive rhetoric? How might they come to comprehend the rhetorical resources that 
will help them to call the people forth? John Murphy argues, “The past is always present 
in American politics and forms a potent base for the creation of political authority.”38 
                                                
35 For more on presidential rhetoric’s definitional function, see David Zarefsky. 
“Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition.” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 34:3 (2004), 607-619.  
36 Zagacki, Kenneth S. “Constitutive Rhetoric Reconsidered: Constitutive Paradoxes in 
G.W. Bush’s Iraq War Speeches.” Western Journal of Communication, 71:4 
(2007), 272-293. 
37 Zagacki, “Constitutive Rhetoric Reconsidered,” 272. 
38 Murphy, John M. “Crafting the Kennedy Legacy.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 3: 4 
(2000), 577-601. 
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Likewise, Skowronek points to a “rudimentary understanding” presidents have regarding 
“their political identity as affiliated or opposed” to the dominant regime within political 
time.39 We can infer, then, that prior discourses are part of a president’s available 
rhetorical resources. Indeed, a number of scholars have examined at length how 
presidents draw from past political discourses to exercise their rhetorical authority. But 
in order to understand how a president’s use of these rhetorical resources operates in 
response to the existing regime (whether ascendant, dominant, or waning), some method 
of rhetorical reconstruction, some way to better understand presidential rhetoric’s 
context, is needed. 
Presidential Rhetoric and the Challenge of Context 
Issues related to understanding, analyzing and evaluating context lie at the heart 
of rhetorical studies. While the earliest studies considered only the immediate context of 
a speech and biographical information regarding the speaker,40 Lloyd Bitzer’s account of 
the “rhetorical situation” encouraged rhetorical critics to think both of particular and 
broader societal contexts that provided the exigencies and created constraints for 
rhetors.41 As rhetorical scholars have engaged with Bitzer, our understanding of context 
has evolved. More recently, scholars have begun to call for “thicker” contextual methods 
that enable rhetorical scholars to understand how rhetors interact with the inventional 
resources afforded by the layers of texts and discourse that are part of the rhetorical 
                                                
39 Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, xv. 
40 See Wichelns, Wrage, and those other studies of Lincoln. 
41 Bitzer, Lloyd. “The Rhetorical Situation.” 
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context. According to John Murphy, rhetorical studies have progressively called for 
critics to consider the “linguistic context of speeches,” resulting in a  
…steadily increasing concern with the inventional sources of public discourse. 
This re-invention of the historical aspect of public address emphasizes not only 
the traditional factors of immediate context and speaker biography, but also the 
“intertextual matrix” out of which and through which rhetorical acts emerge.42  
 
Further, Murphy argues, one thing that differing accounts of context have in common is 
an “emphasis on the inventional charge or that intertextual matrix, in terms of not only 
the historical antecedents of a speech but also the broader culture in which that speech 
moves.”43 Rhetorical studies at present view political rhetoric “as existing not at a sacred 
distance or in an absolute past but rather within a zone of direct and even crude contact 
with all other discourses past and present.”44 Understanding context as the interaction 
among texts, past and present, is thus necessary for understanding how presidential 
rhetorical authority is constructed and enacted.  
The Promise of Political Time for Thick Contextualism 
As a means of understanding the interaction among text, context, and presidential 
authority, I propose to approach presidential rhetoric through the lens of Stephen 
Skowronek’s theory of “political time.” Skowronek explains, 
Political time is the medium through which presidents encounter received 
commitments of ideology and interest and claim authority to intervene in their 
development. Political time has a narrative structure: Presidents bid for authority 
by reckoning with the work of their predecessors, locating their rise to power 
                                                
42 Murphy, John M. “The Language of the Liberal Consensus: John F. Kennedy, 
Technical Reason, and the ‘New Economics’ at Yale University.” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, 90:2 (2004), 133-162. 
43 Murphy, John M. “History, Culture, and Political Rhetoric.” Rhetoric Review, 20 
(2001) 46-50. 
44 Murphy, “History, Culture, and Political Rhetoric,” 49. 
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within the recent course of political events, and addressing the political 
expectations that attend their intervention in these affairs . . . The rhythms and 
demarcations of political time are thus very much expressions of the presidency 
itself, of a political imperative inherent in the office prompting each incumbent to 
attempt to control the terms in which the exercise of its powers will be 
understood.45 
 
In other words, the warrants for presidential authority reside within an existing political 
regime that is emerging, maintaining, or waning. A given president’s available rhetorical 
resources are thus expanded or constrained based on the regime’s place in political time 
as he (or someday she) attempts to control the manner in which the exercise of 
presidential power is understood. Political time draws our attention to the broader 
historical context of a given president’s place within a political regime, helping 
rhetorical scholars to understand the types of rhetorical options available to these 
individuals. This is because, as Skowronek explains, presidents hold parallel positions to 
each other within the recurrent phases of political time based on their temporal location 
within a regime. 
 Political regimes occur in three broad phases: emergence, maintenance, and 
enervation. Emergent regimes, as Skowronek argues, usually develop in opposition to an 
existing political regime that is falling out of favor. For example, Ronald Reagan was the 
leader of an emergent reconstructive regime because he was able to redefine “the terms 
and conditions of legitimate national government” by disavowing the Roosevelt 
regime’s existing “commitments of ideology and interest.”46 Once a regime has risen to 
power, it enters the maintenance phase, in which the representatives of the regime must 
                                                
45  Murphy, “History, Culture, and Political Rhetoric,” 49. 
46 Murphy, “History, Culture, and Political Rhetoric,” 19-20. 
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successfully manage the coalitions that helped the regime rise to power, as well as 
continue to extend the ideological and policy commitments set forth during the 
reconstruction phase. For example, during his second term, Reagan furthered his 
economic policy (known as Reaganomics) both rhetorically and practically, calling his 
economic scheme the “American miracle” and the “great triumph” of his presidency 
while continuing to advocate policy that furthered the goals of Reaganomics.47 Despite 
the efforts of regime representatives, the demands of the very coalitions that helped 
bring a regime to power eventually sap its strength; this leads to infighting, 
fragmentation, and ultimately, regime collapse. Skowronek calls this weakened phase 
enervation, as regimes in this state are opened up to potential repudiation by either a new 
emergent regime or a restructured version of a previous regime. 
Political time has the potential to assist rhetorical scholars in engaging with thick 
contextualism because the political time thesis draws our attention to layers of texts and 
context that enable and constrain the exercise of a president’s rhetorical authority. The 
cyclical nature of political time can aid in understanding how different moments in 
political time provide certain presidents with more expansive rhetorical resources than 
others. The notion of “regimes” in political time provides a more nuanced way for 
rhetorical scholars to think about the evolution of political ideologies as particular 
presidents shifted U.S. politics from one regime in political time to another. Political 
time can thus enhance our understanding of presidential rhetoric as it exists in the 
                                                
47 Niskanen, William A. “Reaganomics” in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. 
Library of Economics and Liberty, 1993. 
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context of political time, embedded in and interacting with myriad discourses from prior 
moments in political time as presidents have striven to exert their rhetorical authority. Or 
to put it simply, political time provides a framework for doing thick contextual analysis 
of presidential rhetoric.  
Thick contextualism as a rhetorical method involves performing a constitutive 
rhetorical history in which the critic analyzes context by attending to layers of discourse, 
both quotidian and official, as they are circulated and recirculated through public 
discourse. This kind of work, Jennifer Mercieca argues, involves “attending closely to 
layers of context,” which “enables critics to read texts as they were produced 
understood, circulated, and interpreted;” this allows critics to “contribute to the history 
of ideas as well as improve our analyses of texts within contexts.”48 
Thick contextualism also involves tracing how texts are circulated and 
constituted through different kinds of textual practices. James Jasinski contends that the 
“idioms of public life (for example, liberalism, conservatism, free market capitalism, 
pro-choice, or pro-life, etc.) and the specific concepts that organize, link, and separate 
these idioms are continually reconstituted through quotidian interaction as well as more 
nuanced textual practices. Charting such alterations in ‘usages’ is a central aspect of a 
constitutive rhetorical history.”49 To that end, James Jasinski has argued that engaging 
“thick contextualism” as a rhetorical method can assist the rhetorical critic in “charting 
                                                
48 Mercieca, Jennifer. “The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of 
American Citizenship.” Quarterly Journal of  Speech, 101:1 (2015), 306-311. 
49 Jasinski, James. “”A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward 
an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)constitution of ‘Constituion’ in The 
Federalist Papers,” in Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases, ed. 
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the organization of, and interaction among, constitutive legacy traditions within the field 
of the text.”50 These “constitutive legacy traditions” serve as inventional resources for 
rhetors, both enabling and constraining rhetorical performance. Thick contextualism, 
according to Jasinski, requires that the critic attend to how texts are “embodied in a 
linguistic idiom or language,” “enacted through particular speaking voices,” “marked by 
various figurative and argumentative patterns or structures,” and “perpetuated through a 
range of textual practices and organized into generic forms that are structured through 
generic conventions.”51 Attention to constitutive legacies as part of constitutive 
rhetorical history is one method of doing thick contextualism.  
Extending Jasinski’s work on constitutive legacies, John Murphy argues that 
“Rhetorical traditions organize the ‘social knowledge’ of communities and make 
available symbolic resources for the invention of arguments aimed at authoritative public 
judgments,” providing people with a “cultural grammar” through which “they might 
speak to each other, define pressing problems as public, and address those issues.”52 
These rhetorical traditions, Murphy argues, are part of history and both “shape and share 
the ambiguities of historical experience and communal life.”53 If we extend this to 
understand that political regimes have their own rhetorical traditions, they could serve as 
                                                
50 Jasinski, James. “Instrumentalism, Contextualism, and Interpretation in Rhetorical 
Criticism” in Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age 
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51 Ibid, 213-214. 
52 Murphy, “Rhetorical Traditions,” 72. 
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a kind of “cultural grammar” through which both presidents and the public understand 
the presidency and understand the exercise of presidential authority. 
Based on the existing scholarship, we can conclude that the rhetorical method of 
thick contextualism involves tracing how texts are taken up, circulated, and 
reconstituted; understanding the figurative and argumentative patterns the texts take on; 
and unpacking the ways in which these texts contribute to cultural grammars, or the 
“social knowledge” of the communities in which they are employed. Thick 
contextualism can aid scholars in better understanding presidential rhetorical authority, 
because these “Rhetorical traditions provide inventional resources which offer actors the 
opportunity to construct political authority.”54 For example, John Murphy’s analysis of 
Lyndon Johnson and Robert Kennedy’s speeches regarding Vietnam show how a former 
president’s rhetoric can provide a “linguistic context” that frames particular arguments 
as a president’s political heirs seek to “provide the public with the most authoritative 
reading” of their legacy.55 Engaging thick contextualism can thus assist rhetorical 
scholars not only with their analyses of presidents and presidential rhetoric, but also 
presidential campaigns. For, as Murphy observes, “Presidential authority becomes 
increasingly complex in moments of succession.”56 
Thus far I have argued that understanding presidential rhetorical authority 
involves understanding its constitutive functions. Thick contextualism—attention to the 
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layers of discourse and context that enable an understanding of presidential rhetoric’s 
constitutive rhetorical history—is the rhetorical method that I argue provides the most 
insight into presidential rhetoric, especially in moments of transition such as presidential 
elections. In this dissertation, I engage thick contextualism by identifying texts 
(specifically from regime construction president Ronald Reagan) that indicated regime 
emergence and tracing their circulation and rearticulation through the process of regime 
ascendancy and maintenance. More specifically, I focus on Reagan’s 1964 speech on 
behalf of Barry Goldwater, “A Time for Choosing,” in order to identify key ideological, 
policy, and rhetorical commitments contained within the text, and then analyze how 
those core commitments were rearticulated throughout Reagan’s presidency, that of his 
immediate successor George H.W. Bush, and preempted during the 1992 presidential 
election.  
At this point, I have provided a guiding question: how is presidential authority 
rhetorically constructed; a case study: Reagan’s reconstruction; a potential theoretical 
guide: political time; and a method: thick contextualism. What is still needed, however, 
is a theoretical perspective that will more closely guide the process of thick 
contextualism and provide insight into how we might trace the layers of context and 
discourse of presidential rhetoric, such as that of the Reagan regime.  
Understanding Textual Circulation: Constitutive Legacies 
 As a means of engaging with thick contextualism and approaching constitutive 
rhetorical history, James Jasinski and Jennifer Mercieca have theorized regarding the 
ways in which texts can work beyond their immediate context, providing rhetors with 
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rhetorical resources that far outlast a rhetorical artificact’s moment of invention. 
Drawing from Maurice Charland and James Boyd White, Jasinski and Mercieca argue 
that a rhetorical act can be a failure in its immediate context, yet circulate and shape 
rhetorical practice in a manner that provides subsequent rhetors with inventional 
resources; they call this a text’s “constitutive legacy.”57 More specifically, their analysis 
of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions demonstrates how constitutive invitations 
inhabit texts, which through circulation and rearticulation, form constitutive legacies. 
They argue: “Over time, circulation practices produce a constitutive legacy that critical 
analysis can reconstruct.”58 For example, “When advocates shift a trope, and argument, 
or a visual image from one historically particular rhetorical situation into a new context 
or connect it to some new controversy, circulation occurs via specific articulatory 
practices.”59 
Analyzing these practices requires attention to both a text’s interiors and 
exteriors. A text’s interiors invites “listeners and readers to modify the meaning of a 
culture’s key terms, to reconceptualize a culture’s experience of public time” and “to 
affirm as well as challenge established sources of cultural authority, bonds of affiliation, 
and institutional relationships”: the text’s “constitutive invitations.”60 For example, 
Jasinski and Mercieca identify four specific constitutive invitations contained within the 
Virginia and Kentucky resolutions: they located the Alien and Sedition acts within an 
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“ominous narrative structure,” “reimagined the states’ role in the constitutional 
narrative,” invited citizens to adopt “a radically textual understanding of the 
constitutional enterprise,” and invited a “hermeneutic posture” that constituted “a 
national community that distrusted those selected to govern.”61 On the other hand, 
attention to a text’s exteriors involves unpacking how texts are circulated and 
rearticulated so that they can be made relevant to new exigencies. Jasinski and 
Mercieca’s analysis of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and Principles of ’98 
traces how a number of different groups and individuals took up these texts and 
rearticulated them to respond to new circumstances, such as Henry Clay’s 1818 
argument that the Principles of 1798 and its rigorous textualism be the terms by which 
the Constitution was interpreted. In short: the constitutive invitations within a text, even 
if it is unsuccessful in its immediate context, can be circulated and adapted to new 
exigencies, resulting in a text’s rhetorical legacy. 
In addition to tracing changes in a text’s usage, rhetorical exteriors can also be 
analyzed by looking at responses to the text. These responses can take any number of 
forms: for example, speeches, letters, and news commentary. While much attention has 
been given to discursive responses to presidential rhetoric, less attention has been paid to 
the visual rhetorical interactions with presidential rhetoric. For example, it may be useful 
to consider how images of presidents on the cover of mass media outlets such as Time 
magazine provide a visual rhetorical reponse to that president’s negotiation of a regime’s 
core commitments and contribute to the rhetorical exteriors of the regime narrative.  
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Examining visual rhetoric as one kind of rhetorical exterior requires analyzing 
these images within their larger context as a response to a president’s efforts to negotiate 
the dominant regime’s commitments. I thus attend both to the interior and exterior of the 
image itself. I analyze the image’s rhetorical interiors by considering it as a visual 
rhetorical text on its own terms. Attending to the visual rhetorical arguments in the 
image itself, it becomes possible to understand how the image as a rhetorical text 
presents particular constitutive invitations regarding the presidency with regard to the 
particular president it features. Additionally, I examine the rhetorical exteriors of these 
images by situating them within their broader context and considering how they interact 
with existing regime narratives and commitments. For example, an image that features a 
president engaged in debate with a world leader might invite the public to conceive of 
the president as a world leader and representative of American exceptionalism 
(rhetorical interior) and might also interact with the regime commitments of diplomacy, 
international cooperation, and deliberation (rhetorical exterior). Making these kinds of 
judgments, however, requires a robust examination of the layers of context (both 
historical and rhetorical) that assist the public in making sense of these visual discourses. 
Images from the cover of Time, as I will demonstrate in my analysis, function as 
public commentary regarding a president or presidential candidate’s proffered vision for 
the nation, and therefore provide a means by which we can better understand the 
rhetorical exteriors of a regime’s rhetoric. Time magazine has played a role in visually 
and rhetorically framing the presidency since its inception in 1923. Historically it is the 
most widely read and influential magazine in the world, contributing significantly to 
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presidents’ and presidential candidates’ attempts to construct their public images.62 The 
corpus of presidential images on the cover of Time, Rod Hart, Deborah Smith-Howell, 
and John Llewellyn explain, should be considered as “important cultural artifacts that 
reflect societal trends and that provide visual cues that can be used by citizens to better 
understand the issues represented.”63 And, as these scholars have noted, there are 
“ideological and societal beliefs embedded in mass media texts” such as Time; these 
texts provide “constitutive invitations” that guide the public’s view of the presidency. 
Additionally, as Erickson notes, presidential images captured by mass media outlets 
provide visual clues into the ideological relationship between the president and the 
public; Time could thus provide clear examples of external validation or repudiation of a 
regime. Thus, Time functions as visual rhetoric about presidents that comments upon the 
stability of a given political regime and represents an ideal rhetorical artifact through 
which we can better understand the rhetorical exteriors of a regime’s constitutive 
legacies.64 
Connecting these ideas to presidential discourse and political time, we might 
consider that a president’s efforts to do rhetorical reconstruction draws from the 
constitutive invitations within existing texts that comprise the regime’s intellectual 
tradition. These texts contain potential narratives that emerge as constitutive legacies in 
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relation to the other texts. Reagan’s form of conservatism, for example (as I will argue 
more fully in the next chapter), drew from a number of rhetorical resources, including 
the preemptive rhetoric of Barry Goldwater, neoliberal ideology, and existing cultural 
fears related to the Cold War. Within each of the texts that formed Reagan’s rhetoric of 
reconstruction in 1980, Reagan was able to capitalize on the narrative potential of each 
that, carefully woven together throughout the campaign, formed the constitutive legacy 
of his reconstruction, which I call the Neoliberal regime. This regime relied on a 
particular narrative arc that offered neoliberal policies as the solution for the nation’s 
economic, foreign policy, and moral ills. Using thick contextualism to analyze the 
constitutive legacies of the Neoliberal regime would thus require (1) understanding the 
constitutive invitations located in the rhetorical interiors of a regime representative’s 
discourse and how it interacts with existing constitutive legacies, and (2) examining the 
rhetorical exteriors, or responses to those texts, including both discursive and visual 
rhetorical responses. 
  Once a regime has been established by a reconstructive president, managing the 
regime’s constitutive legacies becomes an important resource for rhetorical authority. 
Or, as Murphy argues, the need for authority “requires rhetors to adapt the wisdom of the 
past to the problem of the present.”65 Because there is both an overarching narrative that 
binds the regime’s core texts together as well as narratives embedded in the constitutive 
invitations of those texts, the regime’s representatives must also manage those narratives 
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in a way that resonates with the regime’s core ideology (in Reagan’s case, neoliberalism) 
and makes those narratives responsive to changing domestic and international situations.  
Political Time as Analytic Framework 
Using political time as an analytic framework to do thick contextualism has the 
potential to help scholars of the presidency better understand how layers of context and 
discourse enable or constrain presidential rhetors’ attempts to perform presidential 
authority. First, political time draws our attention to the broader historical context within 
which presidential authority is enacted. Understanding Reagan’s rhetoric in the context 
of Roosevelt’s Liberal Regime, for example, could provide insights into how the 
ideologies that undergird political regimes shift and change in response to historical 
exigencies.66 Second, political time could help rhetorical scholars understand generic 
possibilities and constraints for presidents as they operate in different moments of 
political time. For example, we would expect that the rhetorical expectations and 
possibilities for a reconstructive president would be quite different from those of a 
disjunctive president because one speaks as the regime is coming into power and the 
other during its decline. Third, political time as an analytic framework can help us to 
better understand the aesthetic resources of presidents in relation to their political 
regime. Just as Jasinski argues that constitutive legacy traditions are marked by 
figurative and argumentative patterns, so political regimes also have expectations for 
argument and style that enable and constrain rhetorical practice. Following John 
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Murphy’s argument that rhetorical traditions have “interpretive master codes” that 
“provide aesthetic resources for rhetorical action,” I intend to argue that political regimes 
have their own rhetorical legacies, guided by particular texts whose constitutive legacies, 
woven together through the authority of the reconstructive rhetor, form a master code for 
the regime, with its own aesthetic resources.   
More specifically, I will argue that each regime reconstruction results in a blend 
of ideological, policy, and rhetorical commitments that distinguish it from what came 
before. Ideological commitments are the underpinnings of a regime’s rhetorical legacy: 
regimes tend to have one or two core ideological commitments that all others link back 
to. For example, we might consider how Reagan’s neoliberal ideological commitments, 
most obviously manifested in economic policy, provided a guiding framework that all 
other policy commitments could be linked to.  
Policy commitments are the observable manifestations of the regime’s ideology, 
worked out in policy. Affiliated presidents within a given regime must at all times find 
ways to clearly link their policy recommendations to the regime’s ideology; to do 
otherwise would result in being tarred as an apostate to the regime, risking one’s 
legitimacy and opening the door to regime members questioning one’s authority. For 
example, Johnson followed the course set by FDR, offering up his vision of the “Great 
Society” as the next step in fulfilling the promises of the New Deal. Further, Murphy 
argues, Johnson also managed the regime by “continuing the international commitments 
that marked FDR’s final two terms as well as subsequent presidencies.”67 
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Rhetorical commitments are those “aesthetic resources for rhetorical action” that 
define a regime. Typically, the rhetorical commitments will take the form of specific 
tropes and figures that distinguish a regime reconstruction president. For example, as I 
will demonstrate in my first analysis chapter, Reagan’s Neoliberal regime was 
distinguished by narrative and appeals to commonsense; these elements of rhetorical 
style set the tone for what was expected of Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush.  
The Rhetoric of Political Time 
In order to understand how political time functions as an analytic tool for doing 
thick contextualism, some definitional work is in order. Because I intend to demonstrate 
in my analysis that each moment in political time has its own set of rhetorical resources, 
I will now define each moment in political time from a rhetorical perspective as they 
occur in the process of regime construction.   
The rhetoric of repudiation is the first moment of an emergent regime. 
Repudiative rhetoric in its most nascent stage occurs while another regime is still in 
power. Rhetorics of repudiation are fundamentally antagonistic, for they must provide 
the public with a strong reason to reject the existing order. Rhetors employing 
repudiative rhetoric take advantage of any ideological cleavages or signs of weakness in 
the dominant regime, and use those weaknesses to make way for a new order. For 
example, Reagan’s “repudiative stance drew upon Carter’s failure and saddled the very 
word ‘liberalism’ with a stigma of illegitimacy.”68 In so doing, he repudiated the old 
                                                
68 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 19. 
 33 
 
order and made way for the second type of rhetoric in political time: the rhetoric of 
reconstruction. 
Drawing from the rhetoric of repudiation, the “rhetoric of reconstruction” offers 
a new way of understanding government that replaces the old. Reconstructive rhetoric 
thus works in tandem with rhetorics of repudiation, providing justification for the 
establishment of a new order. Reconstructive rhetoric is thus the moment in political 
time where the people, presidency, and government are rhetorically constituted within 
the new order. For example, Reagan’s reconstructive stance “promised the American 
people a ‘New Beginning’ that would proceed on the devastatingly simple premise” that 
government was cause rather than the solution to the nation’s ills.69 This “new 
beginning” constituted the people as rugged individuals fighting a battle against 
encroaching communism, the president as the narrator of a series of epic struggles (both 
domestic and abroad), and the government as an instrument of largesse that must be 
checked. Skowronek points out that individuals inhabiting the reconstructive moment in 
political time have “great rhetorical latitude” to offer new ways of understanding the 
relationship between the president, government, and people. However, as I will argue, 
the rhetoric of reconstruction is constrained by the constitutive legacies initiated by the 
preemptive and repudiative rhetoric that provided the initial warrants for a regime 
change. 
 A third type of rhetoric that occurs within political time is the “rhetoric of 
articulation.” Regime articulation presidents (orthodox innovators and disjunctive 
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individuals) hold a tenuous place in political time as they must “balance the interests 
represented” by a “Huge, diverse, and inherited electoral coalition.”70 Because regime 
articulation presidents are expected to continue the legacy of their predecessors, 
successful articulation rhetoric maintains the core commitments of the regime while 
making them responsive to pressing issues. John Murphy’s analysis of Lyndon 
Johnson’s and Robert Kennedy’s Vietnam rhetoric is instructive in understanding the 
rhetoric of articulation. Murphy argues that when a president dies or leaves office, his or 
her successors “cannot help but augment and alter a heritage even as they speak of that 
heritage in an effort to engage specific controversies;” “the new must accentuate and 
augment the old.”71 We would expect, then, that a rhetoric of regime articulation would 
draw significantly from the existing regime rhetoric while augmenting that rhetoric so 
that it makes sense in light of changing domestic and international exigencies.  
The final type of rhetoric within political time is the “rhetoric of preemption.” 
Individuals who engage in preemptive rhetoric (preemptive presidents and candidates) 
oppose the regime in power and attempt to challenge it. Because the regime has not 
significantly waned, though, this rhetoric does not have the same resonance as the 
dominant regime’s rhetoric. However, preemptive rhetoric can sow the seeds for the 
rhetoric of repudiation once the time is right for challenging the dominant regime.  
Thus far, I have identified four key types, or genres, of rhetoric within political 
time: repudiative, reconstructive, articulation, and preemptive. It is important to note that 
although political time has a somewhat cyclical nature, the genres of rhetoric within 
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political time do not necessarily occur in the order I have listed. It is possible for a 
regime to experience a series of articulation or preemptive presidents (or some 
combination thereof) before political time resets and reconstruction again becomes 
possible. In fact, rather than thinking of the rhetoric of political time in terms of cycles, it 
might be more useful to think of it in terms of rhetorical evolutions: preemptive rhetoric 
sows the seeds for repudiative rhetoric, which often takes time to evolve into another 
rhetorical regime construction; articulation rhetoric slowly moves reconstructive rhetoric 
further and further away from the situation in which it first emerged, as new situations 
arise and the initial rhetoric of reconstruction becomes less persuasive.  
Conclusion 
 This dissertation project seeks to engage political time as a thick contextual 
method in an effort to better understand how presidential authority is crafted, negotiated, 
and received. The case study for this project takes on a significant moment in political 
time: the emergence and ascendancy of the Neoliberal regime beginning with Ronald 
Reagan’s 1964 campaign speech on behalf of presidential candidate Barry Goldwater 
and ending with the contentious 1992 presidential election. This time period in U.S. 
presidential history is important for continued study by rhetorical scholars because the 
ideological shifts that took place during Reagan’s presidency continue to influence 
presidential politics in the current moment. Not long ago, Republican presidential 
primary candidates debated in front of Air Force One at the Reagan Library and engaged 
in the contest of proving who was fit to be the heir to the Reagan legacy. While the 
future of the Republican Party seems tenuous at present, there is no question that the 
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specter of Reagan’s Neoliberal regime continues to provide rhetors with rhetorical 
resources and constraints.  
 Second, this period of time is significant for what it can teach us about 
presidential authority. While Bush was ideally positioned as the legitimate heir to the 
Reagan legacy, he lost to William Jefferson Clinton in 1992; a baffling turn of events for 
many. The 1992 presidential election was both contentious and kaleidoscopic as the 
candidates fought over the national deficit, healthcare, supply side economics, and the 
role of the United States in a post-Cold War world. More importantly, the campaign 
included a third-party candidate, Ross Perot, who posed significant challenges to Bush 
as a fiscal conservative who opposed “Reaganomics” and directly challenged Bush’s 
authority regarding economic issues. The emergence and evolution of the Neoliberal 
regime from its most nascent form in 1964 through the 1992 presidential election thus 
has much to offer regarding the construction, use, and reception of presidential rhetorical 
authority. However, before digging too deeply into the case study itself, it is necessary to 
understand the broad ideological and rhetorical context in which the Neoliberal regime 
first began to emerge.  
Chapter Descriptions  
This dissertation tells the story of the Neoliberal regime’s emergence and 
ascendancy under Ronald Reagan, its articulation under George H.W. Bush, and 
preemption during the 1992 presidential election. However, understanding how Reagan 
enabled the Neoliberal regime’s emergence requires first understanding the 
commitments of the regime for which Neoliberalism was offered as an alternative. While 
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Barry Goldwater was running for president and Ronald Reagan developing his rhetoric 
of neoliberal preemption, the United States was still in the throes of the Liberal regime. 
Initiated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the Liberal regime was marked by faith in the 
government and a fundamental belief in the value of progress. John Murphy explains, 
the liberal era “began with fundamental liberal principles and then turned to pragmatic 
application;” making the government responsible “for creating the social conditions” 
that allowed people to improve. As a result, government “intruded far more into the 
affairs of its citizens than had previously been the case,” emphasizing, “the utilitarian 
calculus of the greatest good for the greatest number.”72 Liberalism venerated those who 
proved themselves through hard work because “those who did not work, or those who 
impeded the bourgeoisie . . . had neither crafted themselves as respectable people nor 
had they earned their way.”73 
In addition, the liberal regime’s priorities emphasized “experimentation, results, 
and progress,” proving the truth of political propositions by testing them in practice 
rather than accepting them “because of tradition or morality.”74 The controlling logics of 
the Liberal regime can thus be thought of as valuing pragmatism, hard work, and 
accountability. Policies were pragmatic rather than radical. Government was seen as a 
means to check corporate greed, and the nation was optimistic “regarding the 
government’s competence, a faith unusual in U.S. history.” 75 The rhetoric of the Liberal 
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regime was thus marked by confidence in the government, undergirded by firm belief in 
the efficacy of a Keynesian economic perspective.  
Within the framework of political time, Barry Goldwater’s oppositional rhetoric 
regarding the Liberal regime could be understood as preemptive rhetoric. As a candidate 
opposed to the existing order, Goldwater offered a series of ideological, policy, and 
rhetorical positions that designed to refute the Liberal regime. Rooted in a nascent form 
of neoliberalism, Goldwater’s preemptive rhetoric sought to undermine faith in 
government action, replace a belief in progress with nostalgia, and predicted “impending 
doom even during apparently favorable times” by characterizing communist action 
abroad as a direct threat to American liberty. 76 Prioritizing political freedom, the 
Neoliberal ideology tied issues of personal liberty to economic freedom. Based Milton 
Friedman’s monetarism, the Neoliberal approach to government argued that government 
control over the economy was a threat to freedom and that unregulated markets were the 
only way to assure individual freedoms.77  
Although Goldwater won the Republican nomination, his run against Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, the faithful son of the Roosevelt legacy, was hugely unsuccessful. 
Goldwater lost in a landslide, yet the rhetoric of conservatism he offered appealed to a 
number of Republican voters who lamented what they perceived as government 
overreach, feared Communism, and longed for a national renewal and return to 
“traditional” values. Thus, while Goldwater’s campaign was unsuccessful in the short 
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term, he provided the public with texts that, primarily through Reagan, resulted in a 
constitutive legacy of Neoliberalism that provided a foundation for Reagan’s repudiative 
rhetoric in 1980. The remainder of this project will thus be dedicated to tracing how the 
rhetoric of the Neoliberal regime emerged, ascended, and was maintained from Ronald 
Reagan’s political emergence through the regime’s first significant challenge in 1992. 
 Chapter II tells the story of regime emergence. In this chapter, I focus on Ronald 
Reagan’s efforts to negotiate the nascent Neoliberal regime beginning with his 
preemptive rhetoric on behalf of Barry Goldwater in 1964, and continuing through his 
successful repudiation and reconstruction in 1980 and 1984. The argument for this 
chapter is twofold: first, I argue that there is a distinct rhetoric of repudiation; its 
rhetorical resources include the preemptive rhetoric of earlier rhetors (in this case, Barry 
Goldwater). Repudiative rhetoric, I argue, relies on Burkean identification and division, 
establishing an “us” and a “them.” The rhetoric of repudiation thus constructs the 
affiliated regime (in this case, the Liberal regime) as an other with which identification is 
no longer possible. The rhetoric of reconstruction capitalizes on identification, 
actualizing the narrative potential within the constitutive legacies of the emergent 
regime. This results in a broader narrative that constitutes the people in a new 
relationship with the government that reflects the emergent regime’s ideological 
commitments.  
Drawing from a number of texts throughout his campaign and presidency, I first 
examine the rhetorical interiors of these texts in an effort to understand how Reagan 
negotiated the constitutive legacies of Neoliberalism to repudiate the Liberal regime and 
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establish the Neoliberal regime. I then examine the rhetorical exteriors of these texts, 
attending to public reception of Reagan’s neoliberal rhetoric by examining cover images 
from Time magazine as responses to and commentary on the Neoliberal regime.   
In Chapter III, I tell the story of regime articulation by examining the presidency 
of George H.W. Bush. Because articulation presidents are charged with extending the 
regime’s commitments and making them responsive to changing domestic and 
international situations, I argue that regime articulation presidents have two primary 
rhetorical resources: casuistic stretching and prudential accommodation. In particular, 
orthodox innovators such as Bush must carefully engage in casuistic stretching, 
consistently justifying their efforts to shift the regime’s commitments in response to 
changing situations. In Bush’s case, casuistic stretching required that he construct a 
hierarchy of the Neoliberal regime’s core commitments and rearticulating the 
constitutive legacies of each commitment so that they fit together in a new narrative. 
However, as I argue, Bush made a critical miscalculation in his exercise of casuistic 
stretching by failing to arrange the regime commitments in a hierarchy that made sense 
both to the Neoliberal regime’s political coalitions and the American people. Further, in 
this chapter I suggest that the rhetorical performance of casuistic stretching is essential to 
prudential accommodation. 
Chapter IV tells the story of preemption by examining competing preemptive 
rhetorics during the 1992 presidential election. Specifically, I analyze the efforts of 
regime challengers Bill Clinton and H. Ross Perot as they attempted to articulate the 
constitutive legacies of the Neoliberal regime in a manner that would justify a change in 
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leadership. I argue that the rhetoric of preemption, enacted in response to a dominant 
regime, resulted in what Skowronek calls a “mongrel mix” of ideology and policy as the 
candidates rearticulated the regime’s constitutive legacies to serve their own purposes.78 
More specifically, I argue that Bill Clinton coopted the rhetoric of small government, 
capturing its ethos and inviting the public to imagine a government that was both 
responsive to the people’s needs as well as small and efficient. Ross Perot, on the other 
hand, focused more on using the stylistic resources of the Neoliberal regime, doubling 
down on the folksy style and simple policy solutions favored by Reagan. The analysis in 
this chapter suggests that preemptive rhetoric occurring early in a regime’s lifespan 
tends more toward harnessing the dominant regime’s prevenient ethos, and less toward 
repudiation. In other words, early regime preemptive candidates such as Clinton and 
Perot work harder to reckon with and manage the regime’s constitutive legacies rather 
than contradicting them. To that end, both candidates consistently repudiated Bush rather 
than the Neoliberal regime’s policies because the regime’s constitutive legacies were 
still a powerful rhetorical force.   
In Chapter V, I offer concluding thoughts regarding political time as an analytic 
framework for thick contextualism. Reconstructing the context of presidential rhetoric 
and political campaigns remains a necessary exercise for those who would analyze and 
evaluate the different forms of political speech. Political time assists in these efforts to 
understand context, drawing attention toward the inventional resources of presidential 
rhetors as they attempt to challenge, reconstruct, or maintain the political order. 
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Attending to textual interiors and exteriors as they function within political time offers 
critics a way to introduce nuance into their contextual analysis as they attempt to account 
for the exercise of presidential rhetorical authority.  
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CHAPTER II 
RONALD REAGAN’S LIBERAL REPUDIATION AND NEOLIBERAL 
RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The day was October 27, 1964. It was less than a week before the presidential 
election and Republican candidate Barry Goldwater was polling far behind Democratic 
incumbent Lyndon Baines Johnson. In an effort to close the gap between the two 
candidates, Republican elites contacted actor and cochairman of Californians for Barry 
Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and asked him to deliver an address on Goldwater’s behalf. 
As Reagan recalled in Speaking My Mind,   
One night a few weeks before the election I addressed a fundraiser at the 
Coconut Grove in Los Angeles. When the evening was over, a delegation of 
high-powered Republicans waited for me. They asked whether I would deliver 
that same speech on nationwide TV if they raised the money to buy the time. I 
said yes and suggested that, instead of just having me in a studio alone, they 
bring in an audience to get a little better feel. They readily agreed. 
The night that the tape of the speech was to air on NBC, Nancy and I went over 
to another couple’s home to watch it. Everyone thought I’d done well, but still 
you don’t always know about these things. The phone rang about midnight. It 
was a call from Washington, D.C., where it was three a.m. One of Barry’s staff 
called to tell me that the switchboard was still lit up from the calls pledging 
money to his campaign. I then slept peacefully. The speech raised $8million and 
soon changed my entire life. Although I didn’t put a title on it, it later became 
known as “A Time for Choosing.”79 
 
If fundraising is any indication of success, then “The Speech,” or “A Time for 
Choosing,” as it later became known, was certainly well received. In addition to raising 
millions of dollars for the Goldwater presidential campaign, “The Speech” catapulted 
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Reagan into the national political spotlight, leading to a successful gubernatorial bid in 
California.80 Despite the immediate success of the address, Goldwater lost. However, “A 
Time For Choosing,” a distillation of Goldwater’s conservatism and Reagan’s rhetorical 
skill, represents an important moment in the gradual transition from the Liberal regime 
to the Neoliberal. As I argue in this chapter, “A Time For Choosing” represents an 
important moment of regime preemption; the constitutive legacy of the speech served as 
an important inventional resource for Reagan in his 1980 presidential campaign, setting 
groundwork for the rhetorical tradition of the Neoliberal regime. Additionally, I argue 
that it is possible to trace the processes of Liberal regime repudiation and Neoliberal 
regime emergence by attending to the constitutive legacies that developed as a result of 
Reagan’s 1964 address. 
The amalgam of ideological, rhetorical, and policy commitments Reagan 
established during his tenure as president and left for his successor, George H.W. Bush, 
is what I am calling the Neoliberal regime tradition. As Robert McChesney notes, 
Neoliberalism is the defining political economic paradigm of our time—it refers 
to the policies and processes whereby a relative handful of private interests are 
permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximize their 
personal profit.81 
 
These policies, according to McChesney, are “characterized as free market policies that 
encourage private enterprise and consumer choice, reward personal responsibility and 
entrepreneurial initiative, and undermine the dead hand of the incompetent, bureaucratic 
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and parasitic government.”82 The set of ideological, policy, and rhetorical commitments 
introduced by Reagan reflect these ideals: the core of his reconstructive efforts consisted 
of his economic ideology, which shifted toward supply-side economics, prioritizing 
private enterprise while wrapping it in the mantle of “free markets.”  
 In this chapter, I trace the processes of regime emergence and ascendancy as 
Reagan helped move the nation from the Liberal Era to the Neoliberal Era. In order to 
trace out this process, I first examine the rhetorical interiors of “A Time for Choosing” 
by closely reading and identifying the constitutive invitations within the text. In so 
doing, I argue that it is possible to trace the constitutive invitations within that text that 
circulated during Reagan’s gubernatorial campaign and resulted in a powerful 
constitutive legacy that Reagan drew from throughout his presidency. These constitutive 
invitations encouraged four interconnected conceptions of the American people: first, 
they encouraged the public to see themselves as rugged individuals, second, as 
neoliberals and champions of monetarism, third, as citizens engaged in an all-or-nothing 
battle against communism, and finally, as members of an exceptional nation whose civil 
religion set them apart from their adversaries. These four constitutive invitations, 
circulated through public discourse and employed by Reagan during the 1980 
presidential campaign, were masterfully woven together and resulted in an overarching 
narrative of Neoliberalism that redefined the relationship between the American people 
and the government, linking American identity with Neoliberal economic ideology.  
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Further, I argue that the constitutive legacy of a regime, once established, 
constrains regime representatives and binds them to the regime narrative they construct 
from those constitutive legacies. In order to make these arguments, I first set the 
historical context of the Liberal regime prior to “A Time for Choosing,” and then engage 
in a rhetorical analysis of its rhetorical interiors to determine its constitutive invitations. 
As a means of understanding the rhetorical exteriors of the speech, I trace how the 
constitutive legacies of the speech were circulated through Reagan’s rhetoric during his 
presidency and visually constituted on the cover of Time. The chapter closes by 
considering how using political time to analyze rhetorical circulation enhances our 
understanding of Reagan’s rhetoric and those who followed him. To begin, I locate 
Reagan in political time. 
Ronald Reagan’s Political Time 
Within political time, Ronald Reagan occupied three distinct rhetorical roles: first 
he engaged in preemptive rhetoric of the Liberal regime; second, he provided persuasive 
repudiation of the Liberal regime; finally, he engaged in the rhetorical construction of 
the Neoliberal regime. As a preemptive rhetor, Reagan had to reckon with the existing 
Liberal regime, which underwent a resurgence under Lyndon Baines Johnson. As I have 
previously discussed, the controlling logics of the Liberal regime were pragmatism, hard 
work, and accountability. Undergirding these issues was a belief in the efficacy of 
Keynesian economics, which recognized the complexity and nuance of legislation on the 
economy. Johnson extended the policy commitments of the Liberal regime by signing 
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which acknowledged the role of the government 
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in alleviating poverty and stimulating economic success for its workers. Further, Johnson 
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Kennedy’s stead. During this moment, Johnson 
rhetorically extended Liberal regime commitments by underscoring the value of hard 
work and fairness, as well as the role of the government in ensuring equality of 
opportunity.83 Johnson was thus the established representative of the dominant liberal 
regime, which opposition candidates such as Goldwater (and by proxy, Reagan) needed 
to rhetorically preempt in order to pave the way for Liberal regime repudiation.  
 1964 was a time of great upheaval in the United States, both in terms of domestic 
and foreign policy. President Kennedy had recently been assassinated and replaced by 
Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson; the Civil Rights movements was in full swing 
and Freedom Summer was about to take place; Vietnam was just heating up; and the fear 
of Communism was pervasive. It was within this whirling vortex of social and foreign 
policy pressure that the 1964 presidential campaign took place, featuring GOP candidate 
Barry Goldwater and Democratic incumbent Lyndon B. Johnson. The two candidates 
took dramatically different stances on the issues: while Goldwater attempted to call up a 
“popular nostalgia for the world of yesteryear,”84 Johnson offered up his “Great Society” 
vision for the future directly descended from FDR’s New Deal.85 In terms of political 
time, Johnson represented the politics of articulation: the faithful son of FDR’s New 
Deal coalition, Johnson was firmly established within the Roosevelt regime. Indeed, as 
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William Leuchtenburg explains, Johnson became all but “obsessed with him [FDR] 
during the 1964 campaign,” even to the point of studying FDR’s 1932 speeches in the 
hopes of “producing the same kind of effect.”86 
 While Johnson ran his campaign as a successor to the New Deal, Goldwater 
stood in staunch opposition, providing a preemptive challenge to the still-dominant 
Liberal regime. Both the content and tenor of Goldwater’s campaign attempted to refute 
the Liberal regime by characterizing government action as federal overreach, which he 
argued would only result in the triumph of communism and continual erosion of 
individual liberties. As a means of countering Johnson’s emphasis on continued 
progress, Kathryn Olson argues, Goldwater’s campaign rhetoric took on the form of a 
jeremiad: a prophetic voice calling Americans to renewal and urging them to “return to a 
way of life aligned with a strict interpretation of the country’s covenant, the 
Constitution.”87 By taking a firm repudiative stance toward Johnson and the Liberal 
regime he represented, Goldwater advanced “criticism of the existing peace, prosperity, 
and progress,” allowing him to “predict impending doom even during apparently 
favorable times.”88 This is an important feature of preemptive rhetoric, for preemptive 
rhetors often must contradict a favorable situation to create rhetorical space for 
increasingly larger criticisms of the dominant regime. Goldwater accomplished this by 
making much of an issue that most Americans feared: the threat of encroaching 
communism. 
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 Goldwater’s campaign revolved around three critical themes: the size and scope 
of government, anticommunism, and the right to private property. John Hammerback 
contends that this trifecta of issues allowed Goldwater to emphasize “one pervasive 
ideal, rugged individualism.”89 For Goldwater, rugged individualism was the only way 
to guard against the threat of communism in both governmental and private contexts. He 
called for a significant decrease in federal government that would free localities to 
manage their own issues and individuals to protect their property from government 
overreach. Similarly, his foreign policy approach required that the United States take on 
the persona of rugged individualism by “de-emphasizing international cooperation, 
discontinuing conciliatory foreign policies, and challenging communism directly.”90 In 
short, what Johnson argued was the logical continuation of the New Deal through the 
Great Society, Goldwater characterized as continued government largesse and control 
that would permit the spread of communism; what Johnson argued was limited 
involvement in Vietnam, Goldwater characterized as a lack of willingness to be tough on 
communism. Johnson praised the stability of the status quo and encouraged the nation to 
continue moving forward; Goldwater warned against a nation tending toward 
totalitarianism and called for a return to his view of Constitutional “government 
confinement.”91 
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 Throughout the campaign, Goldwater consistently lagged behind Johnson in the 
polls and faced intense media scrutiny for his discourse. Perhaps best known from this 
campaign was Johnson’s “Daisy ad,” which resulted from Goldwater’s argument that 
nuclear weapons be used in Vietnam if necessary. By September it was clear that 
Johnson had a comfortable lead, prompting GOP elites to stage an event that would 
remedy Goldwater’s ailing campaign. For this event, they turned to Ronald Reagan. 
Crafting a Conservative Legacy in “The Speech” 
 Although delivered on behalf of Barry Goldwater, Reagan’s 1964 televised 
address does far more to establish Reagan as a legitimate preemptive rhetor than it did 
Goldwater. Although he clearly followed the stock issues of the Goldwater campaign, 
Reagan distinguished himself as a viable political figure apart from Goldwater. He 
accomplished this by engaging in the rhetoric of preemption while employing Burkean 
techniques of identification and division to establish himself as a more centrist voice to 
Goldwater’s strident partisan: first, Reagan carefully situated himself as a reasonable 
individual who had come to conservatism as a result of the Liberal regime’s problems; 
second, he clearly preempted the Liberal regime by criticizing its ideological and policy 
commitments; finally, Reagan offered an alternative to the Liberal regime, what 
Skowronek calls the “legitimating ideas” that would form the basis of “common sense” 
under a new order.92 These rhetorical processes – identification with the existing regime, 
dissociation via ideological and policy criticism, and offering a solution to the existing 
order – form the basis for the rhetoric of preemption. As I will argue, Reagan’s 
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preemptive rhetoric contained constitutive invitations that made it possible for moderate 
Republicans to accept the possibility of a new order, whereas Goldwater’s did not.  
Thus, in the following section I will identify the rhetorical markers of regime 
preemption, repudiation, and reconstruction within Reagan’s 1964 “A Time for 
Choosing Address.” Because this address contains the initial constitutive invitations that 
became the constitutive legacy of the Neoliberal regime, I will then trace out how these 
ideas were rhetorically realized during key moments of Reagan’s political career, 
including his 1976 stump speech, his 1980 inaugural address, and the 1986 “Challenger 
Address.”  
Reagan’s Rhetoric of Preemption 
 Preemptive rhetoric is distinguished from repudiative and reconstructive rhetoric 
primarily by its place in time. The preemptive rhetor has come too early for the process 
of reconstruction o begin and so has the potential to present the texts whose constitutive 
legacy will be invoked when the time for repudiation and reconstruction is right. 
Reagan’s primary rhetorical strategies—identification, dissociation, and establishing an 
alternative—illustrate his place as a preemptive rhetor. Reagan strategically dissociated 
himself from Goldwater while finding ways to identify with moderate voters and 
supporters of the Liberal regime while appealing to the conservative base. In so doing, 
he was able to engage in slight modifications, or redefinitions, of Goldwater’s ideology 
and shift the focus from anticommunism to economic issues: an almost imperceptible 
shift that changed the ideological locus from governmental to economic structure. Using 
dissociation and redefinition, Reagan provided his audience with a preemptive rhetoric 
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of repudiation that would become useful when the Liberal regime had run its course. 
Finally, the alternative Reagan offered (neoliberalism) served as a preview of the 
eventual neoliberal reconstruction. His 1964 address, while unsuccessful in the short 
term, resulted in a constitutive legacy that circulated and provided Reagan with 
rhetorical resources during his later campaigns and throughout his presidency. 
  Although Goldwater was ostensibly the object of “The Speech,” Reagan began 
by strategically dissociating himself—and his ideas—from Goldwater while addressing 
the same key issues of the Goldwater campaign. This is apparent in Reagan’s efforts to 
lay claim to his ideas. He stated, “I have been permitted to choose my own words and 
discuss my own ideas regarding the choice that we face in the next two weeks.”93 
Reagan employed personal pronouns that made the critiques and policy stances in “The 
Speech” his own, stating, “I have an uncomfortable feeling . . .”, “I wonder who among 
us . . .”, and “I personally resent it . . .”94 These first person pronouns reinforced the idea 
that these are Reagan’s thoughts and his alone, making Reagan more than a mouthpiece 
of the Goldwater campaign. This strategy of dissociation, Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca and 
Chaim Perelman argue, works to negotiated tensions and help both rhetors and audiences 
overcome cognitive dissonance.95 Subtly dividing the conservative stance into two parts: 
Goldwater’s perspective and Reagan’s perspective, Reagan provided his extensive 
televised audience with a way to justify supporting conservatism without supporting 
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Goldwater. In Olbrechts-Tyteca’s and Perelman’s terms, Reagan provided a way for his 
audience to support the reality of conservatism (Reagan’s) without supporting the 
appearance of it (Goldwater’s).96  
Second, Reagan used identification to connect with his broader television 
audience by sharing his partisan history. Identification, Kenneth Burke argues, uses 
language to permit individuals to share substance, albeit momentarily. This can allow 
individuals to see themselves as consubstantial, or “both joined and separate,” part of a 
community and as autonomous individuals.97 Reagan accomplished this by drawing 
attention to points of identification he held in common with both Republicans and 
Democrats, stating, “I have spent most my life as a Democrat. I recently have seen fit to 
follow another course.”98 By sharing his history as a Democrat, Reagan creates a point 
of identification with other Democrats and establishes himself as a reasonable voice of 
preemption. Reagan’s partisan history provides another tacit dissociation from 
Goldwater, a self-proclaimed lifelong Republican who was opposed to FDR’s New Deal 
policies.99 As a Conservative Republican and former Democrat, Reagan had the 
capability to be consubstantial with Republicans and Democrats alike. In contrast to the 
extreme and unstable Barry Goldwater portrayed in the media, Reagan established 
himself as a reasonable man of thought not only understood those faithful to the Liberal 
regime, but had been one of them. Having characterized himself as a separate political 
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entity from Goldwater and established his rhetorical authority as a preemptive voice of 
conservatism, Reagan swiftly moved toward criticizing the ideological and policy 
commitments of the Liberal regime. 
Preemptive Repudiation 
Reagan’s critique characterized the New Deal regime as weakened and corrupt 
by drawing from key themes within Goldwater’s campaign: the size and scope of 
government, the right to private property, and anticommunism. For each of these issues, 
Reagan critiqued the New Deal regime’s approach in a manner that, while following the 
topos of Goldwater’s campaign nonetheless gestured toward what would become the 
hallmarks of the Reagan regime in terms of ideological and policy commitments. Using 
the exigencies of the moment to undermine the Liberal regime’s ideology as a whole, 
Reagan created space to offer up a new ideological framework in its place. Reagan’s 
critique of Liberal regime government programs and spending laid the groundwork for 
his rhetoric of repudiation: Reagan’s speech contained constitutive invitations that 
encouraged the audience to join him in redefining government as the problem, the threat 
of communism a threat to free markets, and the United States’ role in the world as a 
safeguard of free markets, which he directly connected to democracy promotion.  
 Reagan first addressed the size and responsibility of the federal government. 
Continuing his rhetorical strategy of dissociation, Reagan redefined government 
overreach in terms of its economic consequences rather than, as Goldwater did, another 
step toward communism. This redefinition of government overreach as an economic 
issue gave Reagan the space to critique the Liberal regime’s economic ideology as a 
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whole. Using the extended example of the farm economy, Reagan challenged the notion 
that government programs solve problems. He explained,  
Since 1955, the cost of this program has nearly doubled. One-fourth of farming 
in America is responsible for 85 percent of the farm surplus. Three-fourths of 
farming is out on the free market and has known a 21 percent increase in the per 
capita consumption of all its produce. You see, that one-fourth of framing—
that’s regulated and controlled by the federal government. In the last three years 
we’ve spent 43 dollars in the feed grain program for every bushel of corn we 
don’t grow . . . Every responsible farmer and farm organization has repeatedly 
asked the government to free the farm economy, but how—who are farmers to 
know what’s best for them? The wheat farmers voted against a wheat program. 
The government passed it anyway. Now the price of bread goes up; the price of 
wheat to the farmer goes down.100 
 
In this example, the fate of the farm industry (one of Goldwater’s biggest grievances 
with FDR101) stands in synecdochically for industry as a whole. As Reagan argued in 
this example, government regulation and programs, far from helping the farm industry, 
prevented farmers from doing what was “best for them”: turning a profit. In addition, 
Reagan criticized a number of other federal programs, including the Area 
Redevelopment Agency, welfare spending, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Each of 
these, for Reagan, demonstrated that the current regime’s focus on big government, 
rooted in an overly complex economic ideology, created problems instead of solving 
them.  
The attacks on big government that Reagan used to repudiate a Keynesian 
economic scheme also applied to the erosion of individual liberty because, for Reagan 
(and Goldwater), the bigger the government, the greater its potential to impede the 
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peoples’ right to self-government. He explained, “This is the issue of this election: 
Whether we believe in our capacity for self-government or whether we abandon the 
American revolution and confess that a little intellectual elite in a far-distant capitol can 
plan our lives for us better than we can plan them ourselves.”102 The choice Reagan 
articulates here is clear: the electorate must choose between the competing ideologies of 
the New Deal regime and its nascent alternative, at this point associated with Republican 
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. 
The final means by which Reagan repudiated the existing regime identified 
Liberal ideology with the threat of socialism and, by extension, communism. 
Throughout “The Speech,” Reagan accused the current administration of bending to 
socialism abroad and advocating socialist policies at home. He mentioned socialism and 
socialist policies nine times during the course of the eight-page speech. In particular, 
Reagan accused the Democratic party of supporting socialist systems abroad and 
predicted that their policies would plunge the United States into the “ant heap of 
totalitarianism,” imposing socialism on the people. For Reagan, repudiating socialism 
allowed him to negate the Liberal regime’s economic ideology. Reagan thus constructed 
a chain of logic in which Keynesian economic ideology advances big government, big 
government results in socialist policies, and socialist policies erode the rights of the 
people. 103 This chain of logic formed a kind of slippery slope in which any kind of 
federal policy could be seen as tending toward imposing socialism on the people. 
Reagan stated,  
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Now it doesn’t require expropriation of confiscation of private property or 
business to impose socialism on a people. What it does mean whether you hold 
the deed to the—or the title to your business or property if the government holds 
the power of life and death over that business or property? And such machinery 
already exists. The government can find some charge to bring against any 
concern it chooses to prosecute. Every businessman has his own tale of 
harassment. Somewhere a perversion has taken place. Our natural, unalienable 
rights are now considered to be a dispensation of government, and freedom has 
never been so fragile, so close to slipping from our grasp as it s at this 
moment.104 
 
By identifying the status quo with socialist threats, Reagan tapped into existing cultural 
anxieties regarding the spread of communism, anxieties heightened by the American 
military presence in Vietnam. Reagan accused the current administration of allowing “a 
perversion” to take place, a perversion whose result was the erosion of private liberties. 
The examples Reagan cited throughout the address, however, have to do specifically 
with economic liberties: he cited examples of businessmen being harassed, farms being 
seized, and property rights being diluted.105 In each of these cases, personal and 
economic liberty are equated, resulting in a chain of logic that ultimately tied back to 
Reagan’s repudiation of the New Deal economic ideology.  
Preemptive Reconstruction 
Reagan’s repudiative rhetoric created the rhetorical space to offer solutions to 
New Deal economic ideology. For each issue he addressed, Reagan provided an 
alternative rooted in an alternative economic ideology. In the farm example, Reagan 
advocated for less government control of the farm economy so that the industry could 
regulate itself, arguing for privatization of the farm industry. This is just one example of 
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the larger shift in economic ideology Reagan advocated: a move away from the 
Keynesian economic ideology that governed the New Deal regime and toward a 
Neoliberal ideology of free market capitalism.  
Here, the rhetorical processes of reconstruction emerged as Reagan offered an 
ideological alternative to the Liberal regime. By advocating that, “government does 
nothing as well or as economically as the private sector of the economy,” Reagan made 
clear that his alternative economic ideology would privatize business.106 Arguing for 
Friedman and Schwartz’s monetarism, which theorizes that restricted government 
spending checks inflation, Reagan offered up neoliberalism as an alternative to 
Keynesian economic policies.107 Increasing privatization, Reagan argued, would not 
only solve the ills within the status quo, but also allow the United States to maintain its 
place as the “last best hope for man on earth.”108 
In order to support this new economic ideology, Reagan connected neoliberal 
economic ideology with transcendent issues such as freedom, morality, and 
commonsense. In messianic style, Reagan exhorted his listeners to “have the courage to 
tell our elected officials that we want our national policy based on what we know in our 
hearts is morally right” and argued that refusing to do so would result in being 
“weakened from within spiritually, morally, and economically.”109 Reagan extended the 
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connection between freedom and morality even further by invoking biblical figures such 
as Moses and Jesus, who were unwilling to purchase life “at the price of chains and 
slavery.”110 He asked his audience,  
. . . should Moses have told the children of Israel to live in slavery under the 
pharaohs? Should Christ have refused the cross? Should the patriots at the 
Concord Bridge have thrown down their guns and refused to fire the shot heart 
‘round the world? The martyrs of history were not fools, and our honored dead 
who gave their lives to stop the advance of the Nazis didn’t die in vain.111 
 
By creating rhetorical linkages between religious figures and American military history, 
Reagan connected Neoliberal economic ideology with civil religion. 
Equating Neoliberalism with civil religion elevated economic ideology to the 
level of sacred texts such as the Constitution and Declaration of Independence, and 
transcendent values such as freedom. Civil religion, the idea popularized by Robert 
Bellah that there exists in the United States a sort of nonsectarian religion consisting of 
sacred symbols and discourses from the nation’s history, is rooted in covenantal 
theology.112 Covenantal theology posits that the United States has a kind of sacred 
contract, or covenant, with the nonsectarian “God” of civil religion. As such, this deity is 
personally invested in the United States fulfilling its role in the world.  
Reagan’s address directly linked Neoliberal economic ideology with the idea of 
the covenant. By characterizing a transition to neoliberalism as the only way for the 
United States to fulfill its divine destiny (or covenantal obligation) of preserving and 
spreading democracy over communism, Reagan made the transition to neoliberalism a 
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sacred charge. Calling the U.S. “the last best hope of man on earth,” without which the 
world would be plunged into “a thousand years of darkness,” Reagan performed the role 
of the nation’s civil religious priest, exhorting the people to preserve their freedom over 
the “utopian solution of peace without victory” offered by those who represent the 
welfare state.113,114  
In “The Speech,” protecting the United States from the threat of communism 
through economic ideology took on a heightened significance; protecting the nation from 
its enemies within (those affiliated with the Liberal regime) and without (communist 
regimes) became the divine appointment of the U.S. and a project upon whose success 
the fate of the world hung in the balance. Kurt Ritter calls this Reagan’s “secular 
apocalyptic,” in which Reagan fused the prophetic, apocalyptic style to secular issues by 
warning of impending doom while maintaining a hopeful tone for the future.115 Reagan’s 
address thus invited the audience to see themselves as members of a divine drama, in 
which the economic ideology of the United States had the potential to affect not only its 
own fate, but the world’s.  
 As I have argued, Reagan’s 1964 “A Time for Choosing” address served three 
purposes: first, it established Reagan as a legitimate preemptive voice for conservatism, 
tacitly dissociating him from Goldwater and making Reagan the next logical choice to 
carry forth the torch of neoliberal conservatism. Second, it demonstrated the rhetoric of 
preemptive repudiation by linking the Liberal Regime’s economic ideology (Keynesian 
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economics) to all manner of ills, both personal and governmental. By undermining the 
Keynesian economic approach, Reagan was able to access a larger critique of the New 
Deal regime’s system of “big government,” whose endless regulations and 
encroachments would erode individual liberties, destroy the economy, and, take a soft 
line on the socialist policies that would eventually give way to the spread of communism 
across the globe. Finally, Reagan offered up a preemptive ideological alternative, or 
preemptive reconstruction, to Keynesian economics: neoliberalism. Just as Reagan was 
able to link Keynesian thought to all manner of socialist evils, he also implied that a 
neoliberal economic approach would solve all the nation’s ills and fulfill its sacred 
obligation to the world. While Reagan never went so far as to identify neoliberalism by 
name, he functionally advocated this ideology by emphasizing the need for government 
to back down, leaving businesses and individuals free to regulate themselves. In essence, 
Reagan’s economic ideology echoed the “rugged individualism” Kathryn Olson 
identifies as a key component of the Goldwater campaign.116 This rugged individualism 
was logically extended to the United States’ international policies, necessitating a tough 
stance on communism and resulting in anticommunist action both at home and abroad.  
Rhetorical Circulation: The Constitutive Legacy of Neoliberalism 
 From the rhetorical interiors of “The Speech,” four constitutive invitations 
emerge that comprise a neoliberal approach to government. First, Reagan invited the 
people to equate liberalism and Keynesian economic with governmental excess, 
resulting in communism. Second, Reagan invited the people to see a neoliberal 
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economic structure as the solution to those ills. Third, Reagan’s address invited the 
people to see themselves and the nation as rugged individuals committed to fighting for 
freedom by spreading democracy and free markets. Finally, Reagan invited his audience 
to associate economic ideology with democracy, and free markets as part of the national 
civil religion. Each of these ideas was linked together by Reagan into a master narrative 
of neoliberalism that, put in its plainest terms, told the following story: “Liberalism has 
led to government control and excess, and will hasten the spread of communism not only 
in our country but abroad. As Americans we have a sacred responsibility to fight 
totalitarianism and spread democracy; this can only be accomplished by ensuring 
personal liberties and checking government intrusion through a free market economic 
system.”  
 While Reagan’s address did not help Goldwater win the presidency, it arguably 
set the stage for Reagan’s reconstruction, which most visibly occurred during his 1980 
presidential campaign. Realizing this narrative required that Reagan craft a series of 
policy and ideological commitments, including (1) a shift in economic ideology and a 
series of deregulation policies, (2) a continued and careful ideological link between civil 
religion and free markets, (3) a staunch anticommunist stance, and (4) a rhetorical and 
policy stance that demonstrated the United States’ belief in rugged individualism, both in 
terms of the citizen and the nation as a whole.  The remainder of this chapter will be 
dedicated to tracing the rhetorical exteriors of Reagan’s 1964 address by identifying how 
these ideas circulated and were rearticulated throughout his presidency. In order to do so, 
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I examine both Reagan’s campaign and presidential discourse as well as responses to his 
rhetoric of neoliberalism as visually constituted on the cover of Time.117  
Neoliberal Economic Ideology: “Reaganomics” 
 Arguably, the controlling ideology of the Reagan regime had to do with its 
economic scheme. As demonstrated by the analysis of his 1964 address, each component 
of a regime’s rhetoric (rugged individualism, anticommunism, and civil religion) served 
as further justification for embracing the economic ideology of monetarism. Reagan’s 
ideological commitment to neoliberalism developed throughout his presidency, 
eventually becoming rearticulated as “Reaganomics.” During the 1976 Republican 
primary election in particular, Reagan developed his economic perspective by drawing 
from his experience as governor of California to demonstrate that his economic ideology 
was feasible. 
 In order to demonstrate how his ideology, turned into policy, might work, 
Reagan utilized the extended example of welfare. His standard stump speech during 
1976 included the following:  
I’ve heard it all before. A few years ago in Calif. [sic.] we were faced with the 
kind of “welfare mess” we are still faced with in Wash. [sic.]. For 4 yrs [sic], we 
tried to halt the ever runaway increase in cost caseload & cost but nothing 
seemed to work. We were frustrated by Fed. [sic.] regulations, court orders 
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obtained by “welfare rights groups” using govt. paid lawyers from O.E.O. and a 
liberally oriented Dem. [sic.] majority in the legis. [sic].118 
 
He continued by explaining how he and his administration went about turning the 40,000 
per month caseload increase into an 8,000 per month decrease. He explained further that 
following this reduction in caseload, “Forty three of our fifty-eight counties were able to 
reduce their property tax rates two years in a row and the second year two other counties 
joined them . . . that $750 million deficit turned out to be and $850 million surplus” that 
was returned to the people as a tax rebate.119 Reagan continued, characterizing the 
“welfare mess” in Washington as an issue that crossed party lines and was 
acknowledged as such by a “liberal Senator now a Presidential candidate.”120 In order to 
underscore this point, Reagan used the example of a Chicago woman who “used 80 
names, 30 addresses, & 15 telephone numbers in collecting food stamps, social security, 
welfare, and veterans benefits from four deceased but non-existent husbands.”121 This 
reference became a stock section of Reagan’s 1976 primary stump speeches, as he 
decried welfare and government spending, instead advocating for cutbacks in federal 
government spending just as he enacted in California. The successful changes in 
California, Reagan explained, were the result of hard work studying congressional acts 
and regulations in order to find inconsistencies and loopholes. Should the federal 
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government engage in such action, Reagan argued, the nation would see the same 
success as California. 
 Despite losing the 1976 Republican primaries, Reagan’s economic ideology 
nonetheless gained traction. His stump speeches were famously associated with the 
“welfare queens,” whose perceived abuses would be stopped through the policy 
implementation of Reaganomics. Following his 1976 defeat, Reagan ran a wildly 
successful presidential campaign during 1980, winning the presidency with 489 electoral 
votes to President Jimmy Carter’s 49.122 Following his election, Reagan began the 
process of putting his economic ideology to work in terms of policy. The fraught nature 
of this process is reflected on the September 21, 1981 Time cover image of Reagan (see 
figure 1). This image visually constituted the process of transitioning to “Reaganomics” 
and reflected the difficult reality of enacting economic change. 123 
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Figure 1. Time Magazine. September 21, 1981. 
 
From a compositional standpoint, the image falls in line with typical portraiture 
standards: Reagan is clearly foregrounded, his features are clear, and he is posed at a 
slight angle to the camera. The image cuts off just below Reagan’s chest so that his 
folded arms are visible. The background of the image includes the gold curtains and flag 
bearing the presidential seal, signifying that Reagan is standing in the oval office 
preparing for work. As if to forestall any confusion regarding Reagan’s purpose, the 
headline: “REAGANOMICS Making It Work” is superimposed over Reagan’s bust.124 
Reagan’s expression is one of grim determination: his mouth is set in a firm line and he 
gazes intently into the camera. Combined with his firm stance and folded arms, Reagan 
appears unyielding. By visually citing the trappings of the oval office, including the flag 
and curtain, Reaganomics is visually associated with the presidential office and its 
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attendant ethos. Thus, while the text of the cover image seems to signify the challenges 
associated with making Reaganomics “work,” the visual representation of presidential 
authority in the image indicates that Reagan’s economic scheme will work; that he will 
make it work. 
Neoliberalism as Civil Religion 
 The second element of Reagan’s emergent narrative of neoliberalism, the 
continued connection between civil religion and free markets, prominently figured in 
Reagan’s discourse. Perhaps nowhere is this clearly articulated than in his first inaugural 
address. In his inaugural address, Reagan took on the role of civil religious priest and 
used the authority of this role to redefine freedom to include a specific, neoliberal idea of 
free markets.   
 Delivered at noon on January 20, 1981 from a platform at the West Front of the 
Capitol, Reagan’s first inaugural is rife with examples of his particular form of civil 
religious exceptionalism. Although the address is relatively short—only three pages 
long—it communicated a vast deal regarding Reagan’s vision for the United States, 
grounded in a shift away from liberalism and toward neoliberal conservatism.  
 Both the content of Reagan’s speech and its location on the West Front of the 
Capitol provide insights into the role Reagan constructs for himself and the nation with 
regard to American civil religion. Reagan acknowledged the importance of the location, 
informing his audience:   
This is the first time in our history that this ceremony has been held . . . on this 
West Front Capitol. Standing here, one faces a magnificent vista, opening up on 
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this city’s special beauty and history. At the end of the mall are those shrines to 
the giants on whose shoulders we stand.125 
 
Reagan continued by referencing the key figures associated with American civil religion, 
including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln, in whose 
company he had been placed, both by winning the presidency and giving his speech 
among the great monuments to those individuals. In addition, Reagan referenced the 
Declaration of Independence, which Robert Bellah calls a “sacred document” within 
American civil religion.126 Having positioned himself as not only president, but as an 
individual imbued with the authority afforded by the texts and lineage of American civil 
religion, Reagan spoke with the authority of national priest.127 
 In addition to situating himself firmly in the tradition of civil religion as national 
priest, Reagan carefully articulated the American people’s place within that tradition. 
Connecting the American people to the great battle against Communism, Reagan stated, 
“no weapon in the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and 
women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today’s world do not have. It is a weapon that 
we as Americans do have.”128 He praised the “tens of thousands of prayer meetings” 
being held during the inaugural and reminded the people, “We are a nation under God, 
and I believe God intended for us to be free. It would be fitting and good, I think, if on 
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each Inaugural Day in future years it should be declared a day of prayer.”129 By invoking 
the idea of the sacred covenant and linking it with freedom, Reagan set the stage to 
elevate economic freedom to the level of sacred obligation. 
 A significant portion of Reagan’s inaugural was dedicated to the economy. 
Reagan opened and closed his address by invoking normative ideas of civil religion 
(sacred texts, presidents, and sacred places), folding his economic ideology into the body 
of the speech. This created associations between civil religion and economic ideology, 
making the economy a vital part of civil religion. For example, Reagan used a prophetic 
style when referencing the economy, calling it “an economic affliction of great 
proportions,” which “distorts our economic decisions,” and would certainly end in 
“tremendous social, cultural, political, and economic upheavals.”130 Having repudiated 
the Liberal order by establishing the severity of the economic situation, Reagan engaged 
in a rhetoric of reconstruction, arguing for an economic renewal that involved unleashing 
“the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than it has ever been done 
before,” and “removing the roadblocks that have slowed our economy and reduced 
productivity.”131 The goal, Reagan argued, was to create “a healthy, vigorous, growing 
economy that provides equal opportunities for All Americans.” This would take place by 
curbing “the size and influence of the Federal establishment” and “demand recognition 
of the distinction between the powers granted to the federal government and those 
reserved to the States or people.” Checking the federal government, Reagan argued, 
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would put “Americans back to work,” end inflation, and ensure a “strong and prosperous 
America, at peace with itself and the world.”132 Finally, this economic shift to free 
markets would ensure the United States freedom. Playing with the idea of freedom, 
Reagan oscillated between discussing free economies and individual liberties until they 
seemed synonymous: he argued, “ending inflation means freeing all Americans,” the 
American people must be willing to ensure the “freedom and dignity of the individual” 
and pay the high price for freedom in order to remain the “last and greatest bastion of 
freedom.”133  
 Finally, Reagan compared the challenges of economic change with sacrifice on 
behalf of the nation, linking individual sacrifice to the civil religious martyrdom. Reagan 
provided a number of examples of individuals who gave their lives on behalf of the 
country, reminding his audience of the “simple white markers bearing crosses or Stars of 
David” that “add up to only a tiny fraction of the price that has been paid for our 
freedom.”134 “Each one of those markers,” Reagan stated, “is a monument to the kind of 
hero I spoke of earlier.” By invoking the sacrifice of those who died in combat, Reagan 
set the stage to require a sacrifice from the American people to ensure freedom through 
the economy: 
The crisis we are facing today does not require the kind of sacrifice that Martin 
Treptow and thousands of others were called upon to make. It does require, 
however, our best effort and our willingness to believe in ourselves and believe 
in our capacity to perform great deeds, to believe that together with God’s help 
we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us.135 
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By comparing the challenges of economic change with the sacrifices of individuals who 
died in places “called Belleau Wood, the Argonne, Omaha Beach, Salerno, and halfway 
around the world in Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Pork Chop Hill, the Chosin Reservoir, and in 
a hundred rice paddies and jungles of a place called Vietnam,” Reagan made the 
difficulties of economic transition seem both relatively minor and expected part of being 
American. By exhorting the people, praising sacrifice, and citing the authority of the 
leaders of American civil religion who came before him, Reagan took on the authority of 
the nation’s civil religious priest. This persona authorized Reagan to redefine freedom in 
economic terms, incorporating the free market into the idea of freedom in civil religion. 
Serving both as the narrator and moral guide of the nation, he had the rhetorical 
authority to do so.136 It is as national priest that Reagan was also visually constituted on 
the cover of Time. 
 The theme of civil religious authority construed in Reagan’s inaugural address 
also bore out in his representation on the cover of Time: despite being embroiled in 
controversy, Reagan’s actions as civil religious priest representing the United States in a 
foreign country were visually represented as both natural and appropriate, signifying 
acceptance of Reagan’s civil religious authority. 
The May 13, 1985 Time cover featuring Reagan provids an interesting 
representation of Reagan as United States’ civil religious priest (see figure 2). The 
photograph was taken during Reagan’s visit to Germany for the economic summit. 
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During this time, Reagan and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited the West German 
town of Bitburg for a “reconciliation ceremony” at a military cemetery where both 
German fighting men and members of the Waffen SS—the elite SS members in charge 
of the Nazi death camps—were buried.137 The visit to these graves provoked controversy 
both in the US and abroad: US journalists, private citizens, and religious leaders 
criticized what they perceived as endorsement of and forgiveness toward the perpetrators 
of the holocaust. A writer from the Los Angeles Times argued that Reagan’s actions 
memorialized and dignified “the agents of Nazi criminality,” while Jewish religious 
leaders stood in staunch opposition to the visit.  One moment within the visit stood out to 
theologians as particularly troublesome: laying a wreath at the gravesite.138 Harvey Cox, 
a professor at Harvard Divinity School, called it a “very religious gesture,” arguing that 
Reagan had “no right performing as a kind of high priest of the United States.”139 
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Figure 2. Time Magazine. May 13, 1985. 
 
Despite the controversy discussed at length in the cover story article and the 
media at large, the image of Reagan on the cover of Time is overwhelmingly positive. 
The text of the cover image features a quotation from his speech at the museum of 
Bergen-Belsen, one of the sites where Holocaust victims were killed during Hitler’s 
Final Solution. However, the image is from the reconciliation ceremony at Bitburg, the 
location that stirred such controversy. Bearing a large wreath with red, white, and blue 
ribbons, Reagan is pictured in motion, walking toward the site where he will place the 
wreath. In effect, the image portrays Reagan performing his role as the priest of 
American civil religion. The Time title and headline echo the red, white, and blue in the 
wreath’s ribbons, literally surrounding Reagan with colors that represent the United 
States. The patriotic coloring of the headline seems to visually confirm Reagan’s 
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enactment of American civil religious priest during this controversial moment, while the 
accompanying text associates Reagan’s Bitburg visit with his more accepted tour of the 
Bergen-Belsen museum. The editorial choices made for this cover image thus 
characterized Reagan’s act of civil religious priesthood free of controversy, visually 
constituting Reagan’s enactment of civil religion as dominant. The circulation and 
reception of Reagan’s form of civil religion through his Inaugural address and depiction 
on the cover of Time thus illustrates the success of Reagan’s rhetorical reconstrution of 
free markets as part of the United States’ civil religious obligation to the world.  
Rejecting Liberalism, Fighting Communism 
 Closely linked to Reagan’s performance of the civil religious priesthood was his 
staunch anticommunist stance. As I have previously argued, Reagan invited his audience 
to see the Liberal regime as tending toward totalitarianism and permitting the spread of 
communism both at home and abroad. Throughout his presidency, Reagan identified the 
threat of communism as a threat to individual liberties; his foreign policy was therefore 
deeply concerned with promoting democracy in order to thwart the spread of 
communism. The importance of protecting freedom and spreading democracy were 
important features of Reagan’s anticommunist discourse, along with strong 
anticommunist posturing. The evolution of these features is easily observed both in 
Reagan’s “First Inaugural Address” and in his January 11, 1989 “Farewell Address to 
the Nation.” 
 Although Reagan did not name communism specifically in his “First Inaugural,” 
there are a number of references to the threat of communist states. Reagan compared the 
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United States’ “neighbors and allies who share our freedom” to “the enemies of 
freedom, those who are potential adversaries.”140 Understood within the context of 
Reagan’s redefinition of freedom to include free markets, we can conclude that the 
“potential adversaries” Reagan referenced were the communist states identified in his 
1964 address. Additionally, Reagan posed a warning to those adversaries: “When action 
is required to preserver our national security, we will act. We will maintain sufficient 
strength to prevail, if need be.”141 Further, Reagan promised that the United States would 
“again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have 
freedom.”142 Each of these references tacitly addressed communist nations who, as 
Reagan previously argued in his 1964 address, posed a threat to both the nation and the 
world.  
 It is interesting to note that as a president engaged in the rhetorical process of 
regime construction, Reagan’s references to communism are far less obvious than they 
were during his stump speech on behalf of Barry Goldwater. While Skowronek notes 
that reconstructive presidents have “great rhetorical latitude,” Reagan’s reserved 
references to communism seem to indicate that this rhetorical latitude has bounds, 
perhaps enforced by the constraints of the inaugural address genre. However reserved his 
articulation of the communist threat was at the beginning of his presidency, by its end 
the constitutive legacy of his anticommunist stance had been reinvigorated with a 
willingness to name communist threats explicitly. 
                                                
140 Reagan, “First Inaugural,” 2. 
141 Ibid, 3. 
142 Ibid, 1. 
 76 
 
During his 1989 “Farewell Address,” Reagan again invoked the theme of 
protecting freedom. This was illustrated through the story of a sailor on the carrier 
Midway, who was hailed by refugees as a “freedom man.” Reagan finished the story by 
explaining, “that’s what it was to be an American in the 1980’s. We stood, again, for 
freedom.”143 Freedom as part and parcel of democracy and capitalism promotion leads 
into democracy promotion, Reagan argued, and represented a new era. This new era of 
American leadership, he stated, led to the promotion of democracy and safeguarding 
freedom worldwide:  
We meant to change a nation and instead, we changed a world. Countries across 
the globe are turning to free markets and free speech and turning way from the 
ideologies of the past For them, the great rediscovery of the 1980’s has been that, 
lo and behold, the moral way of government is a practical way of government 
Democracy, the profoundly good, is also the profoundly productive.144 
 
Following this statement, Reagan contrasted democracy promotion with its antithesis, 
stating, “Nothing is less free than pure communism.”145 He demonstrated this by 
providing a brief narrative of a visit to Moscow where the people saw Reagan and the 
first lady and attempted to engage with them, when “a KGB detail pushed their way 
toward us and began pushing and shoving the people in the crowd.” As Reagan recalled, 
this moment reminded him “while the man on the street in the Soviet Union yearns for 
peace, the government is Communist. And those who run it are Communists, and that 
means we and they view . . . freedom and human rights very differently.”146 For Reagan, 
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the presence of a communist government means that “we must keep up our guard” while 
continuing to work with the Soviet Union. This relationship, he stated, was “trust but 
verify. It’s still play, but cut the cards. It’s still watch closely.”147  
For Reagan, communism was a continued problem that required a tough stance, 
continued vigilance, and the extension of freedom through democracy promotion and a 
free market capitalist economy. As indicated in his Farewell Address, this stance was 
galvanized in the face of threats to freedom and attacks on the people. During Reagan’s 
first term, one such event happened that gave Reagan the opportunity to demonstrate his 
staunch anticommunist stance: the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007. 
Following the Korean flight’s demise, Reagan appeared on the cover of Time on 
September 19, 1983; this cover was accompanied by both an article regarding the attack 
on the Korean flight as well as an interview with Reagan regarding the incident. As 
George Church, Bruce Van Voorst, and Laurence Barrett explained in the cover story, 
after shooting down the Korean commercial airline, “Foreign Minister Andrew Gromyko 
indicated, the Soviets would do it again” in order to protect the “sacred borders” of 
Soviet airspace.148 As the authors of the cover story acknowledged, “The widespread 
outrage at the Soviets’ behavior presented the Reagan administration with a delicate 
diplomatic problem,” the result of which was that “The U.S. . . . would play the part of 
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prosecutor in the court of world opinion, presenting evidence of wanton Soviet 
destruction of civilian lives and demanding an accounting.”149 
The cover image that accompanied the story closely matched the narrative 
provided in the article, portraying Reagan as enraged at the loss of life and the Soviets 
engaged in calm discussion with the phrase, “The target is destroyed” emblazoned across 
the bottom of the cover (see figure 4). The image visually constitutes Reagan’s tough 
stance on communism: a tight close-up of Reagan’s face is located near the top right-
hand side of the cover; his expression appears angry and his mouth is slightly open as if 
he were chastising the Soviet government, pictured on the bottom left of the cover. 
While Reagan looks directly into the camera, the Soviet leaders are pictured talking with 
each other, looking at a TV screen, and staring off-camera; none of them make “eye 
contact” with the reader. To Reagan’s immediate left the cover reads, “Putting Moscow 
on the Defensive.” With the text written all in caps and tightly wrapped around the 
image of Reagan’s face, it looks as if he could be shouting at the Soviets government 
members, some of whose posture seems to denote boredom.  
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Figure 3. Time Magazine. September 19, 1983. 
 
The images of Reagan and the Soviet leaders are each bordered and separated by 
text, which is indicative of the deep ideological schism between the two countries. 
However, from a visual perspective, Reagan appears to inhabit the “high” ground, 
indicating the moral nature of his opposition to both Soviet action in this situation and 
communism as a whole. Taken as a whole, the cover image visually constitutes Reagan 
as strong, tough on communism, the protector of the innocent. Conversely, the Soviet 
leaders are portrayed as smaller than Reagan and somewhat scattered. The message to 
the audience is clear: Reagan, with his staunch anticommunist stance, is the dominant 
leader and would, if nothing else, intimidate Moscow into submission. 
Reagan’s “First Inaugural,” “Farewell Address” and his image on the cover of 
Time following the Korean Airlines Flight 007 demonstrate Reagan’s anticommunist 
constitutive legacy: Reagan positioned himself as strongly anticommunist starting in 
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1964, tempered his anticommunism immediately following his election, and 
strengthened his anticommunist stance throughout his presidency, culminating in his 
farewell address. Reflecting back during his “Farewell” address, Reagan recognized his 
continued skepticism toward the Soviet Union but acknowledged the need to continue 
building a relationship with them in order to continue the project of promoting 
democracy worldwide. The constitutive legacy of anticommunism thus shifted in 
response to changing world events and was used to demonstrate a hopeful skepticism 
regarding the Cold War’s end. 
Rugged Individualism 
 The final constitutive invitation within Reagan’s 1964 address that recirculated 
throughout his presidency is the one that has perhaps become most synonymous with 
Reagan: rugged individualism. The dominance of this trope can be seen in both visuals 
of Reagan and his public address. More specifically, I look to Reagan’s “Challenger 
Address” in order to demonstrate how the constitutive legacy of rugged individualism 
developed through both his persona and, by extension, the nation’s. This included not 
only Reagan’s successful performance of the rugged individual, but also his ability to 
superimpose this trope onto the nation as a whole.  
Delivered on January 28, 1986 following the explosion of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger, this relatively short speech served both to eulogize those whose lives were 
lost and restore the nation’s confidence in the U.S. space program.150 In order to 
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accomplish these goals, Reagan drew from the “rugged individualism” trope that 
characterized much of his discourse. As I argue, the fact that this trope was successfully 
marshaled for the purpose of eulogy following a national tragedy speaks to its resonance 
within the culture and demonstrates the strength of the Regan regime.  
 Less than two pages long, the Challenger Address drew heavily from the rugged 
individualism trope in order to praise the dead and encourage the American people to 
continue supporting the space program. Reagan named the members of the crew 
individually, calling attention to their courage in the face of danger. He called them 
“daring and brave,” with a “special spirit” that met challenges “with joy” and “a hunger 
to explore the universe and discover its truths.”151 The members of the crew were thus 
characterized as embodying the kind of rugged individualism that would inspire them to 
face any number of dangers in the pursuit of progress. Further explicating this theme, 
Reagan called the crew “pioneers” who were “pulling us into the future.” It is at this 
point that Regan expanded his identification of the rugged individual from the 
crewmembers to the nation, reminding the people, “We’re still pioneers.”152  
 For the remainder of the speech, Reagan incorporated the audience into the 
rugged pioneer trope, making the crewmembers’ sacrifice part of a larger project in 
which the entire nation was involved. He reminded the nation, “The future doesn’t 
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belong to the fainthearted; it belongs to the brave,” and followed this statement by 
praising the space program and ensuring its continuation: “We’ll continue our quest in 
space . . . Nothing ends here; our hopes and journeys continue.”153 By characterizing the 
crewmembers and nation as rugged individuals imbued with a pioneer spirit, Reagan 
made continued space exploration—and by extension, the space program—a foregone 
conclusion. For Reagan in this address, the only proper way to memorialize the lost 
crewmembers was by continuing their journey. Reagan closed by drawing an analogy 
between the crewmembers and Sir Francis Drake, who “died aboard his ship” while 
exploring the “great frontier” of the ocean.154 The crew and the U.S. were thus linked to 
a concrete example of rugged individualism in world history, broadening the scope of 
the potential consequences for the United States’ involvement in space. Thus, the United 
States became the rugged individual who must push forward in the wake of tragedy, 
continuing to explore space for the good of mankind.  
The resonance of Reagan’s rugged individualism is evident in his January 1981 
“Man of the Year” cover on Time magazine. In this image, Reagan literally embodied 
the rugged individual (see figure 4). Clad in denim, Reagan is reminiscent of a cowboy 
dressed to go to town. Both his jeans and denim shirt are crisp, his belt and belt buckle 
are promiently displayed, and his carefully coiffed hair contrasts with his ruddy face.  
The top two buttons of his shirt are unbuttoned, evincing a more relaxed Reagan, and his 
hands are in his back pockets. Reagan does not look at his audience but rather off to the 
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side, as though contemplating the future. Indeed, Reagan’s entire body is presented at an 
angle, creating a long, lean line down the cover of the magazine.  
Figure 4. Time Magazine. January 5, 1981 
 
More importantly, the image of Reagan is hand-drawn and the result is that he 
appears to be a piece of Americana, a mythic hero from the not-too-distant past. The 
colors of Time magazine (red and white) along with Reagan’s blue denim invoke a sense 
of patriotism, while the quality of the drawing is reminiscent of a Norman Rockwell 
painting. Standing alone on the white background and relegating even the Time logo to 
the background, Reagan is literally the picture of rugged individualism, seemingly ready 
to contemplate and taken on whatever challenges he may face.  As a newly elected 
president, Reagan’s rugged individualism was already closely associated with his 
persona, as the Time cover shows.  
 84 
 
 In both the Time cover image of Reagan and the Challenger address, the trope of 
rugged individualism, first articulated in his 1964 “A Time for Choosing” address was 
equated with Reagan’s persona and, by extension, the nation’s. The image of Reagan on 
the cover of Time reflected the dominance of this the rugged individual constitutive 
legacy, and the Challenger address demonstrated how pervasive this trope became as it 
was used not only to justify policy, but also to encourage the nation in the wake of a 
national tragedy. Rugged individualism’s constitutive legacy therefore developed from 
the 1964 address into a powerful component of the Neoliberal regime.  
Conclusion  
 As I have argued, the ideological, policy, and rhetorical commitments that 
became so closely identified with the Reagan regime began to emerge far in advance of 
his election to the presidency in 1980. The 1964 speech on behalf of Barry Goldwater 
contains a series of constitutive invitations which, woven together into a powerful 
narrative, were recirculated throughout Reagan’s presidential discourse and visually 
represented on the cover of Time. The visual representation of Reagan’s economic 
ideology echoed the difficult nature of economic reform Reagan outlined in his 1976 
stump speech insert, while the authority of his performance as civil religious priest, 
articulated in his inaugural address, was visually constituted on the cover of Time despite 
the controversy that surrounded his visit to the Bitburg cemetery. Additionally, Reagan’s 
persona of rugged individualism, clearly portrayed on his “Man of the Year” Time cover 
in 1981 later translated into the persona he created for the nation, a persona powerful 
enough to assuage the nation’s grief following the Challenger tragedy. Finally, the 
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strong anticommunist stance Reagan first declared in the 1964 address was visually 
represented on the cover of Time following the Korean Airlines incident; this strong 
stance was further reflected in his “Farewell” address and connected back to rugged 
individualism and civil religious exceptionalism in order to promote American 
leadership in spreading democracy. 
 As my analysis suggests, the rhetorical development of a regime depends on the 
careful weaving together of potential narratives located within constitutive invitations, 
enabling the circulation of a new constitutive legacy that gains potency as the affiliated 
regime wanes. For Reagan, a shift in economic ideology was the linchpin that held 
together his reconstructive narrative. Reagan’s explanations of all other elements of the 
Neoliberal regime were linked back to its economic ideology: existing Keynesian 
economic ideology created a problem of government excess that would lead toward 
communism; the solution to the problem was a shift to a more free market model, which, 
coupled with rugged individualism and a staunch anticommunist stance, would keep free 
markets safe. Civil religion authorized the shift to supply side economics, protecting free 
markets and modeling democracy for the unfree communists. 
The successful emergence and construction of the Neoliberal regime—and 
Reagan’s performance of these ideas—was echoed on the cover of Time. The cover 
images associated with each of these core issues portrayed Reagan as strong, dominant, 
successful. By contrast, when Reagan engaged issues that were not part of his regime 
commitments, such as the Iran contra affair, he was portrayed as weak and uncertain. 
The constitutive invitations Reagan offered during 1964 therefore developed into a 
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powerful constitutive legacy that placed constraints on Reagan: he was as bound to 
function according to the dictates of the Neoliberal regime as his successor would be. 
Continuing in this vein, the following chapter will discuss George H.W. Bush’s rhetoric 
of regime articulation as he governed under the constraints imposed by the neoliberal 
regime. 
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CHAPTER III 
GEORGE H.W. BUSH’S RHETORIC OF ORTHODOX INNOVATION 
 
The evening of February 14, 1988, George Herbert Walker Bush reviewed his 
notes in preparation for the Republican primary presidential debate in Manchester, New 
Hampshire. Among the position reminders on foreign and domestic policy issues, Bush’s 
team admonished: “For New Hampshire Republicans, the primary is more than anything 
else a race to see who is the legitimate heir of Ronald Reagan. You must affirmatively 
show that you are that person by embracing Ronald Reagan at every opportunity.”155 
While Bush won the New Hampshire primary and went on to win the presidency in 
1988, his presidential performance displayed a persistent struggle to perform according 
to the expectations imposed by the Reagan legacy.  
Bush’s efforts to perform as the “legitimate heir of Ronald Reagan” were fraught 
with difficulty: in the 1980 presidential primaries, he had criticized Reagan’s domestic 
and foreign policy, characterizing Reagan’s monetarist policies as “voodoo economics” 
and calling Reagan’s suggestion to blockade Cuba an “inappropriate response to Soviet 
military activity elsewhere.”156,157 As a result, Bush faced lingering mistrust from the 
Reagan faithful who questioned his commitment to forwarding the Reagan legacy.158 
The situation was further exacerbated during Bush’s presidency, at which point he 
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violated his core domestic policy position, “No tax increases,” which was popularized 
during the campaign as his “read my lips: no new taxes” pledge.159 Bush’s decision to 
raise taxes on the domestic front came to overshadow a number of foreign policy 
victories, which included the liberation of Kuwait, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. By the time Bush was preparing for his 1992 re-election 
campaign, his 89% approval ratings from February 1991 had plummeted to a dismal 
19% in July of 1992.160 
In the midst of Bush’s trouble in the polls came yet another blow: Time 
magazine’s “man of the year” cover of Bush was heavily critical and featured a cover 
image that portrayed Bush as a two-faced individual. The image, combined with the 
headline, “Men of the year: The two George Bushes,” took the Bush administration 
completely by surprise. As Marlin Fitzwater, White House Press Secretary recounted of 
the photo shoot and interview, “They [Time] knew damn well we wouldn’t grant one 
with the President if we knew that this was going to be a mocking cover that showed him 
to be a two-faced politician...we were duped.”161 The negative cover story, paired with 
Bush’s approval ratings, paints a picture of a failed president. Yet during Bush’s 
presidency a number of successes occurred, both in terms of domestic and foreign 
policy: the Americans With Disabilities Act was passed, Kuwait was liberated, the 
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Soviet Union was dissolved, and the Berlin Wall came down. Why, then, was Bush 
characterized so negatively? This is the question the following chapter seeks to address. 
In this chapter, I argue that although Bush was initially well-positioned to 
manage the core tenets of the Neoliberal Regime, he ultimately failed to capitalize on his 
achievements and allowed alternative renditions of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy to 
overshadow his own. In the story of political time, then, Bush failed as an orthodox 
innovator by consistently allowing events to define themselves, rather than defining 
events for the people as logical extensions of the Neoliberal regime’s core commitments.  
Situated within political time as an orthodox-innovator, George HW Bush’s 
rhetoric of regime articulation became increasingly fragmented across the course of his 
presidency and represents a failure to continuously control party and public 
interpretations of the ideological, policy, and rhetorical commitments of the Neoliberal 
regime.  While Bush’s actions can be interpreted as prudent, or wise in the moment, his 
articulation of those policies failed to gain rhetorical traction within public discourse. 
From a rhetorical perspective, the Bush presidency reveals that in order to 
maintain rhetorical authority, regime articulation presidents, and especially orthodox 
innovators like Bush, must make use of casuistic stretching to legitimize their rendition 
of the regime’s constitutive legacy. Kenneth Burke explains that casuistic stretching 
involves introducing “new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to old 
principles.”162 Casuistic stretching can occur through metaphorical extension, 
transferring words “from one category of associations to another,” and using synecdoche 
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to “speak of the ‘head’ of a ‘corporation’ or the ‘network’ of a ‘broadcasting system.’” 
More specifically, Richard Miller explains, casuistic stretching requires that the rhetor 
attend to “complex details, the contingencies and vagaries of human experience. 
Casuistry demands that we examine the data and interpretations that surround a given 
case, that we work through appearances in order to find those that are most reliable.” 
Whatever method of casuistry is used, however, Burke cautions that the exercise of 
casuistry must be “absolute and constant.”163  
As an orthodox innovator, I argue that Burke’s use of casuistic stretching was 
neither absolute nor constant, as he failed to exercise rhetorical control over his rendition 
of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy, instead leaving the casuistry to others. To explicate 
this argument, the chapter will proceed as follows: first, I set the context of the Bush 
presidency using Skowronek’s theory of political time, beginning with the 1988 election. 
I then examine speeches and images of Time from Bush’s presidency that demonstrate 
how Bush’s disjunctive performance of the Neoliberal expectations bore out both in 
Bush’s rhetoric and popular visual commentary on those rhetorical performances. The 
chapter closes by considering how political time can help scholars to better understand 
the rhetorical situation of the orthodox innovator. 
The Bush Presidency: An Exercise in Regime Articulation 
As Stephen Skowronek explains, George H.W. Bush can be characterized within 
political time as an “articulation leader.” Articulation leaders, and specifically orthodox 
innovators such as Bush, follow regime builders like Reagan who “leave in their wake a 
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more constricted political universe for presidential action.”164 Bush was expected to 
serve as loyal representative of the political alliance Reagan established; this required 
that he stay in line with established power relationships; any tinkering with received 
commitments would be met with skepticism.165 In order to be perceived as a successful 
orthodox innovator, Bush faced the task of maintaining the commitments of ideology 
and interest established by Reagan and “keeping faith with a ruling coalition in changing 
times.”166 This required that Bush manage the “narrative structure” of political time, 
extending the constitutive legacies of the Neoliberal regime by maintaining the 
repudiative stance of the Reagan regime with regard to any lingering policy or 
ideological ideas from the Liberal regime. Any adjustments to the commitments of the 
Neoliberal regime had to occur in a manner that maintained the overarching narrative of 
the regime, which made big government and communism part and parcel of the same 
problem, and posited free markets as the solution in which the “true” American—the 
rugged individual—would prevail.  
For Bush, the changing times of the late 1980s and early 1990s presented 
significant challenges for performing the economic, exceptionalist, and rugged 
individualist standards of the Neoliberal regime. From an economic perspective, Bush 
was expected to follow in lock step with the monetarist ideology implemented by 
Reagan. In addition to affirming the ideology of Reaganomics, Bush also needed to 
perform Reaganomics through policy recommendations. Bush was also required to 
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perform the exceptionalist discourse of the Neoliberal regime, particularly with regard to 
foreign policy; this foreign policy approach included a strong anticommunist stance 
applied specifically to German and Russian relations. Finally, Bush was expected to 
couch his foreign and domestic policy performances in the persona of rugged 
individualism that Reagan established throughout his presidency. However, as 
Skowronek notes, extending the commitments of a dominant regime proves difficult 
when those commitments are contradicted by political reality. While Reagan, as the 
reconstructive president, had the rhetorical latitude to construct regime expectations, 
Bush was faced with the task of turning that legacy “into a workable system of 
government,” a process that necessarily lacked the rhetorical appeal of Reagan’s 
transformational changes.167 Bush’s position as immediate heir to the Neoliberal regime 
was therefore constrained in interesting ways as he was bound by Reagan’s well-
established constitutive legacy and policy expectations.  
To understand George H.W. Bush’s presidency means to study the historical 
situation in which Bush transitioned from Republican primary presidential candidate in 
1980, through his selection as vice president and eventual election to president. In 
particular, the 1980 Republican primary presidential election reveals the tensions 
between Bush and Reagan that became especially problematic during Bush’s presidency. 
The 1980 Republican primary was a particularly bitter battle between Bush, a career 
politician who ran on the old guard Republican ticket, and Reagan, the former California 
governor and movie star whose political popularity had steadily increased since his 1964 
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debut on behalf of Barry Goldwater during the 1964 Republican primaries. Bush’s bid 
for the Republican nomination in 1980 was a foregone conclusion for many. As the 
editors of the Washington Star remarked, Bush had “been put forward, almost inevitably, 
as the leading heir to the support that Gerald Ford enjoyed in bitter contest against 
Reagan in 1976.”168 While Bush maintained popularity among many Republican elites, 
others complained, “there is no legacy Ford can pass on to a candidate. On the contrary, 
his 1976 supporters are all over the lot—some with Reagan,” and the rest spread across 
the field of Republican primary candidates.169 Thus, the political climate Bush faced 
demanded more than the “moderate alternative” Bush offered, as the Washington Star 
editors continued: “ . . . there just isn’t a great demand for moderates in the Republican 
Party these days.”170  
 Although Bush attempted to characterize himself as a “moderate” alternative to 
Reagan, Reagan spent time articulating his ideological and policy positions on issues 
such as the economy and foreign policy. In so doing, Reagan established himself as the 
measure against which the other candidates would be judged. As a result, Reagan’s 
opponents— especially Bush—spent much of their time attacking Reagan’s policies 
rather than offering their own. For example, an editorial in the Philadelphia Evening 
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Bulletin made the following assessment of Bush: “We’ve had enough people defining 
the problems. Where are his solutions? Nice guy. Presidential material? Not hardly.”171  
 As the campaign wore on and other potential Republican candidates dropped out 
of the field, the contest became increasingly tense. Bush criticized Reagan at every 
opportunity, characterizing his foreign policy positions as “counter-productive” and 
“inappropriate.”172 On the economy, Bush was even more critical: at his April 10, 1980 
campaign speech at Carnegie Mellon University, Bush famously stated that Reagan 
supported “. . . what I call a voodoo economic policy.”173 With these words, Bush sowed 
the seeds of skepticism among the far right in the Republican Party that would only 
proliferate in the coming years. Skowronek notes that this rhetorical move made it 
difficult for Bush to present himself as a stalwart leader with the ability to further the 
Reagan legacy.174 Eventually, Bush was forced to admit defeat and withdrew from the 
primary election May 26, 1980, just prior to the California June primary election.175 In a 
strange twist of fate, Reagan’s first choice for vice president, Gerald Ford, fell through 
after Ford appeared to affirm that he and Reagan had discussed a “co-presidency.”176 
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Richard Allen, Reagan’s first national security adviser, recalled that, left with few 
options, Reagan recommended Bush for vice president on the condition that he “support 
the platform across the board.”177 Bush agreed and, at 11:38 p.m. the night before the 
nominating convention, became Ronald Reagan’s official running mate.178  
 As Reagan’s running mate and eventual political heir, Bush was bound to support 
Reagan’s platform in its entirety, despite the very vocal opposition he voiced during the 
Republican primaries. Throughout his vice presidency, Bush focused on diplomatic 
negotiations with the USSR; this allowed Bush to begin paving a middle road between 
Reagan’s staunch anti-communist stance and liberal acceptance of the Soviet regime. 
Instead, Bush argued for a combination of “realism, strength, and dialogue,” stating, 
“We need to talk to the Soviets. This is a nuclear age, which means it’s simple not sane 
to sit in stony silence at bomb’s length from a powerful adversary.”179 
 During the course of Reagan’s presidency, Bush was involved in the 
reconstruction effort, or establishing a new political regime. This involved not only 
supporting Reagan’s ideological, policy, and rhetorical commitments, but also helping 
put them into action. For example, Bush was deeply involved in establishing a working 
relationship with the Soviet Union, traveling throughout Europe in an attempt to “defuse 
Reagan’s image as nuclear cowboy” and convince European leaders of the president’s 
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“depth of conviction” regarding arms reductions.180 Bush was instrumental in preserving 
the relationships that made de-escalation of the cold war possible: “By putting a 
reasonable face on American policy, Bush lowered rhetorical tensions,” arguably saving 
the Atlantic alliance.181 Bush’s efforts in the political reconstruction of conservatism 
were thus understood largely in relation to his diplomacy and foreign policy efforts. 
As established in the previous chapter, the key tenets of the Neoliberal regime 
were civil religious exceptionalism, a monetarist economic ideology, anti-communism, 
and rugged individualism. In order to determine how Bush negotiated these issues as a 
regime articulation president, I draw from a number of speeches and statements 
delivered across Bush’s tenure, beginning during the 1988 presidential election and 
ending during the 1992 presidential election. These texts include Bush’s 1988 speech 
accepting the Republican nomination, his 1990 remarks announcing a federal budget 
agreement, his Christmas address regarding the fall of the Soviet Union and resignation 
of Mikhail Gorbachev, a number of his stump speeches, and his acceptance speech at the 
1992 Republican National Convention. Bush’s negotiation of each of the tenets of the 
Neoliberal constitutive legacy, including economic ideology, anticommunism, civil 
religious exceptionalism, and rugged individualism will be evaluated as performances of 
orthodox innovation. Following the analysis of Bush’s discourse, I will examine cover 
images of Bush from Time magazine that represent how Bush’s performance of 
Neoliberal regime commitments was visually constituted for the public. 
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Bush’s Economic Articulation: No New Taxes? 
Although Bush began his presidency adhering to the constraints of Reaganomics, 
he failed to engage in casuistic stretching, or consistently communicate with the public 
regarding the recession. As a result, Bush lost control of the narrative of his regime 
articulation. This resulted in a series of last-ditch efforts to convince the public of his 
ability to manage the economy. Thus, while Bush made prudent changes to economic 
policy in terms of governance, he refused to rhetorically perform regime articulation 
until forced by outside events. Bush’s efforts to shape the narrative later during his 
presidency were too little, too late, diminishing his credibility as the standard-bearer of 
the Neoliberal regime. These challenges to his credibility in economic articulation 
became a defining issue of Bush’s presidency, as is illustrated in the increasingly 
disjunctive nature of Bush’s discourse from his election through his eventual defeat in 
1992. 
Casuistic Stretching: Old Policies, New Presidential Persona 
Bush was initially positioned to successfully manage the economic aspect of the 
Neoliberal regime. In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Committee in 
1988, Bush had the assistance of Peggy Noonan and a number of key Reagan advisors to 
help Bush fine-tune his economic discourse so that it would be resonant with Neoliberal 
regime expectations.182 Using a commonsense style and invoking the economic gains of 
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the 1980s, Bush articulated his forthcoming presidency as a continuation of the 
Neoliberal regime, maintaining his fidelity to supply side economics. Specifically, Bush 
used the economy to connect himself overtly with Reagan, arguing that he and Reagan 
had begun the task of returning “America to her greatness. Eight years later look at what 
he American people have produced: the highest level of economic growth in our entire 
history...”183 Additionally, Bush framed economy in terms of achievement, exhorting his 
listeners to “Consider the size of our triumph: A record high percentage of Americans 
with jobs, a record high rate of new businesses – a record high rate of real personal 
income.”184 Reinforcing his dedication to economic issues, Bush argued, “economic 
growth is the key to our endeavors” and would be continued by “maintaining our 
commitment to free and fair trade, by keeping government spending down, and by 
keeping taxes down.”185 The issue of taxes cropped up again later in the speech, when 
Bush famously stated, “My opponent won’t rule out raising taxes. But I will. The 
Congress will push me to raise taxes, and I’ll say not, and they’ll push and I’ll say no, 
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and they’ll push again, and I’ll say to them, ‘Read my lips: no new taxes.’”186 Bush thus 
established his commitment to the Neoliberal regime’s economic tenets while 
previewing the future of the U.S. economy, which for Bush would include the “free and 
fair trade” with other nations.  
“No New Taxes”: A Rhetorical Ticking Time Bomb 
While Bush initially performed economic regime articulation in a manner that 
resonated with Reagan coalition members and the general public, his failure to 
casuistically stretch the economic narrative in response to the ballooning deficit turned 
his “no new taxes” promise into a ticking time bomb. After taking office in 1990, Bush 
initiated a bipartisan deficit reduction summit; by June he had signed a statement 
permitting tax increases.187  In response, more than one hundred House Republicans 
“signed a letter of complaint in opposition to the president’s statement on taxes.”188 
However, the economy was in recession by July 1990, prompting Bush to move forward 
with a bipartisan budget proposal despite potential Republican backlash. Despite the fact 
that the 1990 budget agreement was considered a “very good deal” (less than half of 
Reagan’s 1982 tax increase) and did not affect personal income tax, it was inevitably 
viewed in light of Bush’s 1988 campaign promise: “Read my lips. No new taxes.”189,190 
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Compounding the issue, Bush refused to speak to the public regarding this 
subject, with the exception of the July news conference. Instead Bush assumed that his 
party and the public would understand his means and motives as appropriate for the 
moment: an overt neglect of the “consistency” principle of casuistic stretching. Dan 
Quayle recalled, “He truly believed that the country was going to judge him on results—
what he did and how it turned out—not on what he said in a speech.”191 In the meantime, 
it became increasingly apparent that both the public and Congress would not wait for 
results. On September 30, 1990 Bush and the congressional leadership announced their 
bipartisan budget agreement. In response, Newt Gingrich rallied conservative 
Republicans against the deal. In an effort to garner support for the upcoming October 5 
vote on the budget deal, Bush gave a speech from the Oval Office on October 22, 1990, 
which was designed to provide the explanations for reneging on the “no new taxes” 
pledge that both Congress and the public demanded. 
Bush’s “Address to the Nation on the Federal Budget Agreement” represents a 
last-ditch effort at casuistic stretching that proved to be too little, too late. Although the 
nation expected to be informed about the budget deal, the Bush administration’s failure 
to understand the moment is perplexing. Much of this could be due to Bush’s own 
reticence to engage the rhetorical presidency. Admittedly an “awkward” individual 
lacking in eloquence, Bush put more emphasis on governance that communication. As a 
result, White House Communications Director David Demarest decided to “place the 
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onus on the press to decide what it was going to cover,” letting the policy, rather than 
Bush, speak for itself.192 The lack of communication with the press extended to within 
the White House, as the Office of Public Liaison “didn’t have the foggiest idea what was 
going on” during the budget negotiations.193 Further complicating the situation, Bush’s 
October 2nd speech was not reviewed by Communications: they “learned of the 
agreement only after it was faxed a copy of Press Secretary Fitzwater’s public 
statement.194 The speech took place in the absence any other communication from the 
White House between June and October regarding the budget deal due to a number of 
factors, including the White House’s focus on Iraq, a lack of support from the 
Republicans in Congress, and Bush’s reticence to use his bully pulpit in support of his 
domestic governance. 
 In the address, Bush was forced to go back on his earlier claims of economic 
strength, situating the deficit as a “cancer gnawing away at our nation’s health.”195 This 
was a significant change from the narrative he offered in during the election. Instead of 
Neoliberal policies healing the economy, Bush now told the story of a sick economy 
diseased by the deficit Reaganomics created. This shift was significant, as it required 
Bush to admit the ill effects of Reagan’s supply-side economics, an economic policy 
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whose effectiveness he defended during the election. Pointing out the flaws in this 
economic policy, Bush argued,  
…no family, no nation can continue to do business the way the Federal 
Government has been operating and survive. When you get a bill, that bill must 
be paid. And when you write a check, you’re supposed to have money in the 
bank. But if you don’t obey these simple rules of common sense, there’s a price 
to pay.196 
 
In an attempt to make the economic difficulties coherent within the narrative of the 
Neoliberal regime, Bush employed the commonsense reasoning popularized by Reagan. 
Using the analogy of the family budget and writing a check, Bush reduced a complex 
issue to a simple one, relying on the analogy to justify the budget agreement. 
Bush thus created a sense of urgency designed to motivate his audience – the 
public – to act on the issue immediately. Bush praised the budget agreement’s attributes 
without providing any particulars, calling it “the biggest” and “the toughest” deficit 
reduction plan ever, whose enforcement mechanisms would result in “real and lasting 
spending cuts.”197 Following this, Bush entered the most treacherous terrain of the 
speech: revenue increases. Bush first acknowledged public sentiment, stating, “I’m not, 
and I know you’re not, a fan of tax increases.”198 Reneging on his core economic pledge, 
Bush explained the necessity of tax measures to “allow the economy to grow,” “create 
more jobs,” “lower interest rates,” and “give small and medium sized companies a 
needed shot in the arm.”199 By enumerating the advantages of revenue increases, Bush 
attempted to overcome the audience’s objections to breaking his “no new taxes” pledge, 
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a key tenet of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy. This represented a significant moment 
in Bush’s economic articulation, during which he had the opportunity to shift the 
economic portion of the Neoliberal regime narrative to justify the revenue increases 
Bush thought necessary.   
To justify this dramatic moment of economic articulation, Bush hedged his 
critique of Reaganomics, making the recession Washington’s fault broadly, rather than 
the administration’s. Whatever the cause of the economic failure, Bush portrayed his 
team as willing to meet the challenge of fixing it with hard work and bipartisanship. The 
agreement was “worked out between the administration and bipartisan leaders of 
Congress,” the “first time a Republican president and leaders of a Democratic Congress 
have agreed to real cuts,” and is referred to as “bipartisan” five times during a speech 
that lasted just less than nine minutes. Finally, Bush united the “Democratic and 
Republican leadership” with the president, who “all speak with one voice in support of 
this agreement.”200 By emphasizing the cooperative nature of the agreement, Bush 
attempted to reach individuals across the partisan divide and persuade them to overcome 
their possible objections and pressure their congressional representative to vote in favor 
of the budget agreement. 
Building upon bipartisanship, Bush called the budget agreement the result of 
“blood, sweat, and fears,” and designed to prevent the “economic chaos” that would 
occur if the deficit continued to increase. Bush combined the commonsense style with 
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fear appeals.201 The fear appeals became even more dramatic as Bush described the 
eventual effects of the ballooning deficit: “if we fail to act, next year alone we will face a 
Federal budget deficit of more than $300 billion, a deficit that could weaken the 
economy further and cost us precious jobs.”202 This attempt to establish the urgency of 
the deficit can be seen as Bush’s effort to demonstrate the kairos of the budget 
agreement for the audience. However, what Bush failed to recognize was that kairos in 
this circumstance was tied not to the need for the plan itself, but instead assuaging public 
fears regarding his economic management. 
Having established the bipartisan ethos of the budget agreement, Bush addressed 
possible objections individuals might have with the agreement. By couching these 
possible disagreements in claims of the bill’s bipartisan nature, Bush attempted to 
characterize those objections as outliers rather than the majority, and opponents of the 
bill as opponents of fairness and bipartisanship. He argued,  
Clearly, each and every one of us can find fault with something in this 
agreement. In fact, that is a burden that any truly fair agreement must carry. Any 
workable solution must be judged as a whole, not piece by piece. Those who 
dislike one part or another may pick our agreement apart. But if they do, believe 
me, the political reality is, no one can put a better one back together again.203 
 
In this statement, Bush’s claims of fairness and pragmatism censured those in his own 
party (namely, Newt Gingrich), who criticized Bush’s decision to permit tax increases. 
In fact, as Windsor states, “Gingrich reportedly set out to discredit the government 
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entirely as a basis for restarting a failed or stalled Reagan Revolution.”204 Bush’s appeals 
to partisanship therefore widened the schism between Bush and those in his party who 
remained skeptical of his ability to carry forward the core commitments of the Reagan 
regime. As if to underscore this idea, in no portion of this speech does Bush apologize to 
his constituency for reneging on his “no new taxes” pledge. Instead, Bush takes a 
defensive posture throughout, justifying his actions and criticizing those who had not yet 
acquiesced to this new economic plan: one that directly contradicted a core tenet of the 
economic plank of Reagan’s Neoliberal regime. Bush’s attempts at articulating the 
economic aspect of the Neoliberal regime was therefore problematic, as it not only 
widened existing schisms within the Republican Party, but also called into question his 
ethos as a regime representative among voters. 
Livid that Bush planned to go back on his campaign promise, congress 
eventually defeated the budget deal in the House on October 25, 1990 by a vote of 254 
to 179.205 In the end, Bush’s claims of bipartisanship further fractured his base, while his 
overt appeals to the rhetorical presidency and attempts to sell his budget agreement to 
the people backfired. By effectively turning his back on the economic component of the 
Reagan Neoliberal regime, Bush alienated not only Republican members of Congress 
but also the public. However, Bush attempted to temper the extreme negative reaction to 
his treatment of the Reagan Neoliberal regime with regard to economic policy by 
successful leadership in foreign policy. 
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Ill-Timed Economic Casuistry: The Cold War’s End 
In an effort to salvage his economic articulation, Bush endeavored to translate his 
Cold War successes into economic opportunity for the American people. Successful 
orthodox innovation requires that the rhetor respond to changing exigencies while 
maintaining key aspects of the existing narrative framework; the articulation must 
remain recognizable in relation to preexisting regime commitments. The end of the Cold 
War represents one such moment of significant change that Bush contended with to 
maintain his relevance as a Neoliberal regime representative. Bush’s “Address to the 
Nation on the Commonwealth of Independent States” is an exemplar of these efforts. In 
the address, Bush used his 1988 acceptance address at the RNC as an inventional 
resource, linking successful foreign policy and international cooperation to domestic 
economic opportunity.   
Delivered in the wake of Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation, the address focused 
primarily on acknowledging Gorbachev’s contributions and encouraging the American 
public to support the nascent Commonwealth of Independent States (former members of 
the Soviet Union). What is interesting here is the final section of the speech, in which 
Bush inserted a section that attempted to assuage public anxieties about the economy and 
link the end of the Cold War to eventual economic improvement in the United States. 
Following his celebratory remarks regarding the end of the Cold War, Bush stated:  
These dramatic events come at a time when American are also facing challenges 
here at home. I know that for many of you these are difficult times. And I want 
all Americans to now that I am committed to attacking our economic problems at 
home with the same determination we brought winning the cold war.206 
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Here, Bush attempted to articulate the economic aspect of the Neoliberal regime’s 
constitutive legacy in terms of foreign policy success. By making connections between a 
successful resolution to the Cold War and public sentiment regarding the economy, Bush 
attempted to translate his foreign policy success into domestic confidence. The 
successful conclusion of the Cold War and the economy thus served as mutually 
reinforcing arguments for evaluating his policies as successful, both foreign and 
domestic. Within this new framework, international cooperation and prosperity were 
inextricably intertwined, making foreign policy as important as domestic. As Bush 
argued,  
We will only succeed in this interconnected world by continuing to lead the fight 
for free people and free and fair trade. A free and prosperous global economy is 
essential for America’s prosperity. This means jobs and economic growth right 
here at home.207 
 
Bush thus attempted to shift the narrative from one of unilateral economic success into 
economic opportunity through international cooperation. As a result of the Cold War’s 
end—which Bush had hastened—the United States would become prosperous because 
of the increased economic opportunities abroad.  
Bush further invited the public to accept his articulation of the Neoliberal 
regime’s economics by emphasizing the interconnected global economy. He stressed 
interconnectedness and partnership throughout the speech, foreshadowing his eventual 
critiques of isolationism. Bush discussed plans to “work with,” “engage,” build ties,” 
and “work closely” with the former Soviet nations throughout the speech, with his calls 
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for cooperation culminating in his declaration that “Our enemies have become our 
partners, committed to building democratic and civil societies. They ask for our support, 
and we will give it to them.”208 In his post-Cold War rhetoric, Bush thus attempted to 
shift the narrative, making successful foreign policy a prerequisite for American 
prosperity and economic opportunity.  
While Bush’s remarks regarding Gorbachev and the Commonwealth may be seen 
as demonstrating kairos (as I will explain later), his performance of economic orthodox 
innovation in this moment is somewhat puzzling. The end of the Soviet Union and 
creation of the Commonwealth was a major foreign policy success; to disrupt this 
moment of triumph with remarks regarding the nation’s stagnant economy seems 
strange. Although linking foreign policy success and international trade to the United 
States’ economic success was a major goal for Bush, this speech demonstrated a lack of 
attention to kairos as he shifted the tone of the speech from epideictic to deliberative, 
likely violating audience expectations by calling attention to his perceived domestic 
failures on the eve of a great foreign policy success.  
Smart-Alecks and Word Salad: Failed Economic Casuistry in Dover 
As the 1992 election neared, Bush’s rhetoric of economic articulation became 
increasingly disjointed. Rather than capitalizing on the economic narrative he 
foreshadowed in his 1988 acceptance address and specified in his Christmas speech 
following the resignation of Gorbachev, Bush’s posture became increasingly defensive 
and disorderly as the campaign wore on. His stump speech, “Remarks to Liberty Mutual 
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Insurance Employees in Dover,” provides insight into the struggles Bush faced as he 
attempted to continue reconcile public perception of domestic economic woes with his 
successful foreign policy.  
It is worth mentioning at this point that at least some of Bush’s issues during the 
1992 election were issues of personnel. His campaign manager from 1988, Lee Atwater, 
had died, leaving the upcoming campaign leaderless. Compounding the issue, Bush 
faced increasingly negative poll numbers, which he attributed to problems within his 
administration: Chief of Staff John Sununu had continuously created “mischief” 
throughout Bush’s term and was eventually asked to resign.209,210 In addition, Bush faced 
political challenges from within his own party: former Nixon and Reagan aide Pat 
Buchanan challenged Bush, “finding receptive audiences in places like New Hampshire, 
which had experienced difficult economic times.”211 In an effort to hedge against the 
Buchanan threat, Bush made a trip to New Hampshire in January 1992 during which the 
initial cracks in the administration’s communication became gaping holes. During this 
trip, it became clear that there was no clear leadership either in the campaign or the 
White House.212 Having appointed Samuel Skinner as the new chief of staff, Bush put 
together a campaign team with ties to the 1988 campaign. While each of the members of 
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this team was selected for his success in a specific area, there were communication 
difficulties, as “each wanted to run the entire show, or at least some piece far greater in 
size than the president imagined.”213 Additionally, the campaign team did not include the 
new chief of staff, leading to further disjunction between the White House and the 
campaign. With no clear plan and continuous infighting over the campaign’s leadership, 
Bush’s poll numbers continued to plummet. As Bush told a friend in January, “These 
last two months have been the worst of my presidency, and the last year has been the 
worst of my political career.”214 
Within this context, Bush delivered a stump speech to Mutual Liberty Insurance 
employees in Dover prior to the New Hampshire primary. This stump speech represents 
a total breakdown in Bush’s economic articulation, as he was caught between defending 
his economic record and admitting its ills. This created a situation in which Bush’s 
attempts to extend his earlier economic articulation of increased opportunity through 
international interdependence was not coherent within the larger public narrative of 
economic failure (i.e., the recession) that had come to characterize his presidency.  
Throughout the speech, Bush’s tone was defensive and pessimistic: a drastic shift 
from the continuation of positive change Bush had embodied during the 1988 election.215 
Bush described the economic climate his audience was facing in negative terms, calling 
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them “problems,” “hardships,” and “difficulty.”216 He acknowledged that times were 
“tough,” that there had been “low unemployment” (a misspeak, which Demarest 
clarified should have been “low employment”), and acknowledged his “share of the 
blame” in the current economic situation.217 While this could be a response to the 
popular criticism that Bush had failed to take the economy seriously as an issue in the 
campaign, this strategy became problematic within the speech as Bush painted a grim 
picture of the economic situation during his term as president at the same time he argued 
that “we have economic stimulation.”218 
In opposition to his earlier position on the simplicity of deficit reduction 
(expressed through his family budget/checkbook analogy earlier in his presidency), Bush 
shifted to a description of the economy as a nuanced issue. Denouncing his opponents, 
he implored the audience, “please do not listen to these guys that want to take political 
advantage, come up with a quick fix to something as complicated as the economy, and 
then be gone and never to return.”219 Bush described his opponents’ propositions as 
“scatterbrained ideas and quick fixes to something as tough as the economy,” and the 
country as “plagued” by economic issues. Bush thus challenged his own earlier 
economic articulation, shifting his domestic policy propositions from a simple deficit 
reduction issue to an overly complicated, burdensome issue. 
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Bush also attempted to continue his economic articulation regarding international 
trade but in order to do so, he had to address the criticisms levied against the linkages he 
had previously established between domestic and global economic success. His response 
did not model the form of cooperation he advocated on the international stage, instead 
evincing a tendency toward unilateral action that undercut the credibility of his calls for 
interdependence: “they ask . . . ‘how could you lead the world . . . and then have such 
difficulties with the economy?’ Well, let me tell you something. When I moved all those 
forces I didn’t have to ask Senator Kennedy or some liberal democrat how, whether we 
were going to do it.”220 By blaming the democrats for his domestic trouble, Bush 
contradicted the ethos of bipartisanship he had worked so hard to establish in his 
“Address to the Nation on the Federal Budget Agreement.” Throughout the speech, he 
oscillated between assigning blame to the Democratic Party and admitting his own 
failures, contradicting his prior articulation of the economy as healthy. 
The criticisms of Bush’s foreign policy focus adversely affected his ability to 
forward a coherent narrative regarding global economic growth as a prerequisite for 
American economic growth. Bush initially attempted to explain his rendition of 
economic articulation, claiming “What we’re trying to do is to expand exports by 
making that playing field level and getting access to foreign markets . . . I am going to 
continue to work to open markets, to take this question of equal opportunity—that’s all 
the American worker needs—equal opportunity in the global marketplace.”221 However, 
he quickly shifted to a defensive posture, addressing the challenges of individuals who 
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advocated “… shrinking world markets and going into some siren call of 
protection…”222 Doing so, according to Bush would create the same conditions “that 
threw this country into a depression back in the thirties. I’m talking 25 percent 
unemployment back in those days.”223 
Despite being able to refute the criticisms of his global economic stance, Bush’s 
focus on this form of economic articulation rendered him incapable of accomplishing 
casuistic stretching of the Neoliberal regime’s constitutive legacy in a manner that would 
assuage the public’s economic concerns. Bush attempted to accomplish this in his stump 
speech at Dover but the mix of policies he advocated did not resonate with his prior 
economic articulation, in part because he had refused to perform casuistic stretching 
consistently or absolutely, changing his message on the occasions he decided to speak 
publicly about the economy at all. Over the course of his presidency Bush’s economic 
orthodox innovation lacked both coherence with the existing Neoliberal regime’s 
economic narrative, and fidelity with respect to Bush’s economic trustworthiness. In 
other words, Bush’s orthodox innovation reneged on the established orthodox and failed 
to be acceptable as reasonable innovation. Despite being poised to articulate the 
necessity of a global economic focus early on, Bush allowed events to define themselves 
rather than taking control of the narrative he so skillfully articulated during the 
Republican National Convention. Bush’s failure of orthodox innovation can thus be seen 
not as a failure of policy, but as a rhetorical failure to narrate necessary policy changes in 
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response to changing exigencies in a manner that resonated with existing regime 
commitments: a failure to engage in consistent casuistic stretching. 
Anticommunism Without Communists 
Unlike his tenuous economic articulation, Bush was positioned rhetorically as 
well as diplomatically to engage in a rhetoric of anticommunist articulation. Afforded 
additional legitimacy due to his diplomatic work with the Soviet Union during his 
presidency, Bush was able to narrate the end of the Cold War in a fashion that 
effectively renegotiated existing regime commitments. While some scholars have 
claimed that Bush’s failure to propagate his vision of a “new world order” signaled a 
failure of his post-Cold War rhetoric, I argue that his management of the anticommunist 
narrative from the Neoliberal regime provided the public with a way to identify with the 
former communist threat of Eastern Europe, marking a significant rhetorical success, or 
kairotic performance. In particular, Bush’s anticommunist orthodox innovation 
progressed from a careful balance of hopefulness and skepticism, to a liminal rhetorical 
space in which the former Soviet states could be seen as friends and democratic partners 
while still eschewing Communist ideology. Using presidential rhetoric to mark the end 
of the preexisting, simplistic Cold War narrative, Bush provided a rhetorical transition 
from a struggle between nations to a struggle between ideologies.  
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Ending the Cold War: Successful Anti-Communist Orthodox Innovation 
Toward the end of his presidency, Reagan predicted that “the prospect of not 
only a new era in Soviet-American relations but a new age of world peace.”224  
Referencing Reagan’s own shifting attitude with regard to the Soviet Union at the end of 
his presidency, Bush continued Reagan’s narrative by acknowledging that the changing 
international situation (the end of the Cold War) would necessitate a new perspective 
regarding the United States’ former foes.  
Bush set the stage for his anticommunist articulation by explicitly referencing 
Reagan’s anticommunist narrative and renegotiating it in light of changing international 
exigencies. During his acceptance address at the Republican National Convention, he 
hinted at anticommunism but the bulk of his discussion was forward-looking, predicting 
not a continued threat but the end of the Cold War: 
Look at the world on this bright August night. The spirit of Democracy is 
sweeping the Pacific Rim. China feels the winds of change. New democracies 
assert themselves in South America. One by one the unfree places fall, not to the 
force of arms but to the force of an idea: freedom works.225 
 
Rather than framing his policy in opposition to Communist ideology, Bush addressed the 
issue in positive terms, identifying the change that had taken place during Reagan’s 
tenure. Further, Bush did not mention communism explicitly but enthymematically, 
identifying countries the audience would identify with communist governments. Echoing 
Reagan’s standard of working with the Soviet Union while keeping “up our guard,” 
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Bush promised to employ a “prudent skepticism” that involved peace through strength 
and “hard cool engagement in the tug and pull of diplomacy.”226,227 Using broad terms to 
discuss his anticommunist stance allowed Bush to apply the abstract idea of freedom to 
an equally abstract threat. In other words, refusing to mention Communism or the Soviet 
Union explicitly provided Bush with room to imagine a new future. This was possible 
only through his careful continuation of the narrative Reagan had put into place.  
In addition to managing the Reagan narrative, Bush also negotiated the 
anticommunist aspect of the Neoliberal tradition by tempering the Reagan Neoliberal 
constitutive legacy with his own skills. Emphasizing his military experience, Bush 
reminded that audience, “My life has been lived in the shadow of the war. I almost lost 
my life in one.”228 Based on this experience, he was able to say with complete 
authenticity, “I hate war. I love peace. We have peace.”229 Bush invited the audience to 
see him not only as a tried and tested military man, but also as part of the change that 
had brought peace. By invoking his military experience and connection to the Reagan 
regime in the same moment, Bush strengthened his claim to leadership: he had both the 
connection to the Reagan regime and the military and diplomatic experience to lead the 
nation through the current international moment.  
Upon winning the presidency in 1988, Bush used his inaugural address to 
continue articulating the anticommunist narrative he established during the election:  
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We live in a peaceful, prosperous time, but we can make it better. For a new 
breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn. For in man’s 
heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, 
its old ideals blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze 
is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on.230 
 
As in his acceptance speech, Bush used hopeful, future-oriented rhetoric to describe the 
situation in Communist countries, invoking the imminent end of the Cold War without 
actually referencing Communism. He established points of identification between the 
United States and the Soviet States by referencing a change in the hearts of people in 
Communist nations. This change—in heart, not in fact—was resonant with the state of  
soon-to-be Americans on the eve of the Revolutionary War. By tacitly drawing 
connections between the former Soviet states’ struggle and the U.S. during its own 
moment of political transition, Bush’s negotiation of anticommunism drew from 
powerful existing narratives of the United States’ past and made his articulation relevant 
not just within the confines of the Neoliberal regime, but within the United States’ 
history broadly.    
While his public narrative regarding anticommunism hopeful, Bush maintained 
careful skepticism of the Soviet Union. As CIA sources reveal, Bush “entered office . . . 
determined to put his own stamp on America’s foreign policy and make US-Soviet 
relations its main focus.”231 He ordered a review of existing US policy toward the Soviet 
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Union. The results of this review split his foreign policy team between those who desired 
immediate dialogue with Gorbachev and those who remained dubious of his 
intentions.232 
Eventually, Bush and his foreign policy staff became convinced that “Gorbachev 
was ready for dialogue and compromise.”233 Gorbachev himself made the first move 
toward compromise, surprising the Bush administration (and the world) in his Address to 
the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988 where he “renounced class 
warfare as the basis of Soviet foreign policy, embraced pan-humanist values, and global 
interdependence, and pledged to convert an economy of armaments into an economy of 
disarmament.” Gorbachev called for the end of the Cold War and invited the U.S. to 
participate by “halting the arms race and seeking settlements of regional conflicts.”234 In 
response to Gorbachev’s commitments, Bush gave a speech at Texas A&M University in 
May 1989 where he proposed that the U.S. should “move beyond containment” and 
bring the USSR into the international community. This address belied his foreign policy 
team’s lingering reservations and foreshadowed his eventual articulation of hopeful 
global interdependence while continuing the Reagan-era rhetoric of cautious skepticism. 
Qualifying his efforts to bring the USSR into the international community, Bush 
remarked, “new relationship cannot dimply be declared by Moscow or bestowed by 
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others; it must be earned. It must be earned because promises are never enough.”235 
During this period, Bush’s anticommunist articulation struck a careful balance between 
hopefulness and skepticism, preparing the American people to accept the former Soviet 
states as friends once the Cold War came to its end. 
 As Bush predicted, Gorbachev made good on his promises. The Soviet leader 
initiated glasnost (openness/free speech) and perestroika (economic reform/rebuilding), 
replaced key cabinet members who were symbols of “old thinking,” and withdrew 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan.236 This show of faith resulted in the first Bush-
Gorbachev summit in Malta on December 2-3, 1989. The summit “opened the way for 
the successful conclusion of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990 
and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in 1991.”237 As nations on Russia’s 
periphery responded to glasnost in surges of ethnic nationalism, the Soviet empire began 
to crumble. A CIA intelligence assessment written by the Office of Soviet Analysis 
argued, the “unrest that has punctuated Gorbachev’s rule is not a transient phenomenon. 
Conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to continuing crises and instability 
on a larger scale.”238 Within this maelstrom of instability, Bush offered his rhetorical 
vision of a “new world order,” where diverse nations would be “drawn together in 
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common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, 
freedom, and the rule of law.”239   
Perhaps in response to Gorbachev’s program of glasnost and perestroika, a 
“right-wing cabal of Soviet hard-liners” backed by Boris Yeltsin attempted to depose 
Gorbachev.240 Although the coup was unsuccessful in the short term, the seeds for 
Gorbachev’s eventual demise as leader had been sown. Thus, on Christmas Day in 1991 
Gorbachev called President Bush to announce the “end of the experiment in 
Communism born in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.”241  
Bush’s response, given later that evening, demonstrated that, when willing to 
respond in the moment, he was quite capable of controlling the narrative of 
anticommunism and performing orthodox innovation. In the “Address to the Nation on 
the Commonwealth of Independent States,” Bush harnessed the kairos of the moment 
while continuing to articulate anticommunism in a fashion that embraced the former 
Soviet states, just as he foreshadowed in his Inaugural Address. Bush’s performance of 
regime articulation was therefore successful in this moment not only because he met 
expectations, but also because he had so carefully prepared the public for it  in his 
previous speeches. 
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Bush began the speech by reviewing the great “drama of the 20th century,” 
calling to mind Reagan’s mythic narrative of the ongoing struggle of the “shining city on 
a hill” with the “godless Communists.” He stated,  
For over 40 years, the United States led the West in the struggle against 
communism and the threat it posed to our most precious values. This struggle 
shaped the lives of all Americans. It forced all nations to live under the specter of 
nuclear destruction.242 
 
Bush’s speech marked a unique moment in the Cold War narrative, as he was able to 
bring the drama to a close. Continuing to fold the American people into the narrative, 
Bush stated confidently, “That confrontation is now over . . . This is a victory for 
democracy and freedom. It’s a victory for the moral force of our values. Every American 
can take pride in this victory”243 By continuing with the narrative structure of Reagan’s 
anticommunism, Bush rhetorically performed regime articulation of anticommunism. As 
William Lewis has argued, one of the hallmarks of Reagan’s style was in creating a 
sweeping narrative that had specific roles for the American people.244 By beginning the 
speech in the narrative style, Bush situated himself firmly within the Reagan tradition, 
meeting the stylistic expectation of the existing narrative.  
Having closed this portion of the story, most clearly articulated by Reagan, Bush 
rhetorically moved the audience forward to imagine what a new era of US-Russian 
relations would look like in the absence of the Soviet Union. In order to accomplish this, 
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Bush performed an important aspect of orthodox innovation: acknowledging the 
changing exigencies that permit a departure from the established regime narrative. The 
most blatant shift from the Neoliberal constitutive legacy of anti-communism concerned 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation. Bush credited Gorbachev, rather than the United 
States, for the end of the Soviet Union. Although the end of the Soviet Union was seen 
as “a victory for the moral force” of American values, Bush carefully and deliberately 
noted that the Soviet Union’s end was “signified today by Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision 
to resign as President.”245  
By situating Gorbachev’s resignation as a decision, Bush characterized the 
leadership of the prior Soviet Union and future Russia as partners, not enemies, moving 
the narrative away from the “evil empire” narrative forwarded by Reagan. This was 
significant for Bush because he fundamentally changed the framework through which 
the American people understood the Cold War, the former Soviet Union, and their own 
place in the shifting narrative. Understanding the magnitude of this shift, Bush was 
careful to detail Gorbachev’s actions in terms designed to create identification between 
the American people and Gorbachev: 
I’d like to express, on behalf of the American people my gratitude to Mikhail 
Gorbachev for years of sustained commitment to world peace, and for his 
intellect, vision, and courage. I spoke with Mikhail Gorbachev this morning. We 
reviewed the many accomplishments of the past few years and spoke of hope for 
the future.  
Mikhail Gorbachev’s revolutionary policies transformed the Soviet Union. His 
policies permitted the peoples of Russia and the other Republics to cast aside 
decades of oppression and establish the foundations of freedom. His legacy 
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guarantees him an honored place in history and provides a solid basis for the 
United States to work in equally constructive ways with his successors.246 
 
Rather than reference the specific policies Gorbachev implemented (such as glasnost and 
perestroika), Bush discusses Gorbachev’s leadership in broad terms designed to resonate 
with the American public. His policies were described as “revolutionary,” fought 
oppression, and promoted freedom; Gorbachev himself is characterized as a partner 
whose actions paved the way for future positive relations. Bush did not only recognize 
Gorbachev’s accomplishments personally, but on behalf of the American people, 
describing the events as an “historic choice for freedom,” a “peaceful and democratic 
path” that “clearly serve our national interest.”247 Bush further promoted identification 
between American citizens and the Commonwealth by employing terms popularly used 
to describe the American democratic project: in the space of the seven-minute speech, 
Bush used variations of the word “freedom” ten times and “democratic” eight times; he 
calls the governmental shift “peaceful” and “independent” six times each. By loading the 
speech with terms that had powerful resonance for Americans, Bush situated Gorbachev 
and those succeeding him as positive part of this transitional narrative, permitting a 
change in the national understanding of the Soviet Union’s character from “evil empire” 
to diplomatic Russian partner. 
Having closed the narrative of what happened, Bush transitioned to imagining 
the future for his audience: “We stand tonight before a new world of hope and 
possibilities for our children, a world we could not have contemplated a few years 
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before.”248 Identifying this “new world” Bush started to engage in a form of orthodox 
innovation that left the confines of the Reagan construction of the Soviet Union and 
defined the relationship anew. Bush’s attempts to redefine the relationship at this 
juncture are mainly rhetorical in nature: he recognized and welcomed “the mergence of a 
free, independent, and democratic Russia” along with its “courageous President, Boris 
Yeltsin.”249 Bush acknowledged the transition in leadership, pledging to work with 
Yeltsin “to bring democratic and market reform to Russia.”250  
Shifting entirely out of the reasoned skepticism of the Soviet Union, Bush 
encouraged the audience to embrace a “democratic” Russia as partner to the United 
States. This was reinforced as Bush expressed support for “Russia’s assumption of the 
U.S.S.R.’s seat as a permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council.”251 
Bush continued his show of support for the transition by recognizing the independence 
of the former Soviet states that “have made specific commitment to us,” including 
Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan.” 
Promising to sponsor U.N. membership for those states who are not already 
members, Bush further pledges to “establish diplomatic ties” with those nations.252 In a 
final act of recognition, Bush acknowledged “the remaining six former Soviet Republics: 
Moldova, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, George, and Uzbekistan,” promising to 
“establish diplomatic relations . . . when we are satisfied that hey have made 
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commitments to responsible security policies and democratic principles.”253 This act of 
naming is a powerful rhetorical tool when wielded by a president: Zarefsky notes that 
“naming a situation provides the basis for understanding it and determining the 
appropriate response;” presidents specifically have the power to “define political reality” 
through this process.254 By naming these individual nations within the context of 
establishing diplomatic relations and membership within the United Nations (arguably 
the model for Bush’s “New world order”), Bush offered a new definition of the former 
Soviet Union, one that situated those nations as participants in the great democratic 
project on a global scale. Thus, Bush provided a rendition of anticommunism that 
effectively folded the former Soviet states into an international partnership, making 
communism not a problem of people, but of ideology. Former communist states became 
analogous to the U.S. during the Revolution, and were thus transformed from ideological 
foe to potential economic partner and friend. 
Disjunctive Anti-Communist Orthodox Innovation in the 1992 Campaign 
Although Bush performed orthodox innovation successfully following the fall of 
the Soviet Union and throughout most of his presidency, as the 1992 election neared, his 
narrative became increasingly disjunctive. During his stump speeches, and particularly 
during his address to Liberty Mutual Insurance employees in Dover, Bush was unable to 
stay on message. This compromised the coherence of his carefully crafted 
anticommunist narrative, as it became part and parcel of a larger jumble, dubbed “word 
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salad” by critics. In terms of anticommunist articulation, Bush lost the threads of his 
powerful narrative and took on a defensive stance that undercut his prior successes. 
Bush’s defensive posture throughout the speech evinced his lack of control over 
the anticommunist narrative. Rather than continuing his established anticommunist 
articulation, he allowed criticisms of the economy to overwhelm the orthodox innovation 
of anticommunism he had clearly established throughout his presidency. For example, 
Bush went on the defensive regarding critiques of his focus on foreign policy at the 
expense of the economy:  
I told some of them over there, there’s a big difference, you know, people say to 
me, difference between domestic and foreign policy. ‘How could you lead the 
world’—and they gave me some credit for Desert Storm, that the American 
people feel very, very strongly about—‘how can you do that and then have such 
difficulties with this economy?’ Well, let me tell you something. When I moved 
those forces I didn’t have to ask Senator Kennedy or some liberal Democrat how, 
whether we were going to do it. We did it. I didn’t have to ask some smart-aleck 
columnist who was saying, ‘Bush hasn’t explained this to the American people.’ 
We did it.”255 
 
By allowing his critics to define his achievements following the Cold War as opposed to, 
rather than in support of, his domestic policies, Bush gave up control of his carefully 
crafted narrative. Thus, when he attempted to remind his audience of the connections 
between foreign policy and the economy he had laid out during his acceptance speech, 
inaugural, and remarks at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was in opposition to 
alternative definitions of his foreign policy. Bush’s references to the connection between 
foreign and domestic policy came across as a response to his critics rather than a 
carefully laid out, established plan. For example, Bush referenced disagreements with 
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his opponents while reminding his audience of the link between economic health and 
foreign trade:   
What we’re trying to do is expand exports by making that playing field level and 
getting access to foreign markets. So, when someone says to me, some politician 
out of some state that never heard of New Hampshire comes up here and says, 
‘The President ought not to worry about world peace or the global economy,’ I’m 
going to say, ‘Let me run my business the way I think is best.’ I am going to 
continue to work to open markets, to take this question of equal opportunity—
that’s all the American worker needs—equal opportunity in the global 
marketplace.256 
 
Not only did Bush reference his detractors, he also gave them a clear voice in relation to 
his policy arguments. By engaging in an argument with his critics during his stump 
speech, Bush lent credence to their criticism. Additionally, Bush’s attempts to articulate 
the difference between domestic and foreign policy resulted in a clear statement of his 
disdain for answering questions regarding his motives and actions, which was ostensibly 
the purpose of his New Hampshire visit. This also fed the existing perception that Bush 
was “out of touch” with voters and called into question his advocacy for international 
cooperation; it seemed that Bush himself did not want to engage in either transparency 
or cooperation regarding his foreign policy. Additionally, Bush was overt about his 
reluctance to explain things to the American people. Making his disdain for the press 
apparent, Bush spoke of “smart-aleck” reporters more than once during the speech. The 
reluctance to engage with the press and inform the people exacerbated existing notions 
of Bush as disconnected from voters. 
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 Bush’s defensiveness extended from his articulation of post-Cold War foreign 
policy to his accomplishments in ending the Cold War itself. Continuing to give his 
critics voice during his event, Bush argued, 
 And to those political cynics out there, these political newcomers hitting this 
State for the first time, let me say this: I won’t apologize one minute for the fact 
that your kids and my grandkids might just have an opportunity, because of the 
way we’ve conducted the foreign affairs in this country, to grow up in a world 
with a little less worry about nuclear war.257 
 
Refusing to apologize for his role in ending the Cold War and successful action in Desert 
Storm, Bush attempted to articulate his post-Cold War, anticommunist narrative, calling 
to mind the opportunities afforded to American workers as a result of opening trade with 
former communist countries. However, his condescension for his opponents—who at 
this point included other Republicans—belied his disenchantment with the Republican 
base. Attempting to placate voters while showing his contempt for the Republican 
establishment, Bush pleaded with his audience, “But just give us a little credit for the 
fact that we now have a tremendous change in the world, old totalitarian systems now 
democracies, people in the South of the border now working for free markets. And that 
means more jobs for the people of New Hampshire.”258As in the previous portion of the 
speech, Bush attempted to combine his economic and anticommunist articulation, 
applying extended opportunities specifically to his audience: New Hampshire voters. 
However, his defensiveness and demands that he be given “credit” for his efforts 
(repeated three times throughout the speech) seem desperate rather than confident. 
Interspersed throughout the speech as responses to his critics, Bush’s narrative of 
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anticommunist articulation completely broke down at this point, allowing his critics to 
call into question his foreign policy successes. Further, by attempting to articulate his 
anticommunism as part of his economic plan in this piecemeal fashion, Bush lent 
credence to accusations that his foreign policy focus had compromised any domestic 
focus he might have had. 
 Bush’s articulation of anticommunism from the 1988 through 1992 elections 
illustrates how the challenges of orthodox innovation can overwhelm a candidate and 
turn an initially successful articulation into a rhetorical problem. Although Bush began 
his presidency poised to be the president who ended the Cold War and stimulated the 
economy, Bush’s failure in economic articulation overwhelmed his foreign policy 
successes. Making his anticommunist articulation primarily about opening borders and 
increasing trade, Bush failed to capitalize on the narrative he established throughout the 
first portion of his presidency. Thus, by the time he began the 1992 presidential 
campaign, his anticommunist articulation had been reduced to a mere distraction from 
the “real” problems facing American voters rather than a major triumph of the “moral 
force” of American democracy.259 
Liberalism Rears its Kinder, Gentler Head: Bush’s Civil Religion 
While Reagan used civil religious tropes extensively throughout his presidency 
to legitimate his actions as civil religious priest and revitalize American exceptionalism, 
Bush took a decidedly different perspective on this aspect of the Neoliberal constitutive 
legacy. Rather than act with the authority of a civil religious priest, Bush dissociated 
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himself from Reagan with regard to civil religion and established a different kind of 
rhetorical authority. Bush’s interpretation of civil religion, grounded in community and 
mutual responsibility, resulted in a characterization of both local and national 
government as responsible for ensuring individual success. This perspective represented 
a turn back to Liberal regime interpretations of government, creating a rhetorical 
problem for the heir to the Neoliberal regime.   
Situating himself as related to, yet distinct from Reagan, Bush rejected the 
mantle of civil religious priest, instead relying on his diplomatic and military expertise to 
legitimize his presidential authority. This is made clear in his acceptance speech at the 
Republican National Convention in 1988, where Bush declared, “But now you must see 
me for what I am: the Republican candidate for President of the United States.”260 Bush 
clearly dissociated from Reagan by establishing his own leadership credentials, 
including his military service. The frame of military service became a guiding persona 
for Bush, who characterized himself as  
. . . a man who sees life in terms of missions – missions defined and missions 
completed. When I was a torpedo bomber pilot they defined the mission for us. 
Before we took off we all understood that, no matter what, you try to reach the 
target. There have been other missions for me – Congress, China, the CIA. But I 
am here tonight – and I am your candidate – because the most important work of 
my life is to complete the mission we started in 1980. 
 
By inviting the audience to see him as the commander-in-chief capable of continuing the 
mission Reagan began in 1980, Bush established his authority through life experience 
rather than the authority imbued by the office of the presidency.  
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Bush did not completely eschew civil religion; instead, he enacted the role of 
national pastor rather than priest, concerning himself more with the care and governance 
aspects of civil religion than the ceremonial. As a civil religious pastor, his personal 
experience with religion guided his vision for how American communities should 
interact. For example, in his 1988 RNC acceptance speech Bush stated, “I am guided by 
certain traditions. One is that there is a God and He is good, and his love, while free, has 
a self imposed cost: We must be good to one another.”261 For Bush, performing civil 
religion was part of being a member of a community; instead of performing 
ceremonially as civil religious priest, Bush invoked civil religion from a highly personal,  
pastoral perspective. Civil religion became the authorizing force behind his calls for a 
“kinder, gentler America” and “a new harmony, a greater tolerance” in which “the tired 
old baggage of bigotry” will be left behind.262 
Bush’s enactment of civil religious pastor continued throughout his presidency: 
when speaking to a disability community, Bush argued, “Each American shares a 
responsibility a kinder, gentler America, to follow the example that so many of you in 
this room have lead with your lives.”263 This form of civil religion relied primarily on 
community involvement and individual acts of charity rather than the ceremony and 
ceremonial declamations of the civil religious priesthood enacted during Reagan’s 
presidency.  
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Bush thus engaged casuistic stretching of the civil religious constitutive legacy, 
using discourse to tacitly shift the metaphor of civil religious leader from priest to pastor. 
This form of casuistry perhaps stretched the constitutive legacy of civil religion too far, 
necessitating a shift away from Neoliberal regime government skepticism and toward a 
more Liberal faith in the government. By calling for a “kinder, gentler” nation and 
consistently linking the success of the individual to the success of the community and 
need for government action, Bush articulated a Liberal vision of the relationship between 
the government and people that directly contradicted the constitutive legacy of 
government skepticism Reagan had so carefully cultivated. Bush thus attempted to break 
off one element of the Neoliberal regime’s constitutive legacy—government 
skepticism—while continuing to support others.   
One aspect of Reagan’s civil religious constitutive legacy Bush did not reject was 
the United States’ sacred obligation to model democracy for the world. However, Bush 
significantly stretched the constitutive legacy of democracy promotion to accommodate 
the new situation posed by the end of the Cold War. 
At the start of Bush’s presidency, with the Cold War still in effect, a narrative 
that relied on a clash between the godless Communists and godly Americans was 
available. However, as circumstances changed and this topos no longer made sense, 
Bush shifted the narrative to reflect the changing relationship between the United States 
and former Soviet states. In particular, Bush changed the characters in the narrative from 
a clash between peoples to a clash between ideologies. In this new narrative, it was the 
“American idea” that triumphed, rather than the American people. This shift allowed 
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Bush to continue forwarding American exceptionalism while being responsive to global 
political events, such as the end of the Cold War and establishment of a democratic 
Russia.  
Bush began to make these shifts—or casuistic stretches—early on in his 
presidency. For example, during his inaugural speech, he stated, “I see America as the 
leader—a unique nation with a special role in the world,” and “This has been called the 
American Century, because in it we were the dominant force for good in the world.”264 
He continued by arguing that the next century will “be another American century” 
because “Our work is not done—our force is not spent.”265 While Bush clearly situated 
the United States as having a “special role in the world,” he did so by calling for 
continued democracy modeling rather than a continued Cold War with the Soviet Union.  
Bush’s more nuanced version of civil religious exceptionalism performed 
orthodox innovation by responding to domestic and international events: gone was the 
neat package of the Cold War against which the neoliberal constitutive legacy could 
offer its narrative of godly American triumph over godless communism. The nuance 
Bush was forced to introduce as a result of the Cold War’s end presented significant 
challenges for orthodox innovation, as the Neoliberal constitutive legacy relied on a 
tight, tidy narrative rhetorical package. As Bush attempted to introduce nuance into 
particular aspects of the neoliberal constitutive legacy, he neglected others, particularly 
the trope of rugged individualism. 
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Whither Rugged Individualism? 
 Bush’s efforts to perform orthodox innovation within the constraints of the 
neoliberal regime necessitated significant shifts in his performance of civil religion, 
anticommunism, and economic ideology. While some of those changes were fairly 
successful—such as anticommunism and civil religion—others were less so. While I 
have already discussed the unraveling of Bush’s economic articulation, yet another 
element of the neoliberal constitutive legacy—rugged individualism—was practically 
abandoned during Bush’s tenure. The disappearance of the rugged individualism trope 
can be directly linked to Bush’s efforts to shift the Reagan tradition away from 
simplicity and individualism, and toward nuance and community responsibility. In other 
words, Bush’s orthodox innovation required recognizing that the elements of the 
constitutive legacy existed in a distinct hierarchy. When changing political realities 
posed challenges to the constitutive legacy, some core elements had to be protected at 
the expense of others.  
For Bush, anticommunism and the economy remained priorities. Rugged 
individualism, on the other hand, did not accord with Bush’s rendition of the neoliberal 
tradition and was thus abandoned. In its place, Bush offered a version of individualism 
that valorized individual responsibility in the context of contributing to local, national, 
and global communities rather than the Reaganesque form of rugged individualism. 
Throughout his presidency, Bush worked to stretch the rugged individualism trope from 
its Neoliberal form back into a more Liberal understanding of individual citizens as 
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invaluable members of communities whose success was tied to government 
interventions.  
 During the course of his economic articulation, Bush advocated bipartisan 
cooperation over party loyalty, challenging the idea that the GOP could succeed on their 
own. This posed a direct challenge to the form of rugged individualism Reagan had 
advocated for the GOP when he presented the Neoliberal regime as the only alternative 
to years of Democratic leadership failures. Addressing the need for deficit legislation, 
Bush acknowledged, “any one of us alone might have written a better plan.”266 
Advocating for the bipartisan plan over that of any one person or party, Bush elevated 
cooperation over individual efforts and the good of the nation over the pride of the party. 
As he argued,  
Those who dislike one part or another may pick our agreement apart. But if they 
do, believe me, the political reality is, no one can put a better one back together 
again. Everyone will bear a small burden. But if we succeed, every American 
will have a large burden lifted.267 
 
 While advocating for a shift in economic priorities, Bush thus also attempted to 
renegotiate rugged individualism by proxy, prioritizing bipartisan efforts. Asking the 
American people to urge their Senators to “do what the bipartisan leadership has done: 
come together in the spirit of compromise to solve this national problem,” Bush 
rhetorically elevated compromise over partisan posturing in the face of a looming 
national crisis.268  
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Additionally, Bush challenged the rugged individualist underpinnings of the 
Neoliberal economic ideology: namely, the idea that economic success was the 
inevitable result of individual effort. Instead, Bush acknowledged the role of the 
government and community in creating the conditions for economic success. He stated, 
“Everyone who can should contribute something, and no one should have to contribute 
beyond their fair share. Our bipartisan agreement meets these tests. And through specific 
new incentives, it will create more jobs.”269 In advocating for government action to 
safeguard the economy through regulation rather than deregulation, Bush contradicted 
the existing idea of rugged individualism that was tied to free market capitalism and the 
anti-government regulation efforts that had been central to Reagan’s economic rendition 
of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy.  
Bush’s efforts to renegotiate rugged individualism were also marked by his 
embrace of nuance. Rather than offering simple solutions for simple problems, Bush 
acknowledged the complexities of governing, especially when it came to the economy. 
This was made evident in his challenge of the antigovernment aspect of rugged 
individualism in his acceptance address at the 1988 Republican National Convention. 
Bush addressed the antigovernment stance directly, stating, “Does government have a 
place? Yes. Government is part of the nation of communities – not the whole, just part. I 
do not hate government. A government that remembers that the people are its master is a 
good and needed thing.”270  
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Rather than continue the articulation of government as the problem, Bush 
attempted to introduce nuance into the antigovernment form of the Neoliberal 
constitutive legacy by arguing that government can do good, when engaged 
productively. As a representative of the Neoliberal regime, Bush’s reminder that a 
government can, indeed be “good and needed” was an effort to preemptively authorize 
his use of government to forward his own interpretation of regime commitments. 
However, this move was potentially fraught for Bush, as the existing regime 
commitments had relied so heavily on rejecting government intervention. This rhetorical 
move therefore illustrated the double-bind that Bush inherited from Reagan: expected to 
use the authority of the regime to engage in government action to forward the regime’s 
interests, yet constrained by the existing regime expectations of and anti-government 
stance. Bush negotiated this tenuous rhetorical terrain by maintaining careful skepticism 
of the government and carefully qualifying government action: “good and needed” only 
when it remembered, “the people are its master.” Thus, only a government operating 
with the authority of the people’s voice—ostensibly expressed through the vote—would 
be authorized for action. Bush thus performed orthodox innovation by shifting from a 
staunch antigovernment stance to one in which the government could act appropriately, 
given the right circumstances. These circumstances, for Bush, were those in which the 
government worked to fulfill the demands of the people, who expressed their will 
through the vote, authorizing the Neoliberal regime’s continuation with Bush as its 
figurehead.  
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This more nuanced view of government was directly tied to Bush’s description of 
good and helpful government as “part of the nation of communities.” By invoking the 
idea of the government as part of a larger whole and not simply the ever-present 
“problem” described by Reagan, Bush attempted to shift the understanding of 
government to personal rather than political, an integral part of the workings of countless 
communities. Further, by identifying the United States as a “nation of communities,” 
Bush challenged the existing idea of the nation as a monolithic actor, instead drawing 
attention to the interdependent nature of its parts: not just cities or states, but 
communities. The emphasis on community reinforced Bush’s efforts to personalize the 
government, drawing attention to its role not just in politics, but also in its citizens’ daily 
lives. This became increasingly clear when Bush provided his definition of community: 
not “a limited cluster of interest groups, locked in odd conformity,” but rather 
“thousands and tens of thousands of ethnic, religious, social, business, labor union, 
neighborhood, regional, and other organizations, all of them varied, voluntary and 
unique . . . a brilliant diversity spread like stars, like a thousand points of light in a broad 
and peaceful sky.”271  For Bush, then, the diversity of the nation’s individuals were its 
greatest strength, as they contributed to the communities that gave authority to 
government through their civic participation. Celebrating individualism in the context of 
community interdependence was thus an integral part of Bush’s orthodox innovation of 
rugged individualism.  
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While Bush may have shifted the rugged individualism trope into a celebration of 
diversity, he nonetheless found ways to continue including stock cultural notions of 
conservatism to temper his efforts at orthodox innovation. In this way, Bush used his 
rendition of civil religious exceptionalism to displace the rugged individualism trope. 
One strategy Bush used to accomplish this was by merging the cultural values of 
conservative voters with his more nuanced version of individualism. For example, 
during his 1988 acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, Bush drew 
from the stock Reagan notion of individualism while speaking more directly to 
conservative values voters. Highlighting the importance of family, “our culture, our 
religious faith, our traditions and history,” Bush used the prevenient ethos of family 
values issues as a means of supporting a form of individualism that was reliant on 
community.272 Like Reagan, Bush cited individualism as an important tenet to 
understanding what makes us uniquely American. The importance of the individual was 
tacitly connected to the importance of small government:  
From the individual to the family to the community, and on out to the town, to 
the church and school, and, still echoing out, to the county, the state, the nation – 
each dong only what it does well and no more. And I believe that power must 
always be kept close to the individual – close to the hands that raise the family 
and run the home.273  
 
While Bush highlighted the importance of the individual, it was not the rugged 
individualism popularized by Reagan. Instead, Bush situated the individual within 
networks of family, community, and church. Although Bush emphasized the idea of 
“tradition,” he did not circumscribe his definition of community in Reagan’s narrow 
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terms. Community and government, for Bush, were part of the same fabric of the 
American people, “a brilliant diversity spread like stars, like a thousand points of light in 
a broad and peaceful sky.”274 Continuing to invoke his role as civil religious pastor, 
Bush described family values issues and the importance of the individual as part of his 
“personal philosophy.” By connecting his own personal philosophy to those of values 
voters and doing so from the persona of civil religious pastor, Bush solidified his place 
as part of the coalition that brought Reagan to power and as the appropriate interpreter of 
the Neoliberal constitutive legacy. Thus, Bush harnessed the ethos of the Neoliberal 
tradition and shifted the trope of rugged individualism to one of individuals within 
networks of community and government. 
Visualizing Regime Articulation: Bush on the Cover of Time 
    Bush’s orthodox innovation of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy was 
characterized by his embrace of nuance as he attempted to make the tenets of the 
Neoliberal constitutive legacy responsive to changing domestic and international 
exigencies, adapting his understanding of kairos to events occurring within chronos, or 
linear time. As previously discussed, his attempts at orthodox innovation were received 
with varying degrees of acceptance throughout his presidency. Cover images of Bush on 
Time magazine provide external validation and repudiation of Bush’s efforts at 
negotiating the existing commitments of the Neoliberal regime. As I argue, these images 
mirrored the degree of success with which Bush engaged in orthodox innovation: at first 
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successful, but eventually breaking down completely as Bush’s rendition of the 
Neoliberal regime was ultimately rejected. 
Visual Representations of Bush: Faithful Son of the Neoliberal Regime 
Visual representations of Bush on the cover of Time linked him inextricably to 
the Reagan legacy, providing publics with the visual rhetorical resources to evaluate 
Bush in comparison to Reagan throughout his presidency. As the successor to the 
Reagan legacy, George H.W. Bush was expected to extend the commitments Reagan had 
established, both in terms of policy and ideology. Closely reading the images of Bush 
within their journalistic and historical context provides evidence of how Bush’s 
performance as an orthodox innovator, or continuation of the Reagan regime, was 
evaluated. While Bush was initially situated as a faithful son of the Reagan legacy on the 
cover of Time, the issues leading up to the 1992 presidential election—and specifically 
his “Men of the Year” cover served as external repudiation of Bush’s performance 
within the Reagan regime.  
In his initial appearances on Time, Bush was clearly connected to Reagan 
through visual representations of Reagan and Bush as political father and son. He first 
appeared with Reagan on the July 28, 1980 cover of Time.275 In this image, Reagan and 
Bush stand shoulder-to-shoulder, waving exuberantly to the crowd during the 
Republican National Convention. The title of the issue, “Getting it Together,” was 
emblazoned across the top of the issue and read alongside a teaser for an “Exclusive: 
Inside the Ford Drama.” This teaser title is located on the bottom right-hand side of the 
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cover and layered over part of Bush’s midsection. The visual of Bush and Reagan 
together, along with the text of the cover, suggest that Bush was the solution to 
overcoming the “Ford drama” and would help see the campaign through to a successful 
end.276 Bush is shown to the right of Reagan, waving and literally performing the 
position of “right hand man,” visually marking him as an irreplaceable part of the 
Reagan campaign.  
Bush was similarly depicted on the August 27, 1984 cover of Time, where he 
appeared with Reagan once again as a member of the “Republican encore.”277 This 
cover, like the 1980 image, was also published as part of the coverage on the Republican 
National Convention. The subheading here, “Coronation in Dallas,” situated Reagan as 
powerful leader, with Bush firmly at his side. The language of a “coronation” signified 
the eventual succession of Bush to Reagan and is visually represented in the image, with 
Reagan depicted as a father figure and Bush as his faithful son. The two men were posed 
standing side-by-side, with Reagan in a mature, masculine button-down western shirt 
and Bush in a more casual, youthful polo shirt. Their facial expressions also call to mind 
a father and son: Reagan has a composed, pleasant smile while Bush, although smiling, 
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looks as though he has been caught mid-laugh, with his mouth partially open. Bush’s 
characterization as a member of the Reagan political lineage continued following his 
own successful presidential campaign in 1988. The December 12, 1988 cover image 
once again situated Bush as a son of the Reagan legacy, with the title “Over to You, 
George” accompanied by an image of Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, and a number of other 
Soviet leaders.278 While the image shows Gorbachev making eye contact with Reagan 
and Bush looking on, the title of the issue suggests Reagan passing the diplomatic torch 
over to Bush as the president-elect. Throughout Reagan’s presidency and during the 
beginning of his own presidency, Bush was visually positioned as the eventual orthodox 
innovator: situated alongside Reagan in ways that underscored his youth, Bush was the 
visual embodiment of what Skowronek calls the “faithful sons” of political time: the 
regime articulation president. 
The False Claimant: Visual Representation Following the Death of “No New Taxes” 
Although Bush was visually situated as the unquestioned heir to the Reagan 
legacy, his performance of that legacy was ultimately called into question, visually 
positing Bush as a simulacrum of the Reagan presidency. As previously discussed, Bush 
attempted to reduce the deficit at the expense of his “no new taxes” pledge. This became 
a point of contention among the party faithful, who questioned Bush’s allegiance to 
Reagan’s ideological and policy commitments. Their doubts were visually validated 
through the January 7, 1991 and August 24, 1992 images of Bush. In these images, the 
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visual narrative of Bush as the “faithful son” disappeared and was replaced by questions 
regarding Bush’s ability to govern in line with his received political commitments.   
 Bush’s “Man of the Year” cover, read within its historical context, provides 
insight into how political time and visual culture interact to construct particular readings 
of presidentiality. Created by renowned photographer Gregory Heisler, the image is 
surrounded in controversy. Marlin Fitzwater recalls that Time’s initial request turned out 
to be disingenuous; writer Dan Goodgame’s initial request for a “Man of the Year” 
photo shoot and interview was for Bush’s “leadership in Desert Storm.”279 Fitzwater was 
initially excited by the opportunity, which seemed to be “at last some recognition of the 
president’s leadership, with a nice picture that would be part of presidential history.”280 
However, Dan Googdame and Michael Duffy, the writers for the story, had been critical 
of Bush and were in the process of writing a book about his presidency. Having 
considered the possibility of a negative story, Bush and Fitzwater decided to participate, 
intending to influence the tone of the story through the interview. As Fitzwater recalled, 
“The picture seemed like the least of my worries.”281 Although he was a bit confused by 
the precise layout of the photo shoot, Fitzwater was confident that at least some of the 
coverage would be positive. He was therefore shocked when he saw the cover of Time’s 
“Man of the Year” issue:  
“Those dirty rotten bastards!” I screamed. “They lied to me! This whole thing 
was a setup!” . . . The cover photo showed President George Herbert Walker 
Bush with two faces. The story was just as bad, giving the president credit for 
Desert Storm but also presenting his other face, the one that had ‘done nothing’ 
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in domestic policy. They even renamed the issue: Men of the Year (see Figure 
5).”282 
 
The coverage was disastrous as far as Fitzwater was concerned; as a result of the image 
and story, Heisler and Time’s press White House press privileges were temporarily 
revoked.  
 
Figure 5. Time Magazine. January 7, 1991. 
 
Why were Fitzwater and the White House so upset about this image? Greg 
Dickinson and Kari Anderson point out that Time cover images “serve as enthymematic 
markers of well-known stories.”283 As such, they have “an analogical connection to the 
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things they represent in ways that few other representational forms of media have.”284 
The image of Bush provided the public with a clear visual representation of Bush’s 
performance as an orthodox innovator, both enabled and constrained by the Reagan 
commitments. While the public already perceived his foreign and domestic policy 
performances as disjunctive, the image took this a step further, encouraging the public to 
evaluate his presidential performance and his presidential person as two-faced. Visually 
representing his presidential performance as two-faced directly challenged Bush’s 
warrants for presidential authority, for if he really were split between “two George 
Bushes,” then at least one of them was not a faithful representative of the regime. The 
photo thus condensed critiques of Bush into a single image, resulting in a visual 
shorthand for a failed orthodox innovator: the two-faced president (see Figure 5).  
Taken in the context of the accompanying stories in the “Men of the Year” issue, 
the cover image highlights the tension between authenticity and inauthenticity, the real 
and the hyperreal. By portraying Bush with two faces, the image purports to illuminate 
the “real” George Bush. However, the image has been manipulated in a fashion that 
draws attention to its fabrication. Photographer Gregory Heisler has stated that the image 
was created in-camera, as a double exposure, rather than through post-production 
processes such as Photoshop, making this photo at once more authentic (as an actual 
photographic solution) and less authentic, as the perfectly fused cheekbones and blurring 
at the bottom of the image encourage the audience to remain suspended in their 
judgment of the “real” George Bush. The accompanying stories worked similarly, 
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seeming to suspend final judgment on the real George Bush by oscillating between 
characterizing him success and failure with stories titled “What if We Do Nothing” 
(commentary on his foreign policy), “A Case of Doing Nothing” (focused on his 
domestic policy), and “Determined to Do What is Right.”285 The article sub-headings 
reinforced this view of Bush, encouraging readers to “Read His Hips: Is this Any Way to 
Lead a Nation?” and calling his “pandering to the Right,” “A Schizophrenic 
Straitjacket.”286 The cover image, read within the larger context of the full issue, 
provided a visual representation of the public’s inability to reconcile Bush’s disjunctive 
performances as an orthodox innovator.  
The two-faced image of Bush also invited the audience to see Bush as a 
simulacrum of Ronald Reagan. In her discussion of Ronald Reagan, Diane Rubenstein 
identifies the “two-headed, doubly synecdochal (dare we say schizo?) presidency,” as 
emblematic of the postmodern presidency.287 Representations of Reagan as a “truncated, 
disembodied figure” called attention to his status as an autonomous signifier, or a 
signifier with no attachment to the sign.288 As the orthodox innovator to Reagan’s 
reconstruction efforts, Bush was necessarily connected to Reagan in ways that 
encouraged the public to think of him as a continuation of Reagan. However, his 
unsuccessful performances made Bush a simulacrum of Reagan, “a pretender to the 
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throne” and the two-faced image a visual rhetorical means of “distinguishing the true 
from the false claimant.”289 Bush as simulacrum thus became  
…not simply a false copy but that which calls into question the very notion of the 
copy and the model…Copies, as “second hand possessors, authorized by 
resemblance,” are in some respects well-grounded claimants. On the other hand, 
simulacra imply the false claimant, built around a dissimilitude; its dissimilitude 
is interiorized.290  
 
While Bush was initially a “well-grounded claimant” to the Reagan legacy, his 
performance as orthodox innovator, visually represented on the cover of Time, showed 
his transition from the role of “faithful son” to “false claimant;” his performance under 
the auspices of the Reagan legacy evinced his divergence from existing regime 
commitments.  
 While the two-faced image of Bush dramatized his disjunctive orthodox 
innovation, his final cover image on Time closed the question of whether Bush was fit to 
lead. Published shortly after the 1992 Republican National Convention, the August 24, 
1992 image, entitled “The fight of his life,” was accompanied by a series of articles that 
seemed to portray Bush’s defeat as a foregone conclusion. Read within its larger 
rhetorical context, I argue that the image served to visually confirm of Bush’s futile 
struggles not just to win the presidency, but within his own party. As such, the image 
provides us with an example of the visual rhetoric of failed orthodox innovation.  
 The 1992 Republican National Convention occurred at a difficult political 
moment, in which the core tenets of the Neoliberal Regime were open for negotiation. 
Although Ross Perot had dropped out of the race, the Democratic National Convention 
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had been highly successful and the Bush/Quayle team polled significantly behind 
Clinton and Gore, raising Republican anxieties about the election’s outcome to a fever 
pitch. Bush had faced significant challenges from Republican challenger Pat Buchanan 
during the primaries and come under significant criticism within the Republican Party. 
In an effort to rally the base, the Republican National Convention program of speakers 
appealed primarily to the Christian Right, Pat Buchanan, whose famous “Culture War” 
speech garnered significant attention for its elevation of moral, rather than economic, 
issues. In the speech, Buchanan warned that a vote for Clinton was a vote for “abortion 
on demand, a litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual rights, discrimination 
against religious school, women in combat units,” which he argued was “not the kind of 
change we can abide in a nation that we still call God’s country.”291 The speech 
represented the controlling narrative of the culture war that marked the Republican 
National Convention: one in which the purported “Judeo-Christian” values of the nation, 
represented by the Republican Party, were pitted against the “false moderates” of the 
Democratic Party, which included “radical feminists, environmental extremists, and 
miltitant homosexuals” who could be “dismissed on moral ground.”292 These extremist 
messages were legitimated by the leading voices of the Neoliberal Regime: Ronald 
Reagan and George Bush. While their speeches did not echo the vitriolic tone of 
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Buchanan’s, each of their speeches tapped into the idea of the Republicans versus the 
“liberals” of the Democratic Party, tacitly reinforcing the idea of the culture war. 
  Having allowed Buchanan to doninate the Republican National Convention with 
his moralizing rhetoric of “culture wars,” Bush became embroiled in two wars of his 
own: the first was a fight to control the rhetoric of the Neoliberal regime from within his 
party. Buchanan had harnessed the power of civil religious exceptionalism, using the 
Judeo-Christian values implied within civil religion to argue for a nation united under a 
rhetoric of family values; this rhetorical frame explicitly excluded anyone who identified 
as a “liberal” of any kind and directly undercut Bush’s earlier efforts to unite the nation 
by virtue of its diversity. Indeed, Buchanan’s moralizing challenged Bush’s shift from 
the civil religious priest to the civil religious pastor, as Buchanan engaged in the kind of 
fire and brimstone sermonizing that made totalizing claims rather than leading through 
personal example, which Bush had advocated throughout his presidency. Buchanan’s 
use of civil religious exceptionalism took up the earlier “us versus them” trope from 
Reagan’s Cold War rhetoric and transformed the “us” to conservatives and the “them” to 
liberals, undermining Bush’s narratives of cooperation and interdependence. This speech 
thus stripped Bush of agency as civil religious pastor, calling into question his ability to 
lead while technically endorsing Bush as the Republican candidate. This challenge to 
Bush’s rendition of the civil religious tenet of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy at this 
particular moment rendered Bush unable to challenge Buchanan. Instead, he accepted 
Buchanan’s rendition and focused his own speech on foreign policy and the economy. 
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 Bush’s choice to focus on foreign policy and the economy in his acceptance 
speech brings into focus the second battle he faced: the battle for the presidency. 
Throughout the electoral cycle, Clinton had criticized Bush’s handling of the economy 
and focus on foreign policy, as evidenced in his defensive stance on each issue 
throughout his campaign. In a number of speeches, Bush addressed Clinton’s economic 
and foreign policy critiques, to the point that his stump speeches became marked by 
defensiveness, as discussed previously.293 
 The struggles Bush faced during the election were visually represented on the 
August 24, 1992 cover image of Time. Titled “The Fight of His Life,” the accompanying 
cover story detailed the fractious state of Republican politics and Bush’s choice to bring 
former Reagan chief of staff Jim Baker onto the campaign.294 In concert with the cover 
story, the issue included an interview with Bush and an accompanying piece of analysis, 
in which reporter Michael Kramer described the President as “Bushed, in content if not 
in tone,” and evincing “too little defense and only a halfhearted offense.”295 Bush’s 
leadership was further depicted as incapable of uniting the Republicans, Garrett 
Housont’s “Rot on the Right” article asserting that at the convention, “GOP 
conservatives win a rhetorical victory, but deprived of Reagan’s leadership and the 
Soviet enemy, their fractious movement is in disarray. Some look beyond Bush for a 
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new champion.”296 The issue as a whole thus portrayed Bush as incapable of leadership, 
failing to live up to the Reagan expectations.  
 Within this broad rhetorical context, the image of Bush on the cover of Time 
serves, once again, as a condensed visual representation of the critiques levied against 
Bush. Rather than two-faced or untrustworthy, at this point (nearly a year later), Bush is 
visually constituted as sapped of strength and incapable of providing a “unifying cause 
and an external enemy big enough to outweigh its internal division.”297 The image’s 
composition visually validated the critiques of Bush: although the headline posits Bush 
as engaged in a “fight,” he is pictured seated with his hands folded, looking calmly into 
the camera (see Figure 6). This posture is not what one would expect of an individual 
engaged in a fight. Rather, in the context of the headline and articles, Bush seems 
resigned and unwilling to defend himself. An additional subheading, “George Bush on 
His Presidency,” reads more like a postmortem on his presidency than insight into his 
plan to win a second term.  
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Figure 6. Time Magazine. August 24, 1992. 
 
In addition to Bush’s posture, the lighting of the photo also seems to visually 
confirm the end of his presidency. Well-lit on the left hand side of the photo, the right 
side of his face is almost completely obscured by shadow. Where the image of the “two 
George Bushes” presented more than one Bush, this image fails to even present the 
audience with one whole George Bush. Pictured on a black background, the shadowing 
makes it appear as if Bush is quite literally fading into the background, providing visual 
rhetorical commentary on Bush’s effectiveness and potential for a second term. The 
image thus provided readers with a forthright visual rhetorical rejection of Bush’s efforts 
at orthodox innovation during the 1992 presidential campaign. Presented as weak and 
incapable of engaging in a fight, Bush was visually represented as one already defeated, 
a regime represenative whose mishandling of kairos had resulted in his moment in 
chronos to end prematurely.  
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Conclusion 
 As I have argued in this chapter, although Bush was initially well-positioned to 
manage the constraints of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy and engage in orthodox 
innovation, he ultimately failed to do so. Bush’s presidency was marked by a number of 
successes and exercises in wise governance but he ultimately failed to understand the 
importance of using a consistent and absolute method of casuistic stretching for each 
element of the narrative he attempted to shift. 
 Bush’s economic orthodox innovation included an attempt to translate foreign 
policy successes in to domestic economic achievements due to open trade and the job 
creation open trade would spur. However, Bush’s unwillingness to rhetorically manage 
the bipartisan budget agreement resulted in the perception that he reneged on his “no 
new taxes” pledge, overshadowing his efforts to link domestic economic growth to the 
end of the Cold War. Additionally, his attempts to introduce nuance into the economic 
element of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy was ultimately rejected, perhaps because 
nuance did not accord with the simplistic narrative style introduced by Reagan. This 
became increasingly obvious as Bush approached the 1992 presidential election, as he 
was visually constituted as first two-faced, and then feeble on the cover of Time, calling 
into question not only his judgment but also his ability to govern.  
 The anticommunist element of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy was more 
successfully managed. Having overseen much of the diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union during Reagan’s presidency, Bush was well-versed in making the case for 
working with, rather than against, the nascent Commonwealth and Russian government. 
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Bush’s orthodox innovation of anticommunism shifted the enemy from a people to an 
ideology, marking the end of the Cold War in an epic narrative and linking the people of 
Russia and the Commonwealth to that of the American people on the eve of the 
American Revolution. Calling the choice of Gorbachev to resign and the Commonwealth 
to embrace democracy a victory of the “moral force” of American Democracy, Bush 
demonstrated an understanding of the kairos of foreign policy in this instance. The 
immediacy of his response, his willingness to grant agency to the former Soviet people, 
and his refusal to gloat were all indicators of Bush’s reasoned skepticism and 
hopefulness. However, as his presidency progressed, Bush allowed economic concerns 
to overshadow his foreign policy successes, muddling the narrative he had so carefully 
constructed which linked the two together as mutually reinforcing. 
 Bush’s approach to civil religion was influenced by the end of the Cold War, 
providing Bush with a clear obligation for casuistic stretching. Without the topos of 
godless communists to draw from, Bush needed to perform orthodox innovation in a 
manner that would effectively respond to the end of the Cold War and existing domestic 
issues. He accomplished this by shifting his authority from that of civil religious priest to 
pastor, relying more on his personal example to lead the people into a spirit of 
community and volunteerism. Civil religion of the community-focused, pastoral type 
was thus tied to Bush’s domestic “thousand points of light” plans for volunteerism and 
celebrated the diversity of the American community. While Bush continued to invoke 
the civil religious obligation to spread democracy, he did so without referencing the 
sacred covenant, making it difficult to justify continued foreign intervention. 
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Unfortunately, Bush’s choice to embody the civil religious pastor did not resonate with 
the party and was directly contradicted by Pat Buchanan’s performance during the 1992 
Republican National Convention. Following this breakdown of his civil religious 
orthodox innovation, Bush was visually constituted as weak and ineffective on the cover 
of Time: a commentary not only on his performance as president but also his role as civil 
religious pastor. 
 There was nothing orthodox about Bush’s treatment of rugged individualism. 
Throughout his presidency, Bush worked to undermine this tenet of the Neoliberal 
constitutive legacy, advocating global interdependence, political bipartisanship, and 
community as responsible for the success of the individual. Given that the Cold War had 
ended and the initial motivation for the rugged individual trope had disappeared (at least 
on an international level), this was an astute rhetorical move and demonstrated a sharp 
assessment of the kairos of the situation. However, Bush’s renegotiation of rugged 
individualism became problematic when it contradicted the Neoliberal economic 
ideology (which called for more competition and less government intervention) and 
seemed to call for a return to Liberal government ideology. Ultimately, Bush’s handling 
of this constitutive legacy failed as well: by the time the 1992 Republican National 
Convention occurred, he was attempting to placate the party by enumerating the praises 
of supply-side economics and increased competition.  
 Bush’s example provides us with an interesting example of orthodox innovation. 
As discussed throughout the chapter, part of the challenge of orthodox innovation is to 
maintain the perception of faithfulness to the established order while making that order 
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responsive to changing domestic and international circumstances. Bush certainly worked 
to make the elements of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy responsive to exigencies as 
they arose; however, he did not consistently do so in a manner that evinced his 
commitment to the established political orthodoxy. Most significantly, Bush failed to 
understand that kairos is not just about doing the right thing at the right moment, but also 
a matter of justifying the right thing at the right moment to the citizens you would have 
trust your judgment and authorize your actions.  
While his decision to engage in a bipartisan budget deal was perhaps ill-advised 
given the political climate of the Republican Party, it was not necessarily an impossible 
goal. Bush’s major gaffe here was not one of governance but one of communication. As 
with the other elements of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy, Bush did not manage the 
budget deal with attention to kairos from the perspective of the people. Orthodox 
innovators thus face the task not only of performing orthodox innovation in terms of 
governance, but also in terms of consistent rhetorical performance. In this manner, the 
orthodox innovator can introduce “new principles while theoretically remaining faithful 
to old principles,” accomplishing casuistic stretching.298 This requires attending to 
“complex details, the contingencies and vagaries of human experience. Casuistry 
demands that we examine the data and interpretations that surround a given case, that we 
work through appearances in order to find those that are most reliable.”299 While Bush 
certainly understood the nuances of each case in which he attempted orthodox 
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innovation, he failed to heed Burke’s warning: “The process of casuistic stretching must 
itself be subjected continually to conscious attention.”300 For Bush as orthodox innovator 
and casuistic stretcher of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy, such conscious attention did 
not occur and the process of “working through appearances” from a rhetorical standpoint 
was practically abandoned in favor of attending to the details of governance. Orthodox 
innovators would thus do well to attend to Bush’s example and recognize that this 
process requires careful attention to casuistic stretching, lest the orthodox innovator, like 
Bush, “stretch” too far and open the field for alternative renditions of the regime’s core 
commitments. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BILL CLINTON, ROSS PEROT, AND THE RHETORIC OF REGIME PREEMPTION 
 
 During the 1992 presidential election, President George H.W. Bush had to deal 
with not one but two major contenders for the presidency: Democratic candidate 
William Jefferson Clinton and Independent candidate H. Ross Perot. Both Clinton and 
Perot faced an incumbent who, at the time of the election, was widely regarded as a 
failure in forwarding the core commitments of the Neoliberal legacy. In response, they 
employed different rhetorical strategies to repudiate Bush as a candidate at the same time 
that they engaged the logics of the Neoliberal constitutive legacies. Skowronek calls this 
practice preemptive leadership, “an unabashedly mongrel vision, an aggressive critique 
of the prevailing political categories and a bold bid to mix them up.”301 As I argue in this 
chapter, each candidate offered previews forms of preemptive leadership. Clinton 
engaged in a rhetoric of preemption by repudiating Bush as a representative of the 
Neoliberal regime while advocating parts of the Neoliberal regime and discarding others. 
Perot, on the other hand, engaged in a form of preemptive rhetoric that relied primarily 
on repudiating supply side economics and embracing the aesthetic resources of Reagan. 
Although only one candidate came out as the eventual winner (Clinton), understanding 
how the Neoliberal Regime’s challengers negotiated its constraints provides insight into 
how a regime maintains dominance in the absence of a successful affiliated leader and, 
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perhaps more importantly, how would-be preemptive leaders perform articulation and 
repudiation concurrently. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I establish the rhetorical characteristics of 
preemptive leadership in political campaign rhetoric; second, I set the historical context 
for each candidate’s entry into the 1992 presidential election and analyze how the 
candidates strategically negotiated the core elements of the Neoliberal constitutive 
legacies. My analysis draws from each campaign’s key texts. For Clinton, this includes 
his 1992 acceptance speech and “Man from Hope” video at the Democratic National 
Convention, representative stump speeches, and presidential debate performances. For 
Perot, this includes his video infomercials, one-minute political advertisements, 
presidential debate performances, and stump speeches. Following this, I examine the 
candidates’ respective images on the cover of Time magazine during the election cycle to 
assist in determining how the public received each candidate’s negotiation of the 
Neoliberal constitutive legacy.  
Preemptive Leadership in Political Campaigns 
 Within political time, the potential for preemptive leadership occurs when the 
legitimacy of the prevailing regime is questioned, but not enough to shift political time 
into a new era. This kind of leadership, according to Skowronek, is “more preemptive 
than reconstructive,” and affords individuals more “room to maneuver around received 
commitments” because “it is not designed to establish, uphold, or salvage any political 
orthodoxy.”302 Preemptive leadership takes advantage of existing schisms within the 
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dominant coalition and appropriates “the regime’s most attractive positions and leaves 
its defenders holding only the most extreme ones.”303 Skowronek points to Clinton as an 
example of preemptive leadership, as he offered a “third way” that acknowledged the 
fractured state of Democratic Party and renegotiated its commitments in fashion that 
both acknowledged and made use of the changes to established government 
implemented during Reagan’s presidency. Bringing a rhetorical sensibility to the 
discussion of preemptive leadership, we might consider how would-be preemptive 
leaders use the affiliated regime as an inventional resource. Or, in other words, we might 
ask, how do preemptive candidates engage with the affiliated regime’s reconstruction 
efforts and craft a message that is responsive to the exigencies that both challenge and 
affirm the dominant regime? 
 One way to understand this would be through narrative. As Skowronek has 
argued, political time has a “narrative structure” that presidents must manage.304 Each 
new president (or as I have argued, presidential candidate) must situate their bid for 
leadership in relation to the work of their predecessors. It therefore stands to reason that 
political candidates must offer the public samples of their leadership that demonstrate an 
ability to engage with these narrative structures in a manner that is resonant with the 
existing narrative of the dominant regime. While heroic narratives are available to 
reconstructive presidents, who intervene in a disastrous situation to save the nation from 
a crumbling regime, would-be preemptive leaders have no such rhetorical latitude. 
Instead, they must capitalize on existing cracks within the regime, finding ways to 
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renegotiate the narrative and adjust the constitutive legacies to fit this narrative. Within 
the Neoliberal regime, narrative played a major role in how the public understood the 
key elements of the regime—anticommunism, monetarist economic ideology, civil 
religion, and rugged individualism—fit together to tell an epic story in which Reagan’s 
supply side economics saved the United States from encroaching communism, made its 
people truly free, and became the United States’ sacred charge to model and promote 
through rugged individualist policies.  
 While Skowronek’s explanation of preemptive leadership provides a beginning 
point to understand its characteristics, more work needs to be done to unpack how 
preemptive leadership operates in the context of a presidential election. Skowronek’s 
work assumes the exercise of leadership by an elected leader and thus fails to account for 
how the struggle for power is negotiated by presidential candidates. While we know that 
preemptive leadership is a “mongrel vision” that mixes up “the prevailing political 
categories,” the struggle over competing preemptive leaders has yet to be explored. The 
1992 presidential election is especially suited for this kind of close examination because 
it is an election where there was not one, but two, potential preemptive leaders vying to 
control the public’s perception of a “third way.” While Clinton had the political 
legitimacy of the Democratic Party behind him, Perot’s calls for an anti-establishment 
approach to politics also proved to be a persuasive alternative. Both of these candidates 
purported to understand the situation; both of them offered alternatives to the Neoliberal 
regime that drew from its core commitments, including its economic ideology, anti-
communism, rugged individualism, and civil religious exceptionalism. In addition, 
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Clinton and Perot took advantage of George H.W. Bush’s unwillingness to perform as a 
willing successor to the Neoliberal regime, performing aspects of the Reagan style and 
heightening the disconnect between themselves and Bush. Securing a bid for preemptive 
leadership is thus a careful balancing act that requires the preemptive candidate to split 
the difference between the dominant regime’s commitments in terms of ideology and 
policy, while also harnessing powerful elements of a popular affiliated leader’s style via 
rhetorical performance. 
Clinton’s Democratic Preemption in 1992 
As a preemptive candidate during the 1992 election, Bill Clinton needed to 
provide voters with an option that acknowledged the impotence of the Liberal tradition 
and critiqued enough of the Neoliberal regime to legitimate his bid for leadership. He 
accomplished this by engaging with structural changes taking place in the Democratic 
Party and using a highly personal, sentimental style. In order to understand how Clinton 
was able to offer this “third way” in a manner that was acceptable to establishment 
Democrats, it is necessary to review the coalitional changes that occurred in the 
Democratic Party during the 1980s.    
Following their defeat to Reagan in 1980, the Democratic Party was forced to 
move on from the Liberal Regime established during Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
presidency. To address their weakened status, a group of moderate Democrats formed 
the Democratic Leadership Committee (DLC). The goal of the DLC was to overcome 
the liberal fundamentalism that had caused the Democratic Party to lose the support of 
white, middle class voters during the 1980 election. Formed in 1985, DLC leaders aimed 
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“to move the national Democratic Party, in both perception and substance, toward the 
center of the political spectrum in order to break the Republican hold on the White 
House.”305 The DLC was largely successful in its goal, attracting a number of prominent 
Democrats and developing a more centrist goal for the Democratic Party.  
These goals can be directly linked to end of the liberal regime and the need to 
articulate a new understanding of politics in the wake of Reagan’s reconstruction efforts. 
According to Al From, the architect of the New Democrats, the party was slow to rebuild 
in the wake of its defeat. As late as 1984, “special interest politics defined the 
Democratic Party,” dividing it into a number of caucuses lacking a unified voice.306 In 
terms of political time, the Democratic Party remained tied to the old liberal regime in a 
state enervation and unable to rebuild in response to the constitutive legacy tradition 
established by the Neoliberal Regime. From’s DLC was the first effort to shake off the 
old baggage of the old liberal regime and move toward the center, offering a version of 
Democratic politics that would appeal to a country that had soundly rejected Democrats 
in both the 1980 and 1984 elections by some of the widest margins in history.307 In order 
to overcome their fractured status, the DLC functioned first as a “forum for elected 
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officials interested in discussing party position policy and in creating an impression in 
the public mind of a temperamentally moderate party.”308 
 Despite the DLC’s work to recruit members and appeal to a larger base of voters, 
the Democrats lost the 1984 and 1988 elections to Ronald Reagan and George Bush, 
respectively.  According to DLC insider Al From, this was mainly due to the DLC’s 
inability to advocate a candidate from within their ranks that represented the vision of 
the New Democrat, falling prey to the liberal caricature of Democrats created by Reagan 
and extended by Bush, appealing to existing tropes in the public mind regarding the old 
liberal regime.309 As a result, the core membership of the DLC became more focused on 
developing a policy message in which they characterized the Democratic Party as 
“progressive” rather than “liberal,” functionally adopting a core position of the 
Neoliberal regime by calling for an overhaul of welfare, a decrease in bureaucracy, and 
extensive investment in education and job training for welfare recipients.  Additionally, 
the new DLC platform called for progressivity in the tax code, supported increased 
public investment to make the economy more productive, advocated a guaranteed 
working wage, and favored national health care.310  
Clinton first became associated with the DLC in the mid-eighties, although he 
did not take on a leadership role until 1990, when he became the first outside-
Washington chair of the DLC. In this capacity, Clinton became “the point man for the 
founding of nearly two dozen state DLC chapters, traveling to the states for the initial 
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media blitz and networking with DLC supporters.”311 In exchange for his hard work, 
Clinton was rewarded with early campaign money, campaign workers, and valuable 
DLC endorsements. During the DLC’s 1991 annual conference in Cleveland, Clinton 
gave a stirring speech that caused prominent members of the Democratic Party to take 
notice of Clinton as a potential presidential nominee.312  
At this point, the coalitional changes prompted by the DLC had begun to result in 
real down-ballot change. Gaining control of both chambers of Congress during Bush’s 
presidency, the Democrats had a new, more moderate vision and several strong potential 
candidates for the Democratic nomination. However, thinking Bush to be unbeatable due 
to his high approval ratings following Kuwait, a number of prominent Democratic 
moderates decided not to run. It was following this apparent thinning of the moderate 
field that Clinton announced his candidacy.    
The only prominent moderate remaining in a field of staunch liberals, Clinton 
was well poised to win the Democratic nomination. The reach of the DLC extended far 
and Clinton was its main beneficiary, gaining a boost from Congressional superdelegates 
and benefiting from the campaign funding, staffing, and organization afforded by his 
work within the DLC. Although defeated in the New Hampshire primary, Clinton 
ultimately prevailed, with more than seventy percent of his congressional endorsements 
coming from DLC members.313  
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Despite controversy due to reports of infidelity and draft dodging, Clinton was 
able to secure the Democratic nomination, handily winning with just over seventy-eight 
percent of the total delegate votes.314 Capitalizing on his success in the primaries, which 
he largely owed to the support and vision of the DLC, Clinton adopted key portions of 
the DLC’s “New Choice” platform into his campaign: a platform that mixed Neoliberal 
ideas of restricted government with Liberal notions of equal opportunity and specific 
policy recommendations such as health care reform. Clinton’s platform, entitled “A new 
covenant with the American people,” incorporated thirty-seven specific agenda items 
from the New Choice draft, and no part of Clinton’s official platform disagreed with that 
of the DLC. By the time the primaries were over, Clinton was ready to campaign. He 
had a strategy in place, a large number of influential supporters, and the advantage of an 
electorate that was growing more and more disenchanted with George H.W. Bush and 
his disjointed articulation of the Neoliberal legacy. Throughout his campaign, Clinton 
capitalized on Bush’s struggle by emphasizing his moderate stance, strategically 
articulating some ideas from the Neoliberal legacy, and repudiating others. In so doing, 
Clinton was able to cast Bush as both an unfit representative of the Neoliberal legacy 
and irrevocably joined to the Neoliberal regime’s most unpopular policies. As he 
negotiated the key elements of the Neoliberal regime, Clinton capitalized on the 
untenable situation in which he had placed Bush, making himself the Neoliberal 
regime’s now-moderate articulation.  
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Economic Repudiation and Government Critique 
 Throughout his campaign, Clinton engaged in a rhetorical strategy that both 
repudiated and articulated key aspects of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy tradition. In 
his bid for preemptive leadership, Clinton was able to take a “both/and” approach to 
negotiating the Neoliberal tradition. A central aspect of this strategy repudiated both 
Bush and Reagan’s handling of the economy, which Clinton used to legitimize his own 
economic plan. This is strategy was consistent throughout Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, 
appearing in stump speeches, debates, and his acceptance speech at the Democratic 
National Convention. Through this strategy Clinton capitalized on a core issue for voters 
and renegotiated the manner in which the public understood the Neoliberal regime’s 
synthesis of anti-government rhetoric and monetarist economic ideology. 
 Clinton’s critique of “trickle down economics” was the primary means by which 
he repudiated Bush and his articulation of the Neoliberal regime. Harnessing public 
sentiment regarding Bush’s handling of the economy, Clinton challenged Bush’s 
argument that the “fundamentals of the economy” were strong. For example, in a 
campaign speech at the University of Pittsburgh, Clinton criticized Bush’s economic 
performance by highlighting unemployment rates and income imbalance, citing the 
Federal Reserve Board: “1 percent of America's people at the top of the totem pole now 
have more wealth than the bottom 90 percent, the biggest imbalance in wealth in 
America since the 1920's right before the Great Depression.”315 Further dramatizing the 
economic situation, Clinton pointed out that, “For more than two years now, the average 
                                                
315 Ifill, G., "Clinton's Standard Campaign Speech: A Call for Responsibility." New York 
Times 26 (1992). 
 169 
 
middle class family has worked harder for less money to pay more for health care, for 
housing, for education, for taxes. Poverty has exploded, especially among working 
people.”316 Clinton went on to lay the blame at Bush’s feet in his Address at the 
Democratic National Convention, claiming that Bush had “raised taxes on the people 
driving pickup trucks and lowered taxes on the people riding in limousines.”317 Bush’s 
handling of the economy was further critiqued as Clinton attacked Bush’s integrity, 
stating, “He promised to balance the budget but he hasn’t even tried. In fact, the budgets 
he has submitted to Congress nearly doubled the debt.”318  
Having firmly established Bush (and thus, his articulation of the Neoliberal 
regime) as an economic failure, Clinton continued his repudiative rhetoric by 
questioning Bush’s “theory” of the economy, which he conflated with monetarist 
economic ideology. In his stump speech, “A Call for Responsibility,” he asked:  
What is President Bush’s theory about what’s good about the economy? That the 
government would mess up a one-car parade, and you can’t trust anybody in 
politics or the government. So the answer to our economic problems is to make 
taxes lower on corporations and high-income individuals, and get out of the way 
and let the market do the rest.319 
 
Explicitly connecting public perception of Bush’s economic failure with a textbook 
description of Reaganomics allowed Clinton to characterize Bush’s economic failure as 
a failure of Reagnomics. In other words, rather than solely criticizing Bush, Clinton 
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characterized Bush as a failure because he performed Reaganomics.320 This resulted in a 
chain of logic that made the current economic problems a result of Bush’s economic 
policies, which stemmed from Reagan’s economic theory. The logical conclusion of this 
argument was that a second Bush presidency would lead the country further into 
economic depression because Bush’s economic scheme, an extension of Reaganomics, 
was unworkable. 
 Clinton’s repudiative rhetoric also critiqued Reaganomics more specifically. 
Arguing that the nation was “caught in the grip of a failed economic theory” because of 
“Ronald Reagan and Bush,” Clinton stated simply, “Trickledown economics has. . 
.failed.”321 Reiterating this perspective throughout the debates, Clinton advocated for “a 
departure from tax-and-spend economics” because they had failed to stimulate the 
economy in a manner that benefited the middle class.322 This economic failure, for 
Clinton, was a symptom of a larger problem: a failure of government.  
Tapping into the Neoliberal regime’s critiques of big government, Clinton turned 
the tables on Bush as a representative of the Neoliberal regime. Arguing that the 
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economic failure was a result of ineffectual and oversized government, Clinton also 
made Bush into a failure in representing one of the Neoliberal regime’s core aspects. In 
his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Clinton argued: 
Our people are pleading for change, but government is in the way. It has been 
hijacked by privileged private interests. It has forgotten who really pays the bills 
around here. It has taken more of your money and given you less in return. We 
have got to . . . give our people the kind of government they deserve, a 
government that works for them.323 
 
By characterizing the Neoliberal regime’s handling of government as the problem, 
Clinton adopted residual rhetoric from Bush’s 1980 Republican primary campaign 
against Reagan. Arguing that the government had be “hijacked” by the Neoliberal 
regime, Clinton opened space to remake government in a manner that would “work for” 
the people rather than private interests.  
 Clinton’s redefinition of government excess emphasized not only its 
ineffectiveness under Bush’s administration, but also the intrusion of private interests 
into governance. During his acceptance speech at the DNC, Clinton identified four main 
areas in which government intrusion and excess had become problematic: jobs, 
education, healthcare, and family values. According to Clinton, unemployment was 
linked directly to the government’s privileging of private interests, arguing:  
Your country is the only country in the world where the employment of clerical 
workers in hospitals has gone up by four times the rate of the employment of 
nurses and doctors and other health caregivers. Because we are drowning in a sea 
of paper work brought on by health-insurance organizations, health-care 
bureaucracies and the Government itself.324  
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This critique of private interests subsuming the good of the American people extended 
throughout Clinton’s campaign and provided him with a valuable means of 
rearticulation. By arguing that the bad economy and high unemployment rate was 
directly linked to government excess, Clinton was able to make Bush guilty of the same 
issues Reagan had argued against in the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections, 
reinforcing the idea that Bush was an ineffective representative of the Neoliberal legacy. 
Clinton was thus able to rhetorically paint Bush in a completely untenable situation, one 
where he was depicted as both tied to and an unfit representative of the Neoliberal 
Regime. This created a sort of, “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” situation for 
Bush, who was critiqued by Clinton for his efforts to perform the Neoliberal Regime and 
by the Republican party when he tried to distance himself from it.   
Having thoroughly discredited Bush’s handling of the economy, Clinton was also 
able to discredit Bush’s performance in other domestic areas, including healthcare and 
education. For example, Clinton argued in his speech at the DNC that Bush had “wasted 
billions and reduced our investments in education, ” both decreasing the quality of 
public education and increasing the cost of higher education.325 Although Bush had an 
education plan, which he advocated for during each of the presidential debates, Clinton’s 
characterization of Bush fed into the narrative of a struggling president without a clear 
vision, unable to perform according to the expectations of both his party and the people. 
Clinton, by contrast, clearly connected education to his arguments about the economy, 
speaking of “investing” in education consistently throughout his speeches and debates. 
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For example, in the first presidential debate, Clinton proclaimed that, “we believe in 
investing in education.”326 Clinton repeated this same line in each of the subsequent 
debates as well as his stump speeches. Emphasizing the idea of investment tied 
educational policy to economic policy; this made Clinton, not Bush, appear the 
appropriate choice for an electorate concerned with prudent management of the national 
budget.  
The rhetoric of investment was not only used to advocate Clinton’s educational 
policy but also his stance on job creation and health care reform. Focusing on investment 
reinforced arguments regarding perceptions of the Bush administration’s incompetence. 
As Clinton stated in his standard stump speech: 
…your Government has arrogantly refused to do what all of our competitors 
have done and crack down on the cost of health care and provide a basic health-
care package to all. The people that don't have health insurance, do they get 
health care? You bet they do. But when it's too late, too expensive, they show up 
at an emergency room, and those of you with health insurance pay the bill.327 
 
Clinton underscored the Bush administration’s failures by comparing U.S. performance 
in areas such as health care and economic growth with other nations. As stated above, 
Clinton criticized the Bush administration for “failing to do what all of our competitors” 
(in other words, other industrialized nations) “have done.” This form of critique seemed 
to replace the topos of anti-communism: Clinton portrayed the United States as waging 
an economic war against other countries: a war that, under Bush, it was losing. 
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Anti-Communism 
 By the time the 1992 election was in full swing, the topos of anti-communism 
was no longer available to Clinton. Acknowledging this explicitly throughout his 
campaign, Clinton undercut Bush’s foreign policy experience, stating “The Cold War is 
over, Soviet communism has collapsed and our values . . . have triumphed all around the 
world.”328 No longer able to harness the potent rhetoric of the evil empire, Clinton and 
his team had to find a new foreign challenge to overcome. They found this challenge in 
economic competition. As Clinton stated in his acceptance address at the Democratic 
National Convention, “just as we have won the Cold War abroad, we are losing the 
battles for economic opportunity . . . here at home.”329 Clinton was thus able to construct 
a new external threat, one that Bush’s foreign policy expertise would not be able to 
overcome. The idea of an external economic threat further exacerbated Bush’s untenable 
situation, as Clinton both tied him to Reagan’s outdated view of Cold War era 
international economics, and made Bush out to be unfit to articulate a vision of 
international economic cooperation due to his disjunctive domestic economic 
performance. 
 In order to challenge Bush’s ability to meet this new foreign threat, Clinton had 
to prove that the Bush and Reagan administrations were unable to win the battle for 
economic competitiveness on a worldwide stage. Clinton connected the economic 
hardships the American people were facing to the Neoliberal Regime’s failure to manage 
                                                
328 Clinton, William J. "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 
Democratic National Convention in New York." 
329 Ibid. 
 175 
 
the foreign economic threat. This was illustrated in his stump speech where he argued 
that the United States’ economic challenges were due to the fact that, “We lost our 
economic leadership. Other nations began to do some things better than we do, and their 
economies started growing faster and faster as our slowed down.”330 This kind of 
statement posed a direct challenge to Bush, whose plan for economic stimulation in the 
post-Cold War world relied on opening trade with the Commonwealth and creating jobs 
through these new trade partnerships. This also undercut Bush’s notion of a “new world 
order,” for if Bush’s vision for the economy had failed, how could the United States 
possibly lead a worldwide economic scheme? 
 Further challenging Bush’s articulation of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy, 
Clinton portrayed Bush as not only the author of the United States’ economic woes, but 
also the economic boom experienced by other countries. For example, during the second 
presidential debate in Richmond, Clinton argued that the current administration provided 
tax cuts for foreign corporations that were not available to American corporations, 
advocating for “foreign corporations to pay their fair share of taxes, and investing in 
growing this economy.”331 Clinton described the tax codes and loopholes for foreign 
corporations as yet another example of Bush’s failure to stimulate the economy. In fact, 
Bush’s failure to close these loopholes, for Clinton, served as further proof that Bush’s 
legislative priorities were out of order, making a second term under Bush an unwise 
investment for the American people.  
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Thus far, Clinton had negotiated the economic element of the Neoliberal 
constitutive legacy by dramatizing the state of the economy, including unemployment 
rates, as a failure of Reaganomics (despite the fact that Bush did not abide by its tenets). 
Clinton continued the narrative by shifting the anti-communism element of the 
constitutive legacy to an issue of international economic competition, highlighting 
Bush’s economic performance as a reason to believe that he would be an unfit leader in 
the post-cold war world. Having shifted to a Liberal critique of Neoliberal economic 
ideology, Clinton needed to create a role for the American people in his articulation of 
the Neoliberal constitutive legacy that would both energize voters and allow Clinton to 
continue his critique of Bush’s economic performance. He accomplished this through a 
skillful negotiation of the rugged individualism trope popularized by Reagan and 
strikingly absent from Bush’s performance of the Reagan tradition. 
Rugged Individualism into Southern Bootstraps  
 The beginning of Clinton’s “Place Called Hope” video, shown during the 
Democratic National Convention, set an idyllic scene. Describing Hope, Arkansas as “a 
wonderful little small town where it seemed like everybody knew everybody else,” 
Clinton told the story of a town where a sense of community and interdependence made 
Hope the epitome of the American dream. Throughout his campaign, Clinton positioned 
Hope to stand in synecdochically for the rest of the nation. The Hope trope, employed 
through a series of short stories about himself, his parents, and his grandparents, was a 
means by which Clinton challenged the rugged individualism aspect of the Neoliberal 
regime. Repudiating the idea of rugged individualism and offering a narrative of 
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Southern small town community, Clinton made the American Dream something 
achievable both through hard work and accepting the help of the larger community. This 
articulation stood in direct opposition to the highly individualistic form of rugged 
individualism and economic achievement established by Reagan while also co-opting 
Bush’s vision of community and volunteerism. In this aspect of his campaign, Clinton 
most obviously negotiated the narrative aspect of political time, offering a wholly 
different narrative in place of the mythic frontier narrative that Reagan used to depict 
rugged individualism. This narrative negotiation also tapped into the notions of 
community implicit in Bush’s idea of a “kinder, gentler America” by stressing the 
importance of community to individual achievement. 
The Hope trope prominently featured his grandparents as examples of individuals 
who, as part of a larger community, overcame struggles to achieve the American dream. 
In his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Clinton told the story 
of his grandparents, individuals who had raised him “to believe the American Dream 
was built on rewarding hard work.”332 This theme also appeared consistently throughout 
the campaign in his stump speeches, debates, and advertisements. The idea that the 
American dream was accessible to those willing to work hard enough for it shifted the 
trope of rugged individualism that Reagan popularized during his term. However, 
Clinton replaces the image of the lone cowboy depicted on the cover of Time with that of 
a small town. This is visually represented in Clinton’s “Place Called Hope” video at the 
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Democratic National Committee, which prominently featured both still images and video 
of Hope, Arkansas. Interspersed with interviews featuring his mother, brother, wife, and 
daughter, the video visually represents the argument that success is just not an 
individual, but also a community accomplishment. This narrative of the individual 
succeeding through the help of the community mirrored Clinton’s focus on small-town 
America extended his arguments regarding the state of the economy and national 
government.  
Clinton’s articulation of rugged individualism, more akin to a Southern small-
town narrative of pulling oneself up by one’s bootstraps (which included community 
support) allowed Clinton to tie this trope to Bush’s economic failures. Clinton managed 
this narratively, telling a story in which the American dream had been made inaccessible 
to even the hardest of workers because, under Reaganomics, the rules of the game had 
been changed to privilege the few (individuals) rather than the many (community). 
During his acceptance speech at the DNC Clinton narrated the economic situation of the 
American people, a story in which Washington took the blame: “But we have seen the 
folks of Washington turn the American Dream on its head. For too long those who play 
by the rules and keep the faith have gotten the shaft, and those who cut corners and cut 
deals have been rewarded.”333 Continuing to narrate the plight of the downtrodden 
American, Clinton emphasized that, “Tonight 10 million of our fellow Americans are 
out of work, tens of millions work harder for lower pay.”334 As a result, Clinton argued 
in a stump speech at the University of Pennsylvania, “1 percent of America’s people at 
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the top of the totem pole have more wealth than the bottom 90 percent, the biggest 
imbalance since the 1920’s right before the Great Depression.”335 
By emphasizing the hard work of the middle class and temporally linking the 
current economic situation to the Great Depression, Clinton attempted to persuade his 
audience of the economy’s dire state. If, indeed conditions were just as they had been 
before the Great Depression, then no amount of hard work would allow the majority of 
American people to rise up out of their economic situation. The top one percent, as 
Clinton argued, had broken the system that allowed the rugged individual to make 
something out of him or herself; Washington’s prioritization of corporate interests had 
turned the American dream into a nightmare of endless work for little reward.  
This situation represented a leadership that could only be resolved by a change in 
national leadership. However, unlike FDR, who had presided over the nation at another 
time of economic trial, Clinton did not advocate an expansion of government programs. 
Instead, Clinton acknowledged lingering individualism, advocating for a mixture of 
individual responsibility and government reforms that moved the Democratic party 
closer to the government ideology of Reagan than Roosevelt. For example, Clinton’s 
stump speeches encouraged people to “know that there are some things Government 
can’t do. No one can give us an opportunity if we will not take the responsibility of 
seizing it” and argued that “there are some things the Government can’t do if people 
aren’t willing to do for themselves.”336 Despite acknowledging that the existing regime 
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had destroyed the efficacy of rugged individualism, Clinton refused to abandon the 
trope.  
Throughout the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton shifted the trope of rugged 
individualism to a narrative of “Southern bootstraps” that acknowledged the role of the 
community in individual achievement. Rather than returning to a narrative of 
government intervention, Clinton rhetorically moved the Democratic Party from left to 
center. As he stated in his acceptance speech at the DNC: “my fellow Democrats, it’s 
time to realize that we’ve got some changing to do, too. There is not a program in 
government for every problem . . .”337 This position represented “a new approach to 
government, a government that offers more empowerment and less entitlement . . . A 
government that is leaner, not meaner; a government that expands opportunity, not 
bureaucracy.”338 Clinton negotiated the rugged individualism trope throughout his 
campaign by linking it to failed economic policies and advocating for significant 
changes in the Democratic party’s ideology by arguing for smaller, more efficient 
government. Clinton therefore changed the narrative and made the hard-working 
communities of American middle class the protagonists in a struggle against government 
excess. However, in this case the government excess Clinton argued against was that 
enabled by the Neoliberal regime and, specifically (according to Clinton’s rendition of 
the situation) Bush’s economic failures. Clinton’s promises to scale back government 
and restore the economy involved an economic plan called the “New Covenant,” in 
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which Clinton to connected his policies to existing notions of civil religious and 
American exceptionalism.    
Clinton’s Civil Religious Economy 
Just as Clinton negotiated the anti-communist element of the Neoliberal 
constitutive legacy tradition by adapting it to economic issues, his articulation of civil 
religious exceptionalism also relied on the country’s economic woes. Specifically, 
Clinton’s domestic policy, “the new Covenant” focused on domestic economic 
revitalization that would ensure America’s “special place” in the world, restoring 
American exceptionalism. Clinton accomplished this both by drawing from the civil 
religious element of Neoliberal’s constitutive legacy tradition and by identifying 
challenges to continued foreign intervention that his policy propositions would resolve. 
At times Clinton’s articulation of civil religion and American exceptionalism were 
distinct from each other but at other moments in the campaign, he wove them together 
similar to Reagan’s performance. 
The challenges posed to American exceptionalism, for Clinton, were part and 
parcel of the Neoliberal Regime’s economic failures. These failures, Clinton argued, had 
resulted in challenges to the international perception of the U.S. as a special, chosen 
nation. Clinton used specific examples to make this argument, such as during his 
acceptance speech at the DNC:  
Our country has fallen so far that just a few months ago the Japanese prime 
minister actually said he felt sympathy for the United States. Sympathy. When I 
am your President, the rest of the world will not look down on us in pity but up to 
us with respect again.339 
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If American exceptionalism can be defined as “a powerful national trope that suggests 
the uniqueness of the American democratic experiences, celebrates the values of 
American democracy, and affirms the importance of American leadership,”340 then 
Clinton’s anecdote regarding Japan certainly demonstrated that American 
exceptionalism was in question. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan responded to the 
malaise Americans felt by engaging in a rhetoric of renewal; similarly, Clinton 
responded to Bush by offering a plan that focused on renewal, albeit through domestic, 
rather than foreign policy.341  
 Clinton couched his domestic plan in civil religious language: his plan, called 
“the New Covenant,” relied on a civil religious understanding of a sacred covenant. 
Rather than describing this covenant as between God and the American people, though, 
Clinton’s “New Covenant” described the ideal state of relations between the American 
people and their government. The “New Covenant” figured prominently in Clinton’s 
acceptance speech at the DNC: “I call this approach the New Covenant a solemn 
agreement between the people and their government based not simply on what each of 
us can take but what all of us must give to our Nation.”342 Clinton’s version of the sacred 
covenant was similar to the civil religious covenant between the people and God, 
requiring that the nation do its part, or uphold its end of the covenant in order to receive 
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blessing from a higher power. Taken from the official Democratic Party platform in 
1992, Clinton’s covenant required that the people continue to strive toward the American 
Dream as rugged individuals, upholding their end of the covenant with the national 
government in order to receive its economic blessings. This argument invoked the 
memory of modern national martyr, Democratic president John F. Kennedy, who had 
similarly exhorted the American people to “ask not what your country can do for you-
ask what you can do for your country.”343 By tacitly invoking Kennedy, Clinton inserted 
himself into the line of national priests, borrowing the ethos of the presidential office for 
his own presidential bid.  
Clinton’s form of civil religion also skillfully negotiated changing international 
exigencies: where Reagan’s civil religion had relied heavily on the idea of the “chosen” 
United States versus the godless Communists, Clinton’s civil religion responded to 
domestic concerns. This was an astute choice, given that the topos of anti-Communism, 
which was linked to foreign policy and figured prominently in the civil religious 
constitutive legacy tradition offered by Reagan, was no longer available. Additionally, 
public opinion was on Clinton’s side: during the 1992 presidential election, the economy 
was cited as the issue most important to voters.344 Clinton thus harnessed both public 
opinion regarding domestic policies and changing international exigencies in order to 
offer a suitable civil religious alternative in a post-cold war world.  
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 In order to make space for his version of civil religion, Clinton had to discredit 
the sitting civil religious priest, George H.W. Bush. In order to do this, Clinton 
challenged Bush’s view of the “vision thing,” making Bush’s lack of vision a reason to 
reject him as the leader of American civil religion.  In his acceptance speech at the DNC, 
Clinton stated,  
Of all the things that George Bush has ever said that I disagree with, perhaps the 
thing that bothers me most is how he decries and degrades the American tradition 
of seeing and seeking a better future. He mocks it as the “vision thing.” But just 
remember what the Scripture says: “Where there is no vision, the people 
perish.”345 
 
This criticism of Bush’s ability to have a vision for the nation both played into popular 
sentiment about Bush and challenged his ability to lead the country in as its civil 
religious figurehead. Paired with the policy offering of the “New Covenant,” Clinton 
was able to both repudiate Bush’s leadership and capture the ethos of civil religion 
established through the Neoliberal Regime. 
Additionally, Clinton used the potent combination of civil religion and American 
exceptionalism in order to continue his narration of a better future for the United States, 
rhetorically performing the vision he claimed Bush lacked. Using the Reagan strategy of 
narrating the people, Clinton proclaimed, “We can seize this moment, make it exciting 
and energizing and heroic to be American again. We can renew our faith in each other 
and ourselves. We can restore our sense of unity and community.”346 By offering the 
“New Covenant” and situating the people as heroes within the covenantal narrative, 
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Clinton offered an inspirational message that reestablished Americans as a chosen 
people, tacitly reinvigorating the idea of the United States as a “city on a hill,” invoking 
the Reaganesque combination of American exceptionalism and civil religion. Continuing 
to perform the rhetoric of visionary leader, Clinton invoked biblical support for his 
argument: “As the Scripture says, ‘our eyes have not seen, nor our hears heard, nor 
minds imagined’ what we can build.”347 Clinton thus negotiated the topos of civil 
religion and American exceptionalism, drawing from the Neoliberal tradition and using 
it to demonstrate that he, not Bush, was capable of leading the nation in a post-Cold War 
world. 
Clinton’s negotiation of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy tradition repudiated 
one of its key logics: its economic ideology. Capitalizing on public sentiment regarding 
Bush’s handling of the economy and the effects of the recession on jobs, Clinton was 
able to renegotiate the Neoliberal constitutive legacy tradition in a manner that, 
following the goals of the Democratic Leadership Committee, moved the Democratic 
party toward the middle. This was only possible because Clinton was able to capitalize 
on tropes that Bush had abandoned—namely, rugged individualism and 
anticommunism—and renegotiate anticommunism and civil religious exceptionalism in 
a manner that resonated with the people’s perception regarding the state of the economy. 
Thus, Clinton was able to exacerbate Bush’s disjunctive performance of the Neoliberal 
constitutive legacy tradition by redefining existing policy commitments in light of 
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changing exigencies and re-telling America’s story in a manner consistent with the 
rhetorical expectations of the Neoliberal Regime. 
Visually Reading Regime Preemption: Clinton on the Cover of Time 
 Having discussed how Clinton discursively negotiated the Neoliberal constitutive 
legacy tradition, we are left to wonder: how effective was he? Certainly, one indication 
of his success was Clinton’s victory during the 1992 election. However, we might also 
examine how his efforts at regime preemption played out during the course of the 
election. Just as the cover of Time provided insight into public perceptions of Reagan’s 
regime construction and Bush’s regime articulation, it could also do so in terms of 
regime preemption. A cursory examination of the Time covers during the 1992 election 
reveals that Clinton’s visual portrayal changed significantly during the course of the 
election. This shifting coverage provides visual rhetorical confirmation for Skowronek’s 
theory regarding preemptive presidents on the campaign level. In addition to identifying 
the opportunities for preemptive presidents, Skowronek also outlines particular 
constraints that I argue are visually observable in mediated depictions of preemptive 
candidates. While these candidates pull together a “mongrel” mix of existing regime 
commitments, affording them a degree of rhetorical latitude, these candidates also face 
character attacks more consistently than other candidates because they are engaged in a 
bid to mix up the established order in new ways. As Skowronek explains: 
Shifty Tom, Tricky Dick, Slick Willy—all of these characterizations are of a 
type, a political type, not a personality type. They are characteristic of the 
personalization of politics that occurs when a president is aggressive in 
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preempting established conceptions of the alternatives and trying to substitute a 
third way.348 
 
These character attacks occur not only from those faithful to the affiliated party, but also 
from those within the opposition party who are resistant to change. For preemptive 
candidates, the battle for leadership is not only a contest over controlling the narrative of 
the affiliated regime, but also a battle over the terms of their own party. For Clinton, 
visual rhetorical confirmation of his candidacy required that he weather both character 
attacks and challenges from within his party. Only after he had survived these challenges 
was his preemptive vision validated through visual representation on the cover of Time.  
   The cover images of Clinton during the first six months of 1992 (prior to the 
Democratic National Convention) visually confirm Clinton’s tenuous place in the bid for 
preemptive control. Interestingly, Clinton was the only candidate to be featured on the 
cover of Time, perhaps providing an early signal of his potential to control the 
Democratic Party’s preemptive message. The January 27, 1992 cover of Time poses the 
question, “Is Bill Clinton for Real?” while seeming to visually answer its own question 
(See Figure 7). The image of Clinton is framed as a tight close-up, which lacks 
retouching and makes Clinton look almost too real. The closeness of the image reveals 
lines around his eyes, bags under his eyes, and an awkward bulge of skin over his collar. 
The lack of retouching also extends to the coloring of the photo: Clinton’s teeth appear 
yellowed and his skin—especially his nose—quite red. Additionally, the size and 
positioning of the text and image reflect the conclusion expected of individuals who read 
this image: that Clinton is, indeed, “for real.” The tight close-up image and question are 
                                                
348 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 113. 
 188 
 
the largest items, and those first seen when looking at the image. Smaller text under the 
question provides the reply implicit in the image, stating, “Why both the hype and 
substance have made him the Democrats’ rising star.” At least initially, the cover images 
of Clinton signaled his authenticity.  
This continued into the Democratic Primary debates, as Clinton was shown on 
the March 23, 1992 cover with Paul Tsongas, engaged in “A no-holds-barred debate 
about how to fix America’s economy” (see Figure 8). In this image, both Clinton and 
Paul Tsongas are seated side-by-side and posed almost identically; the only differences 
between them are height and facial expression. In this image, Clinton’s expression is 
pleasant, half-smiling, while Tsongas bears a grimmer expression. Within the context of 
the Democratic Primary, he expressions of the two candidates read as their respective 
feelings about the status of the primary results. While Clinton’s expression appears 
sanguine, Tsongas’s expression is somewhat bleak, perhaps indicating the meager 
number of contests he had won. (on March 19th, shortly before the issue was published, 
he withdrew).  
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Figure 7. Time Magazine. January 27, 1992. 
 
 
While Clinton was portrayed as a somewhat genuine candidate and individual 
during the first half of the primaries, this changed drastically as the race heated up 
between he and California Governor Jerry Brown. The April 20, 1992 cover image is 
indicative of the character attacks preemptive candidates face: after successfully 
weathering the Gennifer Flowers scandal during January, in late March Clinton was 
criticized for admitting that he “briefly experimented with marijuana.”349 In April 1992, 
his favorability rating had dropped to 24% among all voters. The corresponding 
magazine cover visually demonstrated the theme of mistrust. The headline read “Why 
voters don’t trust Bill Clinton” and the attendant image used an enlarged black and white 
film negative to make Clinton look bizarre and otherworldly (see Figure 9). By using a 
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negative, the publication created an image in which the lighting was the inverse of a 
normal photo, with his pupils and the space between his teeth bright white, with the rest 
of his face grainy and dark. The inversion of lighting on the close-up of Clinton’s face 
literally highlights his eyes and mouth, the areas one looks to for nonverbal and verbal 
expressions of trustworthiness. Additionally, the image is strikingly similar to the 
January Time cover that asked whether Clinton was “for real,” suggesting a 
reconsideration of the claims made in the January cover image.  
  
 
 
Figure 8. Time Magazine. March 23, 1992. 
 
 Between April and July (during which the next cover image of Clinton 
appeared), Clinton won the Democratic Primary and had delivered his acceptance speech 
at the Democratic National Convention. Arguably, at that point Clinton had won the 
contest for control of the terms of his party, overcoming questions regarding his 
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character and authenticity, to become the Democrats’ official presidential candidate. The 
image of Clinton on the cover of Time on July 20, 1992 reflects this success. Heralded as 
a representative of “The Democrats’ New Generation,” Clinton appeared on the cover 
image accompanied by vice presidential candidate, Al Gore (see Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 9. Time Magazine April 20, 1992. 
 
 The interplay between this image and the April image is striking. Here, Clinton is 
shown in natural color, from a flattering angle, with a pleasant expression on his face. 
The pose is symbolic of forward movement, as both Clinton and Gore are looking to the 
right, or ahead toward the future. Rather than being portrayed as shady or untrustworthy, 
Clinton is smiling naturally and appears happy. His eyes are wide open, connoting 
clarity of vision—both physical and political—and the perspectival difference between 
him and Gore (with Gore in the background) clearly places Clinton in a position of 
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authority. The yellow text on the cover is vibrant, almost sunny, adding to the positive 
tone of the cover. This positive representation of Clinton extended throughout the rest of 
the election, visually depicting Clinton’s control over the preemptive rhetoric of the 
Neoliberal regime.350   
 Throughout the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton was engaged in a 
complicated political contest: as a candidate outside the established order, his task was to 
control the rhetoric of preemption throughout the campaign in a manner that both 
repudiated aspects of the Neoliberal constitutive legacy tradition that were untenable and 
perform the aspects that remained authoritative. Clinton accomplished this by 
negotiating the rhetoric of preemption, in which he was able to pick and choose 
substantive and stylistic elements of the Neoliberal regime, which he reworked into a 
narrative that responded to changing domestic and international exigencies. From a 
policy standpoint, Clinton argued that Reaganomics had failed while maintaining the 
Neoliberal narrative that big government would not solve the nation’s problems; 
responding to end of the Cold War, Clinton reworked the anticommunist narrative to 
respond to fears regarding international economic competitiveness. Stylistically, Clinton 
refused to perform the trope of rugged individualism, instead emphasizing the centrality 
of community to individual achievement, assuaging the concerns of the middle class. In 
addition Clinton wrapped his policy propositions in the mantle of civil religious 
exceptionalism, reworking the idea of a sacred covenant to a contract between the 
government and the people, calling for increased accountability. The relative resonance 
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of Clinton’s regime preemption was visually represented on the cover of Time. While 
Clinton faced character attacks (admittedly, many justified), he managed regime 
preemption successfully enough that he became the eventual nominee, leading the 
Democratic Party as the key representative of their “New Generation.”  
 
 
Figure 10. Time Magazine. July 20, 1992. 
 
Ross Perot’s Preemptive 1992 Campaign 
 The 1992 presidential election was significant in part because it included an 
independent candidate who posed a significant challenge to the Republican and 
Democratic nominees. Outside of the major parties, H. Ross Perot had an opportunity to 
carve a true “third way.” Perot emphasized his status as a self-made businessman 
throughout the campaign, eschewing “business-as-usual politics” and relying instead on 
his experience with making tough choices and getting things done to legitimate his bid 
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for the presidency. It was within the framework of anti-establishment rhetoric that Perot 
offered his own version of preemptive campaign rhetoric.  
 While Skowronek has detailed the conditions of the preemptive president, his 
focus on sitting presidents has resulted in a regrettable lacuna regarding independent 
candidates who engage in preemptive politics during the campaign. Perot is an example 
of one such candidate. Beholden to neither the coalitional constraints of the Democratic 
Party nor those of the Neoliberal regime, Perot operated in a liminal space within 
political time: both advantaged and disadvantaged by his distance from political parties. 
His anti-establishment stance meant that Perot could critique the government with great 
credibility: as someone outside of politics-as-usual, Perot was not culpable for its ills, 
nor did he run the risk of looking inauthentic or hypocritical. However, Perot was also 
constrained by his position, as it was possible for those within the system to criticize his 
lack of government experience, especially with regard to foreign policy. Throughout the 
campaign, Perot offered a rhetoric of preemption that directly competed with Clinton’s: 
both articulated and repudiated aspects of the Neoliberal regime in different ways. 
However, Perot’s stylistic choices differed greatly: where Clinton offered sentimental 
anecdotes from small-town America to support his preemptive rhetoric, Perot focused on 
policy and concrete examples instead, choosing to rely primarily on plain speaking, 
common sense, and the numbers to legitimate his presidential bid.     
Perot had a well-established record of working outside established systems when 
they kept him from achieving his goals. Having begun his post-Navy career at IBM, 
Perot quickly became frustrated with bureaucracy and restrictive rules. He left IBM and 
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founded Electronic Data Systems (EDS), a full-service computer operation that provided 
data processing operations to large companies in the nascent age of computer processing. 
As a part-time employee for Blue Cross, Perot had a front-row seat to the flood of claims 
that resulted from Medicare and Medicaid. Realizing that the insurance companies 
would be overloaded by claims, Perot acted quickly and gained a contract to handle all 
Texas Blue Cross claims, later gaining contracts from other states as well. Ultimately, 
Perot’s foresight paid off. By the time EDS was seven years old, the company was worth 
$200 per share, making Perot worth roughly two billion dollars.  
 In 1969, Perot became actively involved in POW and MIA issues during the 
Vietnam War. He founded an organization called United We Stand, whose goal was to 
raise awareness about Nixon’s Vietnam policies and the plight of POWs. Perot also 
actively supported the troops in Vietnam, attempting to bring food and supplies to the 
POWs. However, he was repeatedly denied access and eventually made an assassination 
target by the North Vietnamese because of his covert MIA searches.351 A man of action, 
Perot was also involved in a successful covert rescue operation to free two of his EDS 
employees from an Iranian prison.   
 Given his wide-ranging experience and success in a number of venues, Perot was 
appointed by Governor William Clements to chair a committee on the problem of illegal 
drugs in Texas. Spending more than a million dollars of his own money to study the 
issue, Perot and his team proposed a series of bills designed to make is harder for illegal 
drug sales to take place in Texas. The legislature passed all of the bills with minor 
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changes, and Perot’s success was noticed by the next governor of Texas, Mark White, 
who appointed Perot to a state committee on education.  
 By 1992, Perot had become a political insider in Texas and many questioned 
whether he would run for the presidency. At first denying any inclination to run, Perot 
appeared on Larry King and stated that if he could get on the ballot in all fifty states, he 
would run. The grassroots efforts of Perot’s supporters paid off, and in the course of five 
weeks, Perot had more than enough petition signatures in each state to be included on 
the ballot.352  
 As an outsider to both the Republican and Democratic parties, Perot faced a 
challenging situation. Lacking the ethos of a member of an established regime, Perot had 
to cobble together a platform that would capitalize public disaffection with Bush, appeal 
to the still-powerful Neoliberal legacy, and effectively challenge Democratic candidate 
William Jefferson Clinton. He accomplished this by engaging in what Broussard calls 
“corporate populism,” simultaneously calling for individual responsibility and collective 
sacrifice to save the economy.353 Using a style that focused on the nuts and bolts of 
political change rather than the ideologically-driven positions of Bush and Clinton, 
Perot’s statements served as a catalyst for more pragmatic discourse on issues such as 
the deficit, health care, and international competitiveness. Paired with a plain-speaking 
style infused with Texan colloquialisms, Perot couched his extensive knowledge in a 
folksy style that hearkened back to elements of Reagan’s narrative, but without 
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providing the overarching story that made the facts and figures hang together in a 
manner that demonstrated narrative coherence.  
Economic Ideology and Government Critique 
 Like Clinton, Perot spent a significant amount of time repudiating the economic 
ideology of the Neoliberal Regime. Perot relied less on broad descriptions of the 
economy and narratives, instead engaging in a wonkish discourse that talked about 
budgets, expenditures, and the deficit in concrete terms, using charts, graphs, and source 
citations to support his claims. As an outsider to both the old liberal regime and the 
established Neoliberal Regime, Perot had the rhetorical latitude to eschew discourses of 
ideology and instead engaged in fact-based arguments using facts and figures to talk 
about issues such as the economy, health care, and employment rates. In Skowronek’s 
terms, Perot was neither preemptive candidate nor orthodox innovator; instead, he 
occupied a liminal space both inside (due to his knowledge) and outside (due to his 
experience) of politics-as-usual.  
  A primary concern for Perot was repudiating the Neoliberal Regime’s efficacy. 
Appropriating the epithet Bush used to describe Reaganomics during the 1980 
presidential primaries, Perot called the Neoliberal Regime’s economic plan, “voodoo 
economics.” Perot even went so far as to use a “voodoo stick” that one of his supporters 
sent him to point to the charts and graphs he created for his 30-minute political 
infomercials. Like Clinton, Perot took Reaganomics to task specifically, arguing that 
“Trickle down economics, didn’t trickle.” 354 However, Perot’s economic discourse was 
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unique in that his critique was accompanied by detailed explanations of the current 
economic situation, along with an equally detailed solution that was not reducible to a 
clever sound bite. To the contrary, Perot directly challenged the notion of sound bite 
politics during the second presidential debate when moderator Carole Simpson told him 
to “wrap it up.” Perot responded, “Sure. But to the point, do you want to fix the problem 
or sound-bite it? I understand the importance of time, but see, here’s how we get to this 
mess we’re in.”355 Rather than offer a “new covenant” or argue succinctly that the 
“fundamentals of the economics” were sound, Perot encouraged the voters to see the 
complexities of the economic situation through extended arguments so that they would 
be better positioned to understand the solutions offered by each presidential candidate. 
This occurred both rhetorically during the debates and visually during his infomercials, 
as Perot incorporated charts and figures that illustrated his arguments regarding the 
economy. 
 Perot’s rhetorical performance during the presidential debates also clearly 
separated him from the other candidates. For example, during the first debate in 
Richmond, Perot answered the other candidates’ critique of his experience by stating, 
“Well, they’ve got a point. I don’t have any experience in running up a $4 trillion debt. 
Don’t have any experience in gridlocked government where nobody takes responsibility 
for anything and everybody blames everybody else.”356 Rather than challenging 
assertions regarding his experience, Perot drew attention to the brokenness of the 
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existing system, in which the economy—and especially the deficit—figured 
prominently. Perot thus engaged in a rhetoric of repudiation that refused to acknowledge 
the kind of experience that politicians such as Clinton and Bush had gained over their 
political careers. Instead, Perot argued that this kind of experience was what was wrong 
with the system, merging his economic critique with a critique of government excess. 
Unlike Clinton, Perot refused to characterize anyone as a villain, arguing instead, 
“They’re just in a bad system. I don’t think there are any villains, but boy, is the system 
rotten.”357 
 For Perot, the system had taken on a life of its own, infusing politics with 
polarization and ineffectiveness that could not be borne. During one of his infomercials, 
Perot personified the government, claiming, “You now have a government that comes at 
you. You’re supposed to have a government that comes from you.”358 Rather than 
naming individuals within the Congressional and Executive branches who had helped 
create the economic situation and its attendant governmental excess, Perot made the 
government a thing in and of itself that could be tamed. By cutting spending (specifically 
in terms of governmental staff) and imposing campaign finance reform, Perot attempted 
to demonstrate that he could subdue the governmental beast and put things in order. For 
a candidate outside the existing political structure, this was an astute move for Perot: as 
an individual without the built-in support a political party could afford, Perot needed to 
make the government, not the parties, the issue. Adhering to this strategy, Perot time and 
again referred to the government and polarization broadly as problems, rather than the 
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people or parties themselves. Perot thus attempted to negotiate the constraints of political 
time by calling attention to the broken structure rather than its figureheads. This, at least 
in theory, would help Perot gain support across a broad political spectrum because, as 
Pew Center data demonstrated, the one thing all voters could agree on was the state of 
the economy.359 In addition to negotiating the economic plank of the neoliberal 
constitutive legacy tradition via structural critique, Perot also leveraged the economy to 
renegotiate the anticommunist aspect of the neoliberal tradition. 
Anti-Communism 
 Unlike Bush and Clinton, Perot dealt with the anticommunist aspect of the 
neoliberal constitutive legacy tradition by linking the United State’s economic status to 
the potential for destabilization in the nascent Commonwealth. For Perot, economic 
stability was the centerpiece around which both domestic and foreign policy revolved; 
managing the existing anticommunist sentiment was only useful insofar as it provided 
the potential to prop up a stagnant U.S. economy. Throughout his speeches, 
advertisements, and debate performances, Perot argued for a shift away from foreign 
policy to domestic (and specifically economic) policy focus, advocated for action that 
would promote stability in the Commonwealth; this explicitly tied international 
democracy promotion to U.S. economic interests. 
 Perot’s primary rhetorical move when negotiating the anticommunist aspect of 
the neoliberal constitutive legacy tradition was to critique the existing focus on foreign 
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policy and advocate for a shift in priorities to domestic issues. For example, during the 
presidential debate in Richmond, Perot argued: “See, for 45 years, we were preoccupied 
with the Red Army. I suggest now that our number one preoccupation is red ink in our 
country.”360 For Perot, the primary threat was at home, not abroad. Playing with the 
color red, symbolic of communism, Perot demonstrated the severity of the threat. By 
equating the state of the economy with the threat of communism during the height of the 
Cold War, Perot reframed the economy as a national security issue.  
Perot continued this economic reframing in his political advertisements. Run 
during October 1992, one advertisement in particular featured white text scrolling on a 
red background. The text read: 
While the cold war is ending, another war is now upon us. In this new war, the 
enemy is not the red flag of communism, but the red ink of our national debt, the 
red tape of our government bureaucracy. The casualties of this war are counted in 
lost jobs and lost dreams. As in all wars, the critical issue to winning is 
leadership. In this election, you can vote for a candidate who has proven his 
leadership by making the free enterprise system work. Creating jobs. Building 
businesses. A candidate who is not a business-as-usual politician, but a business 
leader with the know-how to expand the tax base, reduce the national debt, and 
restore the meaning of “Made in the U.S.A.” The issue is leadership. The 
candidate is Ross Perot.361 
 
This advertisement spelled out in detail the arguments he made enthymematically during 
the debates. The symbolism is clear: the red threat currently faced by the U.S. was no 
longer foreign, but domestic; the economic situation was more dire than any existing 
communist threat. The reframing of the economy in terms of war was made explicit 
here, with body counts equivalent to lost jobs and dreams. Further, Perot directly 
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addressed the issue of leadership—commander in chief—and transformed it into a 
discussion of economic leadership. This is a direct contradiction of Bush’s leadership, 
which was understood as foreign policy, not domestic, successes. By shifting the 
primary exigence at hand to an economic one, Perot reframed the economy as the new 
Cold War. Using the symbolism of the color red to dramatize the significance of the 
economic threat, Perot harnessed preexisting public fear of communism and shifted them 
to the economy.  
 Another rhetorical strategy Perot used to manage the anticommunist element of 
the neoliberal tradition explicitly tied the U.S. economic success to the stability of the 
region. This allowed him to both acknowledge the potential for a continued threat 
(instability in the region) while continuing to prioritize the U.S. economy. During his 
debate in Richmond, Perot argued that “…we’ve got to put our people back to work so 
that we can afford to do these things we want to do in Russia.”362 Perot thus prioritized 
domestic economic health, arguing that the United States’ role in other countries would 
be impossible in the status quo. However, Perot did not completely eschew U.S. 
involvement in the Commonwealth. In fact, he argued that the threat of communist 
resurgence was real:  
We need to help and support Russia and the republics in every possible way to 
become democratic, capitalist societies and not just sit back and let those 
countries continue in turmoil, because they could go back worse than things used 
to be. And believe me, there are a lot of old boys in the KGB and the military 
that like it better the way it used to be.363 
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The economic health of the United States thus presented a clear threat: without the U.S. 
to lead the way in promoting democracy, it was possible for the region to destabilize. 
The economy therefore became, for Perot, as much an international as a domestic issue. 
Reinforcing the severity of the issue, Perot claimed, “Germany will spend one trillion 
dollars over the next ten years rebuilding East Germany. We’d better get busy rebuilding 
our great country . . .”364 For the U.S. to keep the region on track, the economy had to be 
improved.  
Civil Religion, Rugged Individualism, and the Frontier Myth 
 For Perot, U.S. exceptionalism was of far greater import than forwarding civil 
religion. While he consistently used the phrase, “God bless America,” these phrases read 
more as typical Southern colloquialisms coming from a Texan than any kind of religious 
statement. Perot did, however, present impassioned arguments in favor of preserving 
American exceptionalism. And like the rest of his policies, the linchpin of preserving the 
exceptionalism was the economy. Presenting his arguments regarding exceptionalism 
within the framework of the American dream, Perot presented both domestic and 
international visions for the future of American exceptionalism that only he, with his 
particular business acumen, could solve.  
 Perot presented a form of American exceptionalism that portrayed the American 
individual as individually important and capable of achievement. Within this portrayal, 
the true threat to the potential of the American people was the system. In fact, Perot 
portrayed the American people as hard-working individuals, tapping into the trope of 
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rugged individualism and invoking the notion of individual sacrifice. When referencing 
the sacrifices necessary to save the economy, Perot asked:    
Will it be easy? No. The sooner we start, the sooner we’ll finish. But believe me: 
it will be a whole lot easier than a lot of the things that people did for this great 
country who came before us. I’ll take this challenge anytime, to going west in a 
covered wagon. I’ll take this challenge anytime, over the challenge the people 
had who fought the revolution and gave us our freedom. They had their lives on 
the line, this is just hard work. If we will do it, if we will team up, if we will 
make our diversity a strength instead of a weakness, if we will focus on a goal, 
and if we won’t quit until the battle is won, we can pass on the American dream 
to our children because we can do anything in this great country. That is the 
American dream: we can be anything we want to be. Now, it’s going to be tough 
but in the thick of it, think of all the difficult things you’ve done in the past in 
your life that you totally committed yourself to. I’ll bet in retrospect these are 
some of your happiest memories. These are the things you sit up at night and talk 
about. Think how good we’ll all feel when we have these problems solved. 
Together, we can do it; together, we can do anything.365 
 
Perot recast the current moment in terms of the frontier myth, making the American 
people part of an epic narrative: by calling the American people to be part of a larger 
narrative, Perot made the rugged individualism of the frontiersmen and women central to 
his articulation of exceptionalism. In doing so, Perot tapped into the frontier myth, which 
Leroy Dorsey has argued, “offers an account of how the constant challenge of an 
unknown and limitless frontier turns some individuals . . . into heroes because of their 
epic struggles.”366  
 The sacrifice and challenges faced by the individuals on the frontier, according to 
Perot, were what made them exceptional and made them worthy of attaining the 
American dream. Similarly, the individuals in the current moment had the opportunity of 
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performing the sacrifice necessary to reinvigorate the economy, making the American 
Dream available to their children. Perot thus made sacrifice and the performance of 
rugged individualism by the American people a prerequisite for attaining exceptionalism 
and being worthy of the American dream. This weaving together of different tropes 
related to American exceptionalism rearticulated Reagan’s version of rugged 
individualism: no longer was the president (or presidential candidate) a person who 
performed unilateral action as a kind of rogue cowboy. Instead, Perot made rugged 
individualism into a kind of individual sacrifice that must be undertaken for the greater 
good of the nation.  
Reading Perot on the Cover of Time 
 As an independent candidate, Perot faced a slightly different set of constraints 
than Clinton, as his depiction on the cover of Time during the election cycle reveals. 
Rather than facing character attacks or skepticism from within his own ranks, Perot 
struggled for legitimation in part because he lacked a recognizable political affiliation. 
When visually reading the cover images of Perot from Time magazine in concert with 
his campaign rhetoric, it becomes clear that Perot was an individual without a complete 
package. In other words, Perot technically had many of the pieces to be perceived as a 
credible candidate for the nation’s highest office, but he ultimately failed to weave those 
pieces together into a coherent whole. 
 The May 25, 1992 cover image of Perot begins to visually establish the image of 
a piecemeal candidate. Perot is shown full-face, but the right side of the image is 
cropped in such a manner that his cheek, ear, and the top of his head, are not visible. The 
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attendant headline, “Waiting for Perot,” calls to mind the play Waiting for Godot by 
Samuel Beckett in which the two main characters wait for an individual who never 
appears (see Figure 11). The subheading reads, “He’s leading in the polls, but can he 
lead the nation?” suggesting that Perot’s popularity would be insufficient proof of 
leadership capability. Taken together, the partial face, literary reference, and rhetorical 
question come together to make the argument that Perot as an electable independent 
candidate is a person who will never truly arrive. While his performance in the polls may 
have been heartening initially, this cover image suggests that Perot’s attempts at regime 
preemption would not be perceived as legitimate. 
 Questions regarding Perot’s political legitimacy continued throughout the 
campaign, and his visual depictions as a piecemeal were exacerbated. The June 29th 
special issue cover of Time continued to cut Perot down quite literally, showing this time 
only half of Perot’s face while the other half of the cover image was blacked out (see 
Figure 12). The headline, “Nobody’s Perfect: The Doubts About Ross Perot,” seems to 
indicate that Perot’s issues were simply a function of being human. However the half-
black cover image seems as though Perot is hiding something, perhaps some part of 
himself. The issues in the special issue made clear the message of the cover image, 
revealing that Perot was “as much of a tyrant as he was a charismatic leader.”367 This 
challenge to Perot’s character exacerbated questions surrounding his political legitimacy. 
Perot left the campaign in June, only to reenter during October.  
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Figure 11. Time Magazine. May 25, 1992. 
 
The visual depiction of Perot as a partial candidate was perhaps most clearly 
visually articulated on the October 12, 1992 cover of Time. Having reentered the 
presidential race, Perot is shown with only the top half of his face visible, his nose 
hanging over the red edge of the magazine border in cartoonish fashion (see Figure 13). 
The size of Perot’s head in comparison to Bush and Clinton’s makes the image even 
more comical: Perot’s image was manipulated to be less than half the size of either Bush 
or Clinton’s. Additionally, he is pictured between two candidates engaged in a vigorous 
verbal contest: both Bush and Clinton are portrayed with mouths open, speaking to (or 
at?) each other, while Perot is cropped so that he has no mouth at all. The headline, 
“He’s back!” is in all caps and large, bold font, making the image of Perot anticlimactic 
by comparison. Perhaps more than any of the other covers, this image serves as a visual 
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public argument that rejected Perot’s rhetoric of preemption. Without the coalitional 
legitimacy of and established political party or the rhetorical legitimacy of a coherent 
preemptive narrative, Perot was truly a man without a voice. His attempts to challenge 
Bush and Clinton form the middle were rejected by the voting public in the end, as he 
was defeated by Bill Clinton in the general election and came in third to Bush. 
 
 
Figure 12. Time Magazine. June 29, 1992. 
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Figure 13. Time Magazine. October 12, 1992 
  
 Perot’s attempts at preemptive rhetoric were not altogether disastrous. Despite 
losing the general election, he garnered 18.9% of the popular vote, the highest amount 
for any independent candidate without a party. His rhetoric of preemption relied mainly 
on facts and figures presented in a folksy, plain-spoken style. However, his campaign 
rhetoric lacked the narrative coherence of Clinton’s, instead taking the form of a series 
of policy propositions focused on reducing the deficit. By failing to provide a coherent 
narrative for the people, Perot also failed to manage the narrative structure of political 
time and locate his bid for power in the context of his predecessors’ work. A significant 
part of the Neoliberal regime’s power was in its simple narrative; by running on a series 
of policy propositions that did not meaningfully interact with the constitutive legacies of 
the Neoliberal regime, Perot’s preemptive rhetoric was indeed a “mongrel mix,” albeit 
one without a clear recipe. Specifically, Perot’s rhetorical preemption challenged the 
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ideology of “trickle-down” economics, characterizing it as “voodoo economics” on the 
ideological level and a problem of government excess on the practical level. He 
negotiated the anticommunist trope similarly to Clinton, making economic 
competitiveness a prime issue and using Cold War imagery to make his case. Finally, 
Perot avoided civil religion altogether, instead relying on the power of American 
exceptionalism to make the case for his domestic policies. While each of these made 
sense on their own, these ideas failed to resonate with each other and form an 
understandable narrative that would legitimize Perot as a potential president.  
 Conclusions 
 The 1992 presidential campaign was primarily a competition among rhetorics of 
preemption. As Skowronek states, legitimation issues within the presidency continue to 
“drive American politics toward flashpoint crises of legitimacy before wrenching it in a 
new direction.”368 Although Neoliberal regime was still in power, its figurehead (Bush) 
was called into question due to economic legitimacy issues. Without a strong leader to 
continue the process of regime articulation, the possibility for rhetorical redefinition was 
opened up to the two preemptive candidates. These challengers to the presidency—
Clinton and Perot—took different paths to renegotiating the rhetoric of the Neoliberal 
regime in a manner that would repudiate Bush and benefit them.  
 Clinton’s preemptive rhetoric was indeed a “mongrel mix” of political ideology 
as he moved Democratic Party to the right in an effort to appeal to voters loyal to 
Reagan’s version of the Neoliberal regime. Challenging Bush more directly, especially 
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with regard to his economic performance, Clinton was able to invoke some elements of 
the Neoliberal constitutive legacy (such as civil religion) and shift others toward a 
Liberal stance which, ironically, Bush had already primed them for, such as community 
and volunteerism. This renegotiation strategically affirmed portions of the Neoliberal 
tradition while eschewing Bush as its representative.  
From a visual perspective, Clinton’s role in political time as a preemptive 
candidate was predictably represented with character issues at the forefront of his 
candidacy. However, as his positions gained traction, Clinton’s representation on the 
cover of Time was increasingly positive, with Clinton eventually visually represented 
within the visual rhetorical confines of presidentiality.  
 Perot’s preemption was of a different sort than Clinton’s. As a third-party 
candidate, Perot lacked the institutional support enjoyed by Clinton, presenting Perot 
with a different sort of legitimacy issue. Reliant on facts, figures, and simple truths, 
Perot performed the commonsense aesthetic aspect of the Neoliberal regime but was 
unable to fully realize his vision for voters in the form of a coherent narrative. This was 
visually represented on the cover of Time, as Perot was consistently portrayed as an 
incomplete candidate, and not one to be taken seriously.  This raises the question: in the 
current two party system, are third party candidates doomed to preemptive status? 
Despite being a relatively successful third party candidate, Perot’s failure to reckon with 
the narrative structure of political time makes it impossible to determine whether a more 
fully realized third-party preemptive rhetoric could result in a reconstruction. After all, 
Skowronek states that preemptive individuals are expected to provide a “third way” and 
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wrench politics in a new direction. It may be, then, that preemptive rhetoric, properly 
employed, could provide powerful rhetorical resources for third-party candidates seeking 
to establish their rhetorical authority within the U.S. political system. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION 
 
 During the election of 1992, incumbent George H.W. Bush faced a difficult 
situation: challenged from within his party by individuals such as Pat Buchanan and 
Newt Gingrich, and from without by Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, Bush’s rhetorical 
authority was persistently contested. Rhetorical authority, especially as it relates to 
politics, requires mastery of a rhetor’s inventional resources. Understanding inventional 
resources requires an understanding of the past as it informs the present and can provide 
insight into the future. Individuals who would amass rhetorical authority must therefore 
understand how past discourses enable and constrain rhetorical practice, finding ways to 
reorient past discourses to respond to the future, in what Murphy calls a “performative 
display of practical wisdom.”369 This dissertation has sought to better understand how 
these displays of practical wisdom are constructed, circulated, and responded to as 
presidents and presidential candidates attempt to convince audiences of their rhetorical 
authority, locating their bid for authority within the context of their presidential 
predecessors. 
As I have argued, using political time as an analytic framework to engage in 
thick contextualism provides a more nuanced way to understand presidential rhetoric, 
including Bush’s predicament in 1992. By tracing the emergence, ascendancy, and 
maintenance of the Neoliberal regime, constructed under Ronald Reagan, it becomes 
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possible to observe how discourses circulated and were reconstituted through the course 
of political time. More specifically, I have argued that attention to the rhetorical interiors 
and exteriors of the texts that comprise a regime’s core commitments, or its constitutive 
legacies: texts that, although unsuccessful in their immediate context, gain traction as 
they circulate, are rearticulated, and responded to over time. Attention to constitutive 
legacies helps shed light on how rhetors not only interpellate audiences, but also new 
relationships to and understandings of government and ideology. In this case study, the 
constitutive legacy of the Neoliberal regime provided inventional resources and 
rhetorical constraints for each of the regime’s members, who each occupied their own 
place in political time.  
The first analysis chapter sought to identify the rhetoric of regime emergence. 
Rhetors involved in regime emergence, as my analysis suggests, often occupy a 
preemptive role, offering up repudiative and reconstructive rhetorics to oppose the 
existing regime before any actual change can occur. In this study, Reagan was situated in 
the preemptive role prior to becoming a reconstructive figure. As a preemptive rhetor, 
Reagan provided the audience with a number of constitutive invitations that became 
clear when examining the rhetorical interiors of his 1964 speech on behalf of Barry 
Goldwater: first, he employed a repudiative rhetorical strategy by inviting his audience 
to see Liberalism as an approach that would hasten the spread of communism. Second, 
Reagan made a reconstructive rhetorical move by offering supply-side economics as an 
alternative to the existing Keynesian economic ideology. Third, Reagan continued his 
reconstructive efforts by connecting supply side economics and free markets with 
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freedom, and constituted the spread of free market ideology as a sacred, civil religious 
obligation. Finally Reagan offered a persona for the public and the nation through which 
governmental transformation and triumph over communism would be possible: rugged 
individualism. Throughout his presidential campaigns and presidency, Reagan 
rearticulated these themes, merging them into a consistent narrative that posited the U.S. 
as threatened by liberalism and government overreach, a problem that would only be 
solved by a shift in economic ideology, whose promotion was the sacred obligation of 
the United States. Attention to the rhetorical exteriors, or constitutive legacies of 
Reagan’s 1964 address, demonstrated how Reagan continued to offer supply side 
economics as a panacea for the nation’s ills. Finally, attention to rhetorical exteriors as 
the Neoliberal regime was visually constituted on the cover of Time revealed a visual 
narrative of an increasingly powerful regime. From this chapter, it became clear that the 
rhetorical act of constituting the regime occurred primarily through rhetorics of 
repudiation and construction; by the time the regime had become ascendant, its 
constitutive legacies were well established, as evinced on the cover of Time. 
The second analysis chapter examined the rhetoric of articulation under George 
H.W. Bush. As my analysis demonstrates, Bush entered the presidency at the point that 
the regime had been firmly established and the narrative structure of its core 
commitments understood. As an articulation president, Bush was charged with making 
the regime’s commitments responsive to changing domestic and international 
exigencies, such as the end of the Cold War. This rhetoric of orthodox innovation is 
exemplified through Burkean casuistic stretching: maintaining faithfulness to the old 
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while making it responsive to the new. In Bush’s case, casuistic stretching was most 
successful with regard to anticommunism: his efforts to “stretch” the anticommunist 
narrative to accommodate the end of the Cold War resonated with the people and was 
accepted as an appropriate rendition of the Neoliberal regime’s legacy. However, Bush 
was less successful in his economic casuistry, largely because he failed to consistently 
communicate his rendition to the public. In addition, his civil religious articulation, 
while attempting to negotiate the situation presented by the end of the Cold War, failed 
because it returned to Liberal regime understandings of the relationship between the 
government and people. Enacting the persona of civil religious pastor rather than priest, 
Bush lacked the rhetorical authority to reorient the past Liberal discourses to the new 
situation. Bush’s lack of rhetorical authority also bore out in the visual rhetorical 
exteriors of the Neoliberal regime: displayed as two-faced and enervated, once the 1992 
election approached, Bush had not only discursively defined himself out of the 
Neoliberal regime; the visual discourses on the cover of Time had done so as well.   
The third analysis chapter, which examined the case study of preemptive rhetoric 
during the 1992 presidential election, demonstrated two different forms of preemption: 
one which successfully managed the narrative structure of political time, and the other 
which did not. Clinton’s preemptive rhetoric repudiated particular aspects of the 
Neoliberal regime, such as its economic ideology, while embracing and rearticulating 
others, such as individualism. In the process of preemption, Clinton found ways to take a 
both/and approach, identifying with liberals and conservatives alike by offering a 
“mongrel mix” of policies that, situated within a coherent narrative, responded to the 
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nation’s economic fears and imbued Clinton with the rhetorical authority Bush lacked. 
The visual rhetoric about Clinton on the cover of Time confirms Skowronek’s theory 
regarding preemption: character attacks predominated in Clinton’s coverage on Time 
until he was firmly situated as the Democratic candidate, at which point he was visually 
constituted in a similar fashion to Reagan during his 1980 campaign.  
Like Clinton, Perot engaged in a rhetoric of preemption.  Unlike Clinton, 
however, Perot relied on facts, figures, and anecdotes to build his rhetorical authority. 
Rather than engaging the existing narrative of the Neoliberal regime, Perot attempted to 
repudiate it on several fronts and engage in an extensive rhetorical reconstruction—a 
process the public simply was not ready for. While Perot did attempt to engage the 
aesthetic resources of the Neoliberal regime by using a Reaganesque plain-spoken style, 
his failure to meaningfully locate his ideas in relation to the core commitments of the 
Neoliberal regime, and package them in an overarching narrative, proved to be his 
undoing. Perot’s piecemeal approach to preemptive rhetoric was visually echoed on the 
cover of Time: on each cover, Perot was only a partially depicted. Missing part of his 
face, manipulated to look far smaller than the other candidates, or shown with his back 
to the camera, Perot was visually constituted as at best, a partial candidate.  
Through these case studies, I have shown that there are distinctive rhetorical 
moments in political time, each which have a set of rhetorical resources for establishing 
authority. Successful repudiative and reconstructive rhetors employ identification in 
order to generate appeal for their challenge to the existing regime; articulation leaders 
must engage in casuistic stretching; and preemptive rhetors mix repudiation and 
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articulation, exploiting the cracks in the dominant regime while adopting enough of its 
commitments to appease the regime faithful. One common thread that crossed each of 
these moments in political time was the importance of narrative structure: a successful 
bid for political authority, regardless of its location in political time, requires that the 
rhetor construct a believable narrative that weaves together the different elements of the 
regime (or its rearticulation) in a manner that makes sense within the current moment. 
Finding the narrative that best responds to the moment is a matter of kairos, for a 
narrative may work in one moment that would not work in another. For example, it is 
possible that had Bush introduced and consistently articulated his post-Cold War 
narrative of economic opportunity through international cooperation, he may have had 
less of a challenge when it came to the economy. Of course, this is speculation, but one 
thing Bush did not do was forward a consistent, absolute narrative of post-Cold War 
Neoliberalism.  
 Returning Bush’s initial conundrum, the framework of political time helps us to 
understand Bush’s presidency not simply as a rhetorical failure, but as an individual 
engaged in a persistent struggle to articulate the Neoliberal constitutive legacy during a 
moment when political realities contradicted many of the Neoliberal regime’s core 
commitments. Bush’s rhetorical authority was thus consistently called into question not 
because of his political ineptitude, but because he did not properly understand the 
rhetorical resources (namely, casuistic stretching) afforded him through political time. 
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In this dissertation, I have argued that there is a rhetoric of political time. By 
engaging in a constitutive rhetorical history of the emergence, ascendancy, and 
maintenance of the Neoliberal regime beginning with Ronald Reagan and ending during 
the 1992 presidential election, I have demonstrated that there are particular rhetorical 
resources for individuals occupying each of the roles within political time: repudiation, 
reconstruction, articulation, and preemption. 
In addition to providing a rhetorical history of the Neoliberal regime’s 
ascendancy and initial challenges, I have also offered political time as a more nuanced 
method for doing rhetorical history of presidential rhetoric. That is, by layering political 
time with constitutive legacies and using these theories to orient my approach to thick 
contextualism, I have demonstrated how political time can aid rhetorical scholars in 
understanding the emergence, ascendancy, and circulation of ideology. Doing so, as I 
have argued (following Jasinski and Mercieca), requires attention not only to textual 
interiors but also exteriors, including the visual rhetorical responses to presidents’ and 
presidential candidates’ negotiation of the dominant constitutive legacies. 
By attending to the rise of Neoliberal ideologies through these case studies, I 
hope to have contributed to the history of Neoliberalism’s rise in the U.S. through the 
vehicle of the presidency. Reagan’s reconstructive presidential rhetoric, Bush’s failed 
attempt to return to particular Liberal perspectives, and Clinton’s shift to the right 
confirm the political time thesis: that the reconstructive president sets the course for 
future leaders. Moreover, my analysis has shown that understanding political time is 
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important not just for understanding the presidency, but also presidential campaigns, an 
area Skowronek has as yet neglected. 
The struggle for legitimacy and rhetorical authority in U.S. presidential politics is 
continuous. At the time of this writing, the United States is mired in a presidency that 
strains the bounds of credulity, following an election where one candidate’s (Hillary 
Clinton’s) authority was consistently called into question on the basis of her truthfulness, 
gender, ambition, and so on. The other candidate’s rhetorical authority, drawing from 
stock Reagan economic ideology, is pushing neoliberal regime discourse to its limits. 
Both candidates, it seems, are still operating under the auspices of the Neoliberal regime, 
struggling over whose rendition will win out. The rhetoric of political time thus has very 
real and immediate implications not only for those who would study presidential 
rhetoric, but also for those who would practice it.  
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